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“Presidential administration” has been discussed for the last twenty years. However, 
scholars have not considered whether courts are doing the same thing. Like presidents, courts 
may oversee the quality of administrative action under authority granted by the Constitution 
and legislation. And also, like presidents, courts make policy decisions in lieu of the agency 
that has been delegated policymaking power. 
This Article draws on case law and legal scholarship, as well as work from public 
administration and political science, to construct a paradigm of “judicial administration.” 
More specifically, it offers a history of and traces the tension between the “overseer” and 
“decider” approaches to judicial administration. In addition, it explains the implications of 
these approaches for the constitutionality and efficacy of judicial review today. 
First, this Article considers judicial administration as accomplished through the 
reinforcement of administrative procedure. These efforts were criticized as judicial 
policymaking by formalists. However, as this Article notes, these decisions focus on reconciling 
administrative action with constitutional, technical, and rule-of-law norms and are thus rooted 
in overseer impulses. In other words, the decider dimensions of even the most intrusive judicial 
review of agency process have been overstated. 
Second, and in contrast, this Article notes that the recent call to overturn Chevron 
constitutes uncritical advocacy for the decider approach to the judicial administration of 
statutory directives. In the past, courts have limited their role in the administration of 
legislation to that of overseer. However, today’s formalists seek to implement de novo review 
wholesale. This effort is, at its core, a push for courts to decide policy in lieu of the agencies to 
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which Congress has delegated policymaking power or to which policymaking power belongs as 
a matter of executive authority. 
This may not trouble functionalists much. But it should trouble the very formalists who 
denounce Chevron. First, this evinces an inconsistency in their position, given that many 
have condemned what they identify as judicial policymaking in administrative process. More 
broadly, as in presidential administration, the decider approach to judicial administration 
runs the risk of treading on the legislature’s authority to make the law. To the extent this is 
the case, calls to dismantle the administrative state and instate the judiciary in its place are 
focused on reimbursing the wrong branch of government. 
For those interested in judicial intervention as a means of regulating the administrative 
state, including the exercise of presidential power, the overseer model of judicial administration 
is less likely to offend a formal conception of the separation of powers. Furthermore, long-
standing paradigms of judiciary as overseer confront the pressing issues—namely, the 
denigration of administrative due process and corrosion of expertise in service of the President’s 
agenda—resulting from today’s unsupervised executive branch. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The judiciary influences the administration of law. Courts have the power to 
shape or even direct administrative activity, or to stop it in its tracks. This Article 
refers to this paradigm as “judicial administration.” 
Almost twenty years ago, then-Professor Elena Kagan introduced the concept 
of “presidential administration,” whereby the President is involved in agencies’ 
administration of the law.1 Since then, the scholarly treatment of presidential 
 
1. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245 (2001) (introducing 
the theory of “presidential administration”); see also Bijal Shah, Executive (Agency) Administration, 72 
STAN. L. REV. 641, 650 n.40 (2020) (noting constitutional arguments both for and against presidential 
administration by scholars such as Steven Calabresi, Elena Kagan, Jerry Mashaw, Peter Shane, and 
others). Kagan argued that the President has authority to direct agency action. See Kagan, supra, at 2247, 
2250. Others have suggested that “presidential administration” is better understood as presidential 
“efforts to control bureaucratic discretion from outside of the agencies.” Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald 
F. Wright, The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside-Out, 65  
U. MIA. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (2011) (arguing that the “administrative presidency” has played a role in 
deteriorating agencies). While Kagan’s work made a lightning rod of the topic, a body of thoughtful 
literature on presidential control of agencies existed prior to 2001. See, e.g., FRANCIS TROWBRIDGE 
VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 94 (1942) (noting that agencies “acting as the 
administrative arm of the legislature [are] necessarily free from executive interference”); Steven  
G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541 
(1994); Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law in a Global Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change, and the 
Rise of the Administrative Presidency, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1101, 1105–06 (1988) (discussing the rise of 
presidential control over the “regulatory matrix”); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Agency 
Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 533 (1989) hereinafter Bruff, Presidential Management of 
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administration,2 and to some extent, the “congressional administration” of 
agencies,3 has been thorough. For instance, scholars have considered the 
mechanisms of presidential administration,4 whether presidential administration 
overwhelms or is at odds with the congressional priorities that govern agencies,5 
and whether presidential administration violates the constitutional separation of 
powers by infringing on the legislature’s authority to empower the administrative 
state.6 This Article brings to the fore the mechanisms of judicial administration, 
confronts its constitutional implications, and considers its relevance today. 
Today, courts influence agencies to engage in certain conduct or to adopt a 
particular approach to implementing the law. One way courts do this is by reviewing 
agency action. This can include interrogating the quality of agencies’ policy records 
or evaluating the processes, like rulemaking and adjudication, by which agencies 
come to their policy decisions. For instance, in 2019, the Supreme Court denied the 
Department of Commerce’s effort to put a question about citizenship on the  
U.S. Census.7 The agency made this effort to further President Trump’s goals for 
immigration policy.8 In this case, the Court began its analysis consistent with the 
 
Rulemaking]; Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451 
(1979) [hereinafter Bruff, Presidential Power and Rulemaking ]. 
2. See, e.g., Shah, supra note 1 (discussing how Presidents control independent agencies by 
litigating against them); Harold J. Krent, Presidential Control of Adjudication Within the Executive 
Branch, 65 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1083 (2015); Thomas W. Merrill, Presidential Administration and the 
Traditions of Administrative Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1953 (2015); Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 211 (2015); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The “Reformation of 
Administrative Law” Revisited, 31 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 782, 782–83 (2015) (arguing for “the critical role 
of Congress and the President in the reformation of both the American regulatory state and 
administrative law”); Daniel P. Rathbun, Irrelevant Oversight: Presidential Administration from the 
Standpoint of Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 107 MICH. L. REV. 643 (2009); Lisa Schultz Bressman  
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential 
Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47 (2006); Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, The President: Lightning 
Rod or King, 115 YALE L.J. 2611, 2613 (2006). The list goes on. 
3. See, e.g., Rebecca Ingber, Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs, 106 VA. L. REV. 395 
(2020); Bijal Shah, Congress’s Agency Coordination, 103 MINN. L. REV. 1961, 1963–65 (2019) 
(considering dynamics of congressional administration—in particular, how the legislature controls 
agencies through statutes requiring administrative coordination); Jack M. Beermann, Congressional 
Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61 (2006). 
4. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2247–50 (discussing the different approaches to presidential 
administration taken by Presidents Reagan, H.W. Bush, and Clinton). 
5. See, e.g., Josh Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 397, 425 (2018); 
Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 745 (2016). 
6. See Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106  
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 274 (2006) (“It is that open question—that is, the authority of the President to 
direct the discretionary powers delegated to officials—the contemporary debate pursues.”). Even 
Kagan herself, enthusiastic as she was about presidential administration, noted that it proceeds without 
statutory authorization. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2319-20 (“In directing agency officials as to the use of 
their delegated discretion, the President engages in such [lawmaking] functions, but without the 
requisite congressional authority.”). 
7. See Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019) (holding that the agency’s 
action was illegitimate because it “rested on a pretextual basis”). 
8. Id. at 2581 (Alito, J., concurring in part). 
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application of the Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) arbitrary-and-capricious 
standard under “hard look” review, which considers the quality of administrative 
decision-making.9 Consistent with hard look doctrine,10 the Court sought to 
consider “what role political judgments can and should play” in the administration 
of the Census.11 Ultimately, the Court held the action was illegitimate because the 
justification for it was based in pretext.12 As a result, the Trump administration was 
forced to end its pursuit of this policy just one week later,13 despite the President’s 
continued interest in pursuing this policy.14 
In another example in which the judiciary might shape administrative 
policymaking, the Environmental Protection Agency recently rescinded the Clean 
Power Plan (CPP) rules that the agency issued under the Obama administration15 
in response to an executive order issued by President Trump.16 Like the case that 
initiated hard look, Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co.,17 “[t]he Trump Administration’s proposal to repeal the 
Obama Administration’s CPP rules presents a similar situation—a new 
administration that campaigned on a deregulatory platform is seeking to rescind one 
 
9. See infra Section I.C (discussing the basis for hard look review); Dep’t of Com., 139  
S. Ct. at 2569. 
10. See infra Section I.C.1 (arguing that courts oversee the influence of politics on agency action 
via hard look review). 
11. Census Act—Review of Administrative Action—Judicial Review of Pretext—Department of 
Commerce v. New York, 133 HARV. L. REV. 372, 372 (2019). 
12. Id. 
13. Michael Wines, 2020 Census Won’t Have Citizenship Question as Trump Administration 
Drops Effort, N.Y. TIMES ( July 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/02/us/trump-census-
citizenship-question.html [https://perma.cc/KJQ2-LFXB] (“The Trump administration, in a dramatic 
about-face, abandoned its quest on Tuesday to add a citizenship question to the 2020 census, a week 
after being blocked by the Supreme Court.”). 
14. Jacqueline Thomsen, DOJ Reverses, Says It’s Trying to Find Ways to Include Citizenship 
Question on 2020 Census, THE HILL ( July 3, 2019, 5:36 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/
administration/451639-doj-ordered-to-find-ways-to-include-citizenship-question-on-2020 [https:// 
perma.cc/5N3T-SJM7] (describing Judge Hazel’s conundrum). Indeed, the President’s interference 
with the judicial ruling was so strong that one district court judge ( Judge Hazel) sought to determine 
whether “there could be a mechanism by which I order—and, again, I’m not saying I’m inclined to do 
this—the Census Bureau or the Department of Commerce to take whatever steps are necessary to 
counteract [the President’s tweets], which [I admit] is an odd place for the judiciary to be.” Transcript 
of Proceedings at 11, Kravitz v. U.S. Dep’t of Com., 366 F. Supp. 3d 681 (D. Md. 2019) (No. 8:18-cv-
01041-GJH) (ordering that either the parties propose a scheduling order for the equal protection claim 
at issue in the suit or that the Department of Commerce enter into a stipulation indicating that the 
citizenship question will not appear on the Census).  
15. Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from 
Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing 
Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 ( July 8, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
16.  Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783, 82  
Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 28, 2017). 
17. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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of its predecessor’s major regulatory initiatives.”18 It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the judiciary will apply hard look to this deregulation, as the Supreme Court 
did in State Farm,19 or whether it will take a lenient approach under the APA’s 
arbitrary-and-capricious standard. In any case, the courts have the power to decide 
whether this regulation lives or dies. 
The Court has ended other agency attempts to administer the law through 
judicial review of agency action—notably, by determining that certain administrative 
policies are illegitimate because they are not the result of adequate rulemaking 
processes. In 2019, the Court held that the Department of Health and Human 
Services’s new policy that dramatically and retroactively reduced Medicare payments 
to hospitals serving low-income patients must be vacated because the agency 
neglected its statutory notice-and-comment obligations.20 In 2016, the Court 
stopped the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent 
Residents program (DAPA), implemented by the Department of Homeland 
Security as part of the Obama administration’s immigration agenda, because the 
program had not gone through the notice-and-comment process (and because it 
was arbitrary and capricious).21 However, in a throwback to Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,22 the Court also reasserted, in 
2015, the view that the judicial augmentation of rulemaking requirements “imposes 
on agencies an obligation beyond the [APA]’s ‘maximum procedural 
requirements.’”23 Therefore, although courts can ensure that agencies engage in the 
bare minimum of APA rulemaking requirements, they may not add steps to the 
regulatory process.24 
Judicial efforts to square administrative statutory interpretation with legislative 
intent also alter how agencies implement the law. In 2019, the Court interpreted the 
 
18. Jack Beermann, The Deregulatory Moment and the Clean Power Plan Repeal,  
HARV. L. REV. BLOG (Nov. 30, 2017), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/the-deregulatory-moment-
and-the-clean-power-plan-repeal/ [https://perma.cc/JTL2-JVUJ ]. 
19. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 55–57; see also infra text accompanying note 227. 
20. Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804, 1816–17 (2019). 
21. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), aff’g Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 
(5th Cir. 2015). More specifically, “an equally-divided Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s 
invalidation of the initiative because it was not promulgated as a rule, by means of a sharply-defined 
notice-and-comment process.” Bijal Shah, Putting Public Administration Back into Administrative Law, 
JOTWELL ( June 12, 2018), https://adlaw.jotwell.com/putting-public-administration-back-into-
administrative-law/ [https://perma.cc/NQ35-XL4D] (reviewing Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin  
M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1239 (2017)). 
22. 435 U.S. 519 (1978); see infra Section I.B. 
23. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92 (2015) (citing Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524); see 
also Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/
cases/perez-v-mortgage-bankers-association/ [https://perma.cc/ML88-E4V9] ( last visited April 1, 
2021) (“The D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which requires agencies to use the notice-and-
comment process before it can significantly revise an interpretive rule, is contrary to the clear text of 
the Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking provisions and improperly imposes on agencies an 
obligation beyond the Act’s maximum procedural requirements.”). 
24. See generally sources cited supra note 23. 
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Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act in a manner that stripped away 
the National Park Service’s jurisdiction over navigable waters.25 In 2009, during the 
early Obama years, the Court interpreted the Indian Reorganization Act in a manner 
that invalidated the Department of the Interior’s long-standing policy of taking land 
belonging to certain Indian tribes into a trust on those tribes’ behalf.26 
Furthermore, efforts to square agency actions with the Constitution may also 
lead to judicial intervention in administration. For instance, in 2019, the Court held 
that the Lanham Act’s prohibition on the registration of “immoral” or “scandalous” 
trademarks violated the First Amendment; in doing so, the Court took away the 
government’s ability to limit viewpoint-based discrimination itself.27 
Although judicial administration has been on full display lately, by no means 
is it a recent development. Courts have influenced how agencies act for some time.28 
By many accounts, courts have played a strong role in shaping administrative power 
since the advent of the modern administrative state,29 and the term “administrative 
responsibility” has long been used to describe the organization and operation of 
both agencies and the courts.30 In other words, via judicial review, courts have long 
affected and effected government policies on a regular basis. 
What does this Article mean by judicial “administration,” precisely? This 
phrasing does not refer to the traditional notion of the “administration of justice,” 
which includes the frameworks of criminal and civil law implemented within Article 
III courts.31 “Administration” encompasses, in a loose sense, all that governmental 
 
25. Sturgeon v. Frost (Sturgeon II), 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1085–87 (2019). 
26. Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379, 381–82 (2009). 
27. Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2296 (2019); First Amendment 
 — Freedom of Speech — Trademarks — Iancu v. Brunetti, 133 HARV. L. REV. 292, 301 (2019) (“As 
the government explained at oral argument, striking down the ‘immoral or scandalous’ bar of the 
Lanham Act leaves the government without the opportunity to ‘restrict trademarks on the ground that 
they’re obscene.’”). 
28. LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 119 (1965) (noting that 
courts hold a sort of amorphous responsibility to enforce “the enforcement of rights and duties and 
under broad grants of statutory and ‘common law’ jurisdiction”). “Modern administrative law relies 
heavily on the premise that federal agencies are responsive to judicial review.” Robert L. Glicksman  
& Emily Hammond, The Administrative Law of Regulatory Slop and Strategy, 68 DUKE L.J. 1651, 1652 
(2019). “Judicial review of the basis for administrative decisionmaking is . . . robust, rooted both in core 
administrative statutes and in constitutionally informed administrative law doctrines.” Gillian  
E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1933 (2013). 
29. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 16 (1975) (noting that 
in the mid-1700s “courts had vast coercive power of a criminal, administrative, and civil nature”);  
id. (“In the absence of a bureaucracy, [political] authorities often possessed little coercive power of their 
own and therefore often had to turn to courts.”); JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN AMERICA: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 16 (2017) 
(“Administrative law did not start with judicial review of administrative activity; the courts were the 
administrators themselves.”); id. at 71 (noting W.F. Willoughby’s point that courts act as “auxiliary 
agencies for securing the administration of public law”). 
30. WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 9 (1929). 
31. Id. at 3. 
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agencies do to implement the law.32 When either the President or courts engage in 
“administration,” they are participating, in some sense, in agency action. This Article 
identifies and examines judicial administration of rulemaking, adjudication, and 
policymaking that stems from administrative statutory interpretation, which covers 
a significant portion of what agencies do.33 
The analogy to presidential administration is imperfect. This Article draws on 
it for context to explain the dynamics of judicial administration and as a  
jumping-off point for exploring how the two forms of administration interact, 
rather than for the purpose of deep comparison. In addition, the analysis is 
sharpened by revealing both the similarities and the differences between the two. 
Presidential administration tends to involve the constitutional power to 
appoint (and remove) agency heads, as well as via direct mandates like orders, 
directives, and other forms of presidential guidance.34 Judicial administration is 
accomplished through judicial review of agency action. Presidential administration 
also engages informal mechanisms of oversight, including regulatory review. The 
 
32. “[T]he vast majority of federal activities involve administrative agencies and people when 
they are conceived and planned as well as when they are performed. . . . Administration is why and 
where and when and what and how and by whom things are done.” Frederick C. Mosher, Foreword to 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 
LATE 20TH CENTURY, at viii (Richard J. Stillman II ed., 1989); see also 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative 
Law § 46 (2020) (“Administration has to do with the carrying of laws into effect, that is, their practical 
application to current affairs [that are] . . . administrative in nature.”). The provision of a more precise 
definition of “administration,” and of clear distinctions between what agencies, courts, Congress and 
the President do, is far beyond the scope of this Article—it is (and has been) the work of several 
lifetimes, really. 
33. Cary Coglianese, The Challenge of Regulatory Excellence, in ACHIEVING REGULATORY 
EXCELLENCE 1, 4 (Cary Coglianese ed., 2017) (describing administrators as rule “appliers” and 
“enforcers” and as engaging in “a variety of other actions—from educating to subsidizing to 
adjudicating disputes, all in an effort to solve the problems they have a responsibility to address”); 
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 
(1975) (“[T]he traditional model [of administrative law] affords judicial review in order to cabin 
administrative discretion within statutory bounds, and requires agencies to follow decisional procedures 
designed to promote the accuracy, rationality, and reviewability of agency application of legislative 
directives.”). It bears noting that this Article is suggestive and does not claim to be exhaustive. In other 
words, it offers examples of cases and doctrines that are illustrative of judicial administration, but there 
are surely other doctrinal frameworks worth considering. One dimension this Article excludes is 
reviewability of agency inaction. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
34. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 715-18 (2007) (discussing how the President may legitimately control 
agencies through appointments, removals, coordination, and “political synergy,” by which the 
“President’s place as leader of his party and patron of appointees assures strong incentives to follow 
his wishes”); Shah, supra note 1, at 686–88 (describing appointments, removals, and informal 
consultation such as “shaping the scope and substance of governmental litigation, issuing broad 
mandates via directed memoranda and executive orders, creating presidential councils, and guiding 
agencies’ implementation of their statutory mandates” and efforts to coordinate as the main forms of 
presidential control over executive agencies (citations omitted)); Watts, supra note 5, at 685-86 (stating 
that presidential administration has taken the form of “covert command [and] . . . overt command [such 
as] . . . issuing written directives and publicly claiming ownership of regulatory policy [in order to]  
. . . influence or outright control regulatory policy”). 
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judiciary draws on indirect administration less often, although it does sometimes 
direct agencies at a remove, rather than administering itself. Examples include 
instances in which the judiciary appoints special masters or other administrative 
figures to the federal executive branch35 or at the level of federal courts to engage 
in administrative tasks,36 both in order to serve an investigative or prosecutorial 
function and/or to ensure that agencies comply with a court’s decisions.37 (While 
these dynamics also have implications for the formal separation of powers, 
particularly concerning the boundary between judicial and executive power,38 this 
Article excludes them in order to limit its scope.) The President is also interested in 
taking credit for or holding out (to the public) an agency’s actions as his own.39 
Likewise, while judges do not hold press conferences, they are nonetheless more 
likely to be promoted to the Court if the public can attribute to them certain values 
that are important to the political sphere. 
A prevalent framing of presidential administration, by Peter Strauss and 
others, distinguishes between two forms of presidential administration.40 In the 
first, the President acts as “overseer” of agency action41 in order to ensure that it is 
consistent with executive branch norms and the President’s agenda. In the second, 
the President acts as policy “decider” by exercising the authority of the agency 
officials to whom the power to administer the law has been delegated by Congress.42 
The former is, to many, a comfortably constitutional exercise of presidential 
 
35. See Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397–99 (1879) (holding that court appointment of 
federal marshals, who are executive officers, is constitutional under the Appointments 
Clause); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988) (alteration in original) (quoting Siebold, 100  
U.S. at 397) (comparing the Court’s interbranch appointment of independent counsel to the 
“appointment of federal marshals, who are ‘executive officer[s]’”). 
36. For example, the Chief Justice has broad authority to appoint administrative support in the 
judiciary. 28 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1); id. § 624; James E. Pfander, The Chief Justice, the Appointment of Inferior 
Officers, and the “Court of Law” Requirement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1125, 1132 (2013) (citing the same 
statutes in support of the Chief Justice’s appointment power). 
37. See Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (upholding 
the appointment of private attorneys to act as prosecutors in judicial contempt trials); Nicholas  
R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt 
Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 704–06 (2018) (noting that judges often seek to compel agencies to 
comply with judicial decisions by issuing contempt filings, among other tools). 
38. See Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 
STAN. L. REV. 661, 662 (1978) (arguing that courts violate the separation of powers by “appointing 
executive and quasi-executive officers responsible to the judiciary and by determining administrative 
processes in elaborately detailed decrees”). 
39. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2250 (discussing how President Clinton sought to take credit for 
the Food and Drug Administration’s anti-tobacco initiatives). 
40. Strauss, supra note 34, at 696-97. 
41. Id. at 715-18. 
42. Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1205 
(2013) (describing this model as one in which the President “step[s] directly into the shoes of the 
relevant official”); Watts, supra note 5, at 729 (“Kagan has won. Presidential directive authority with 
respect to executive agencies is alive and well.”). 
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power.43 The latter is more controversial, in that it evinces the President exercising 
agency policymaking authority despite the delegation of that authority by Congress 
to agencies themselves.44 In both cases, the President tends to be motivated by an 
interest in pursuing her preferred policy interests. 
Courts, too, administer the law as overseers and deciders.45 As to the former, 
the judiciary oversees the extent to which agency action is consistent with 
constitutional norms and the legislature’s agenda. As to the latter, courts sometimes 
engage in policymaking themselves. The latter raises the question, similarly raised 
by presidential engagement in the decider model, as to whether the courts are 
infringing on the legislature from a formal separation-of-powers perspective. In 
either case, courts might, like the President, seek particular ends or, unlike the 
President, seek to further legal values and norms. The line distinguishing overseer 
from decider does not follow strictly the boundaries between determinations to 
defer or not or those that separate procedural and substantive review. Rather, the 
dividing line is, loosely, whether the court is an enforcer of the rule of law or a 
director of policymaking outcomes. 
To be clear, the decider approach to judicial administration is not necessarily 
more interventionist. Indeed, the judiciary may significantly influence what agencies 
do while it promotes administrative adherence to constitutional and rule-of-law 
norms. Thus, even the overseer model may have a great impact on administrative 
policy outcomes and even appear to nitpick mere procedural defects in order to 
make substantive policy. The distinction between the two lies, as a theoretical 
matter, in judicial intent. In the overseer approach, the court seeks to uphold 
constitutional and other administrative law values. The court’s knowledge that this 
may change the agency’s policy outcome is distinct from the court’s goal, which is 
 
43. See, e.g., Watts, supra note 5, at 730 (suggesting that the President may make “suggestions” 
that serve “as relevant decisional factors without violating Congress’s intent”); Harold H. Bruff, 
Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 461, 490 (2010) (suggesting that 
“basic supervisory relationships” between the President and agencies could foster more sound policy 
in a constitutional manner). 
44. See Vermeule, supra note 42, at 1205 (“On this view, grants of discretion to the heads of 
executive agencies are presumptively to be read as authorizing presidential direction as a formal legal 
matter.”); Strauss, supra note 34 (discussing and arguing against the decider model of presidential 
administration); Stack, supra note 6, at 263 (arguing “the President has statutory authority to direct the 
administration of the laws only under statutes that grant to the President in name”); Merrill, supra note 
2, at 1977 (suggesting the decider model of presidential administration relies on a “constitutional order 
in which the President exercises autonomous policymaking authority without the need for any 
delegation of power from Congress, at least for the duration of the presidential administration”). But 
see Strauss, supra note 34, at 757 (noting that in “the connection of agency priorities as a general matter 
to the President’s program, and the ordinary opacity even of agency judgments about such 
matters . . . one might find considerably greater room for the presumption of directorial authority for 
which Dean Kagan and others argue”). 
45. As Harold Bruff notes, there is a distinction between the judiciary determining “whether 
the action was selected by fair procedures within constitutional and statutory limits and whether the 
action was substantively reasonable,” and the possibility of courts “supplant[ing] administrative 
discretion over policy matters by substituting judicial judgment for that of an agency.” Bruff, Presidential 
Power and Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 459. 
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to ensure compliance with transcendent norms. In the decider approach, the court’s 
interest lies directly in shaping the substance of the precise policy at issue. 
This distinction between the two models may be difficult to perceive. Just as 
Strauss has noted with regard to presidential administration,46 the overseer model 
of judicial administration may bleed into the decider model. For instance, in some 
cases, strong judicial intervention under the overseer approach may appear to be 
purposivist,47 a consideration this Article grapples with throughout. Indeed, this 
tension in judicial administration is reflected by consistent disagreement concerning 
the extent to which any exercise of judicial review is, in fact, an articulation of 
policymaking power otherwise assigned to agencies by the legislature or as inherent 
to agencies’ placement in the executive branch. 
This Article considers the overseer and decider approaches as they have 
appeared along two vectors of judicial administration: judicial review that seeks 
accountability to “due process and rule-of-law values on the one hand” and judicial 
review that seeks “accountability [to legislative intent] on the other.”48 
The purpose of judicial review of agency procedure has included persuading 
agencies to adhere to administrative due process49 and norms of fairness and 
accessibility in rulemaking,50 as well as encouraging agency policymaking based in 
reasoned expertise.51 In this context, formalist commentators, including on the 
Supreme Court, have characterized and condemned judicial review as judicial 
policymaking—in other words, on the grounds that courts have engaged legislative 
or executive power and thus furthered the decider model of judicial 
administration.52 This Article argues that, in contrast, these doctrines remain solidly 
based in overseer impulses because they are motivated by courts’ constitutional duty 
to ensure fair and adequate process. 
The overseer approach has also been the courts’ preferred model of reviewing 
agency statutory interpretation. In this form of judicial administration, courts 
oversee agency fidelity to legislative intent. And yet this modality, too, allows for 
the decider approach. Here, too, a court may sometimes adopt the legislative or 
 
46. Strauss, supra note 34, at 704 (“The difference between oversight and decision can  
be subtle . . . .”). 
47. Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological 
Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1764 (2010) (“Purposivists [endorse] 
a more expansive judicial role in statutory interpretation, in which courts act in partnership with the 
legislature in the elaboration of statutory meaning. As a result . . . purposivists generally feel freer to go 
beyond the confines of statutory text and will not necessarily find that text trumps contradictory 
evidence of purpose.”). 
48. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107  
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1750 (2007). 
49. See infra Section I.A. 
50. See infra Section I.B. 
51. See infra Section I.C. 
52. See generally infra Part I. 
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executive policymaking authority delegated to agencies by making policy 
decisions itself.53 
While the decider dimensions of the judicial review of agency procedures have 
been overstated, they are overlooked today in regard to the judicial control of 
administrative statutory interpretation. Today’s formalists argue for the elimination 
of Chevron54 and for courts to be installed as the sole arbiters of administrative 
statutory implementation.55 Advocacy for this approach signals an unexamined turn 
toward the decider model of judicial administration, as a systemic matter, but 
primarily within the context of statutory interpretation. By taking this position, 
formalists emphasize bolstering the judicial branch, rather than reinstating 
administrative power in the legislative branch, as would seem to support better the 
position of those decrying the functional nature of the nondelegation doctrine. In 
addition, even those formalists who assert that Congress should engage more 
wholesale in the nuances of regulation may be overlooking the extent to which a 
seemingly complementary expansion of judicial power could likewise infringe on 
the legislature in a formalist paradigm of the separation of powers. 
Overall, this Article offers a comprehensive framework of judicial 
administration and explores how this framework bears on the importance of judicial 
review to the legitimacy of the administrative state. Throughout, the Article threads 
its account with a discussion of the legal paradigms—including administrative 
adjudication, rulemaking, hard look review, the nondelegation doctrine, and 
Chevron—that are focal points of Kagan’s seminal Presidential Administration,56 
among many other articles on the topic. These paradigms have given rise to and 
continue to shape not only presidential administration, but also, as this Article will 
illustrate, judicial administration. 
This Article does not evaluate whether the cases it discusses were decided 
correctly. By furthering certain administrative outcomes, judicial administration 
might hinder the machinery of the administrative state—or improve it, as the case 
may be. Accordingly, the Article’s use of the term overseer or decider for a particular 
approach to judicial administration is not meant to be complimentary or 
derogatory,57 but rather, descriptive. 
 
53. See infra Part II. 
54. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
55. See Harold J. Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of Powers Controversies, 74  
VA. L. REV. 1253 (1988). 
56. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2263-83. 
57. Cf. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-80 (1982) (using the term 
“managerial judges” critically). For instance, this Article does not assert that judicial administration is 
necessarily shaped by underlying political or constitutional ideologies held by the courts, even though 
it may be. An example of this normative approach is the assertion that anti-administrativists are 
interested in increasing judicial oversight precisely because it would curb agency action but not agency 
inaction. See, e.g., Daniel E. Walters, Symmetry’s Mandate: Constraining the Politicization of American 
Administrative Law, 119 MICH. L. REV. 455, 499 (2020); Sidney A. Shapiro, Rulemaking Inaction and 
the Failure of Administrative Law, 68 DUKE L.J. 1805 (2019). Another example involves claims of 
judicial “activism,” a label denouncing judicial review as motivated by goals inapposite to nonpartisan 
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However, this Article does note that frameworks of judicial administration 
have normative implications for the ongoing discussion regarding the 
constitutionality of the administrative state. Some formalists58 apply the 
“externalist” account of the administrative state59 to argue that agencies are 
illegitimate. More specifically, they contend that agencies are unconstitutional 
because they exercise discretion in the implementation of law.60 Furthermore, they 
often suggest that this discretion should be shifted into the hands of courts to 
remedy the constitutional transgression.61 
Functionalists62 are less troubled by administrative power. These scholars 
admit that agencies wield a fair amount of clout63 and that Congress could do more 
 
judicial review. See Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of “Judicial 
Activism,” 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1441, 1471-73 (2004) (defining judicial activism as “judicial legislation”). 
58. Those adhering to a formalist approach . . . argue that the key to separation of powers 
disputes lies in determining whether the challenged action should be characterized as lawmaking, in 
which case the power is to remain in the province of the legislature; as enforcing the law, in which case 
it is to remain the prerogative of the executive branch; or as interpreting the law, in which case it falls 
within the domain of the judiciary. Krent, supra note 55, at 1254. 
59. Per this view, the expansion of agencies as a result of the New Deal was the result of a 
political loss for the courts. See Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, Engineering the Modern 
Administrative State, Part I: Political Accommodation and Legal Strategy in the New Deal Era  
(Nw. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 19-03, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335114 [https://perma.cc/9J8S-YFRH]. 
60. “This judicial skepticism of administrative government, which [Gillan Metzger has] labeled 
anti-administrativism, is heavily constitutional, marked by a formalist and originalist approach to the 
separation of powers [and] a deep distrust of bureaucracy . . . .” Gillian E. Metzger, The Roberts Court 
and Administrative Law, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (2019) [hereinafter Metzger, The Roberts Court ]. Critics 
of the administrative state “paint the administrative state as fundamentally at odds with the 
Constitution’s separation of powers system, combining together in agencies the legislative, executive, 
and judicial authorities that the Constitution vests in different branches and producing unaccountable 
and aggrandized power in the process.” Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term 
—Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017) 
[hereinafter Metzger, 1930s Redux]; id. at 34 (noting that anti-administrativists have “a rhetorical and 
almost visceral resistance to an administrative government perceived to be running amok . . . and a 
heavy constitutional overlay, wherein the contemporary administrative state is portrayed as at odds with 
the basic constitutional structure and the original understanding of separation of powers”); see,  
e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 2-4 (2014) (introducing his 
argument that agencies are unconstitutional); Philip Hamburger, Vermeule Unbound, 94  
TEX. L. REV. 205, 206-08 (2016) (arguing that administrative agencies exercise “absolute  
power” unconstitutionally). 
61. “Anti-administrativism” is defined, in part, by “a strong turn to the courts as the means to 
curb administrative power.” Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 60, at 34. 
62. “[T]hose adhering to a functionalist view of separation of powers . . . argue that, given the 
rise of the administrative state, it is impossible to distinguish the branches based on the type of acts 
they perform. Each branch acts in a variety of ways—making rules, interpreting rules, and applying 
them in a myriad of contexts.” Krent, supra note 55, at 1254–55. 
63. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Executive Branch, Administrative Action, and Comparative 
Expertise, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2189, 2190 (2011) (“Agencies (and here I include virtually all civil 
executive branch agencies, bureaus, and departments) typically possess great power.”); Steven Reed 
Armstrong, The Argument for Agency Self-Enforcement of Discovery Orders, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 215,  
222–23 (1983) (“For instance, agencies promulgate rules, grant and terminate a variety of government 
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to articulate clear directives for agencies.64 Nonetheless, they accept that, by now, 
the United States and most working governments have conceded to some form of 
an administrative state to accomplish their goals.65 This view cares, primarily, that 
agencies exercise their discretion effectively with the aid of judicial oversight and 
that the judiciary not interfere with the workings of agencies as a functional matter.66 
The debate between formalists and functionalists is focused primarily on 
seeking appropriate boundaries to agency autonomy. However, it neglects to 
consider whether there are formal limits to the judiciary’s power over the 
administrative state, given that agencies are conduits for the legislative and the 
executive branches. First, both sides assume that courts act only “judicially,” as a 
descriptive matter, no matter the breadth or tenor of their control over agency 
policymaking. Second, both take for granted that the Constitution allows for the 
increase of judicial review ad infinitum to strengthen limits to what agencies can  
do (even though functionalists disagree as to whether this is advisable as a  
functional matter). 
In contrast to this focus on the limits of administrative activity, this Article 
contributes a framework for evaluating the contours of, and potential limits to, the 
judicial review of administrative activity. In many ways, this Article reaffirms the 
“internalist” account of administrative law67 by arguing that there is legitimacy to 
agency autonomy vis-à-vis the courts. More specifically, it introduces the idea 
 
benefits, fix rates, grant and deny professional licenses, impose penalties, and terminate employment 
without prior federal court approval.”). 
64. See Gillian Metzger, Stanley H. Fuld Professor of L., Fac. Dir., Ctr. for Const. Governance, 
Columbia L. Sch., Panel at the 2019 ABA Administrative Law Conference: The Nondelegation 
Doctrine After Gundy: Is the ‘Intelligible Principle’ Standard an Intelligible Principle? (Nov. 14, 2019) 
(conceding that Congress could be more specific in its delegations, while also noting that there are 
other tools, like appropriations, investigations and the like, that Congress can use to exercise 
administrative oversight). But see Ernst Freund, The Substitution of Rule for Discretion in Public Law, 9 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 666, 669 (1915) (arguing that some legislation is quite specific and that agencies 
are, in any case, better suited to plan regulatory programs). 
65. Ernst Freund, The Law of the Administration in America, 9 POL. SCI. Q. 403, 424 (1894) 
(“[T]he strength of the government must grow with the expansion of its functions.”); Roscoe Pound, 
Executive Justice, 55 AM. L. REG. 137, 146 (1907) (“Legislatures are pouring out an ever-increasing 
volume of laws. The old judicial machinery has been found inadequate to enforce them. . . . If we are 
to be spared a return to oriental justice . . . the profession and the courts must take up vigorously and 
fearlessly the problem of to-day¾how to administer the law to meet the demands of the world  
that is.”). 
66. For instance, scholars argue that judicial review may cause ossification in agencies. See Jason 
Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of 
Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1425-28 (2012) 
(discussing various functionalist scholars’ views on judicial ossification); see, e.g., Richard J. Pierce  
Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59 (1995); Thomas O. McGarity, 
Some Thoughts on Deossifying the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992). Many also critique 
courts’ institutional competency vis-à-vis agencies in matters of expertise. Infra note 274. 
67. This position asserts that the current administrative state developed as a result of 
incremental doctrinal change, as opposed to merely shifting political winds. For a comprehensive 
treatment of this view, see Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 59. Note the authors make a cogent 
argument that neither the externalist nor the internalist view tells the whole story. Id. 
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that—just like the President68—courts could overstep their role as a formal matter 
when behaving as policymaking deciders. In addition, it suggests that the Supreme 
Court has abdicated its role as overseer of constitutional norms, particularly in 
acquiescence to presidential administration. 
Finally, this Article acknowledges implicitly throughout that Congress’s role as 
overseer and decider is both complementary to, and in tension with, the judicial 
model this Article explicates. On the one hand, the legislature’s claim to the role of 
overseer has been overstated in many cases, particularly by those who accuse the 
judiciary of engaging in “judicial activism” when it engages its duty to maintain the 
requirements of the Constitution. On the other hand, courts’ behavior as deciders 
of statutory meaning obscures the fact that the legislature serves as the foundation 
of administrative policymaking and that it has the authority to delegate policymaking 
functions to agencies without garnering outsized intervention from the courts. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I offers an account of the judicial 
administration of agency processes, whereby courts impose procedural 
requirements to improve compliance with constitutional or other rule-of-law 
norms. The concerns confronted by this Part include the requirements of due 
process in agency hearings and adjudication, as sustained by fair and publicly 
accessible rulemaking and as supported by the quality of agency expertise. 
Commentators, including the Supreme Court itself, have suggested that judicial 
review of these matters is a vehicle for judicial usurpation of legislative or executive 
policymaking. This Part argues that, as powerful as judicial intervention in these 
cases may be, it is rooted in the oversight model of judicial administration as 
opposed to a judicial fixation on policy outcomes. 
Part II explores the judicial administration of statutory directives. The 
judiciary’s role in this context is founded in the overseer approach as well, in that 
courts have maintained distance from agency policymaking. However, this Part 
argues that recent efforts to alter the application of, or eliminate, Chevron constitute 
an affirmation of the decider model of judicial administration. This Part defends its 
claim on three fronts: first, by suggesting that judicial restraint has historical 
underpinnings; second, by recounting how Chevron, which made explicit the custom 
of judicial restraint, nonetheless provides ample opportunity for courts to maintain 
ownership of statutory interpretation; and third, by illustrating, in great depth, how 
the decider approach to judicial review of the implementation of statutes has come 
to fruition under an evolving application of Chevron. In this way, scholars who 
 
68. See Strauss, supra note 34, at 704-705 (“As in earlier scholarship, my own conclusion is that 
in ordinary administrative law contexts, where Congress has assigned a function to a named agency 
subject to its oversight and the discipline of judicial review, the President’s role—like that of the 
Congress and the courts—is that of overseer and not decider.” (footnote omitted)). “Perhaps a stronger 
case for the President as ‘the decider’ in ordinary administration arises in contexts where we do not 
expect judicial review, a developed record for administrative action, relatively formal administrative 
process, or [Freedom of Information Act] transparency.” Id. at 757-59 (discussing topics under the 
heading “The President as Decider on Issues of Priority”). 
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discredit the legitimacy of the administrative state do so at the risk of allowing the 
judiciary to infringe on the very branch, the legislature, that these commentators 
seek to protect. 
Part III concludes the Article by considering how judicial administration 
impacts the constitutionality of agencies. Just as the decider model of presidential 
administration does for the President, the decider model of judicial administration 
allows courts to act in the place of agency administrators. This cautions against 
uncritical advocacy for the decider model of judicial administration, particularly for 
those concerned with the legitimacy of the administrative state under a formal 
separation-of-powers paradigm. After all, from a formalist perspective, courts 
engaging in the decider model of judicial statutory interpretation are impermissibly 
exercising the policymaking power that has been delegated to agencies by the 
legislature (notwithstanding formalist concerns with the exercise of legislative 
power by agencies) or that exists as part of agencies’ role in the executive branch. 
For those interested in judicial intervention as a means of regulating a powerful 
executive branch,69 reinforcement of the overseer model of judicial administration 
would limit potential separation-of-powers repercussions and allow courts to 
contend with the most pressing problems caused by today’s administrative state. 
I. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
The President exercises control over processes of administration, both as 
overseer70 and as decider.71 This Part discusses cases in which the judiciary 
administers agency processes and characterizes these cases as doctrines of oversight. 
In the process, this Part both marks and refutes a prevalent formalist 
characterization of these decisions as infringing on the legislature’s or agencies’ own 
policymaking domain. None of these are easy decisions to parse, and there are 
thoughtful arguments suggesting that courts have engaged in policymaking within 
this paradigm. But the essential judicial motivation underlying these decisions—to 
oversee the constitutionality and quality of procedure, as opposed to engage in 
policymaking directly—suggests that these decisions are rooted in the  
overseer approach. 
 
69. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch 
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2314, 2317 (2006) (referring to the executive branch as the “most 
dangerous branch”). 
70. See Krent, supra note 2, at 1085 (discussing presidential “management” of administrative 
adjudication); Bruff, Presidential Management of Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 533 (examining 
“presidential oversight” of rulemaking by the Reagan administration). 
71. See Bruff, Presidential Power and Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 507 (suggesting that the 
President “retain[s] the opportunity to resolve ultimate value choices within the alternatives left open 
by statute”). But see Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 967, 984 
(1997) (arguing that the “delegations of authority that permit rulemaking are ordinarily made to others, 
not [the President]—to agency heads whose limited field of action and embeddedness in a multi-voiced 
framework of legislature, President, and court are the very tokens of their acceptability in a culture  
of law”). 
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Throughout the modern era, commentators have “switched positions on 
judicial review, judicial restraint, and the role of the federal courts” with regard to 
the review of administrative procedures.72 The passage of the APA was marked by 
a judicial emphasis on a public choice conception of agencies73 after years of 
skepticism toward agency growth that led to the APA in the first place. Once the 
APA was passed, and for decades after, courts were more likely to “look benignly 
on agency authority and autonomy.”74 For instance, during this time, the Supreme 
Court applied the “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review in a highly 
deferential way.75 To some extent, allowing for an expansion of the administrative 
state was “largely a self-conscious repudiation of legalism” at this time.76 
But as fits the cyclical nature of judicial review, there began once again a period 
of heightened judicial interest in ensuring that agencies acted in accordance with 
procedural and constitutional norms.77 As Richard Stewart notes, “[t]wo 
fundamental criticisms” undergirded this rise in judicial involvement in 
administrative procedure.78 First, critics of administrative agencies argued that “the 
limitation of the traditional [judicial review] protections to recognized liberty and 
property interests is no longer appropriate in view of the seemingly inexorable 
expansion of governmental power over private welfare.”79 Second, there was a 
perception that “agencies have failed to discharge their respective mandates to 
protect the interests of the public in their given fields of administration.”80 The 
judicial corrective to both of these problems required, broadly speaking, a demand 
 
72. Jack M. Balkin, Why Liberals and Conservatives Flipped on Judicial Restraint: Judicial Review 
in the Cycles of Constitutional Time, 98 TEX. L. REV. 215, 215-16 (2019). 
73. Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 
1043-44 (1997). 
74. Id. at 1043. 
75. See, e.g., Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 180–81 (1935); Am. Trucking 
Ass’ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1953); Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,  
143 (1967). 
76. “On this view, the appropriate response of the legal system to the rise of administration is 
one of retreat.” Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 
2072 (1990) (“New Deal reformers believed that modern problems required institutions having 
flexibility, expertise, managerial capacity, political accountability, and powers of initiative far beyond 
those of the courts.”). 
77. “[T]he view that law and administration are incompatible has enjoyed a revival—ironically, 
mostly at the hands of people with little sympathy for regulation in general or the New Deal reformation 
in particular.” Id. at 2073-74. As the court and populace once again became cynical of agencies’ 
motives, they drew on mechanisms of judicial review to take a more directive role vis-à-vis agencies in 
order “to ‘perfect’ administrative agencies” so that the various “pathologies” associated with agencies’ 
public choice motivation could be overcome. Merrill, supra note 73, at 1043, 1047; see also Stewart, supra 
note 33, at 1712 (describing the new emphasis of the judiciary on ensuring the “fair representation” of 
a wide range of affected interests in the process of administrative decision-making). These pathologies 
included agency capture. Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 2, at 783; Merrill, supra note 73, at 1047, 
1064-65. 
78. Stewart, supra note 33, at 1670. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. 
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that agencies adhere better to constitutional expectations of due process  
and fairness. 
First, a period of expansion “took place in the 1960’s and early 1970’s as a 
result of the consumer, health and safety, and environmental movements,” which 
meant that more new agencies were created and regulatory activity accelerated.81 In 
response, a “populist mistrust of agencies” caused an “upsurge” in judicial 
intervention in a variety of agency processes.82 Then, in the 1980s, the beginning of 
“hard look” review, which was both based in and transformed the APA’s  
arbitrary-and-capricious standard, saw judicial involvement in the minutiae of 
administrative expertise. Accordingly, since the mid-twentieth century, courts have 
invalidated agency policies and otherwise ordered agencies to conduct their actions 
again with an eye toward shoring up their procedure. 
Commentators suggest that judicial mandates to agencies to improve process 
or evaluate information differently has led to judicial policymaking—in other words, 
that the judiciary has behaved as a decider for much of this case history. This Part 
argues, in contrast, that these actions do not (for the most part) stray beyond the 
formal bounds of judicial authority and are therefore moored in the oversight 
model. Overall, the overseer model has been the approach of choice for even the 
most intrusive judicial intervention into agency procedure from the 1960s  
through today. 
This argument is based in a recognition of the judiciary’s primary role in 
ensuring the constitutionality and quality of administrative process. As Felix 
Frankfurter once noted, “our administrative law is inextricably bound up with 
constitutional law.”83 Agencies “undertake, without prior federal court approval, a 
number of actions that affect the rights and privileges of individuals”84—matters 
that, as Gillian Metzger notes, go to the heart of constitutional values the judiciary 
is empowered to protect.85 Accordingly, a long-standing premise is “that courts 
play[ ] a primary role in constitutional interpretation, including determining the 
constitutionality of agency action.”86 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional mandate also includes the enforcement of rule-of-law norms.87 As 
 
81. A Brief History of Administrative Government, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T, https://
www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3461 [https://perma.cc/F7M3-Y2RB]  ( last visited April 1, 2021). 
82. Merrill, supra note 73, at 1064. 
83. Felix Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614, 618 (1927). 
84. Armstrong, supra note 63, at 222. 
85. See generally Metzger, supra note 28, at 1897-1900 (discussing actions by federal 
administrative agencies to interpret and implement the Constitution, including agency elaboration of 
constitutional principles and the constitutional structure of the administrative state more generally). 
86. Sophia Z. Lee, Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism from the 
Founding to the Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1699, 1703 (2019) (disputing this view). 
87. Daniel Rodriguez and Barry Weingast note that “the Court’s protection of the rule of law is 
related to a sense of institutional responsibility to protect rule of law values, a view that perhaps predates 
the Constitution, but is certainly embedded in our conception of judicial power . . . .” Rodriguez  
& Weingast, supra note 59, at 30; see also Maggie McKinley, Petitioning and the Making of the 
Administrative State, 127 YALE L.J. 1538, 1538 (2018) (arguing that the agencies were created to 
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Robert Fuchs argued more broadly, functions of agencies include “achieving justice 
in ordinary human relations [and] adjusting . . . maladjustment between the scope 
of the problems to be met and the competence of the agencies relied upon for 
dealing with them.”88 The judiciary is both uniquely equipped and required to take 
a substantive approach to reviewing whether agencies are justly implementing  
the law. 
First, this Part suggests that judicial oversight of due process and of the agency 
adjudication of equal protection matters belongs in the overseer category, despite 
formalist critiques, because it is concerned with ensuring that agency adjudication 
complies with constitutional norms, as opposed to effecting a particular outcome. 
An exception that is perhaps more akin to legislative policymaking is the judicial 
issuance of structural injunctions in response to a finding that an agency violated 
equal protection law. And yet, despite the legitimacy of judicial oversight for 
constitutional purposes, the Supreme Court has, as of late, been reluctant to curb 
executive policymaking on constitutional grounds. 
Second, this Part considers both the mid-twentieth century practice in which 
courts added to APA section 553 rulemaking requirements and the enduring judicial 
oversight of the notice-and-comment process. Judicial augmentation of rulemaking 
has been rebuked as legislative policymaking under a formalist model and 
invalidated under this model by the Supreme Court itself. This Part contends, 
nonetheless, that these decisions are driven by the same impulses underlying the 
Court’s more tepid, but still flourishing, practice of invalidating regulations due to 
inadequate notice-and-comment. More specifically, both sets of doctrine are 
motivated by the constitutional impulse to ensure fairness in public processes and, 
therefore, both exemplify the overseer model. 
Third, this Part examines ongoing doctrine in which the Supreme Court and 
D.C. Circuit have applied the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard to take a 
“hard look” at agency policymaking. Although the arbitrary-and-capricious standard 
is generally deferential, courts typically demand meaty administrative records under 
hard look review. Many commentators, formalist and functionalist, have argued that 
hard look review is outcome oriented and thus is a vehicle for courts to make policy 
in lieu of agencies. This Part suggests that under hard look review, courts are 
focused on parsing the influence of politics. More recently, hard look review has 
been deployed to ensure that the agency merely acted ethically in the face of pressure 
from the President. Judicial oversight of these dynamics is necessary to maintain a 
healthy separation of powers. Therefore, hard look review, too, is arguably a 
doctrine of constitutional oversight, rather than judicial policymaking. In addition, 
to the extent courts interrogate the development of expertise in agency 
 
improve the petition process); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (Frankfurter,  
J., concurring) (“The history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.”). 
88. Ralph F. Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Administrative Law Theory, 47 
YALE L.J. 538, 539 (1938). 
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policymaking under hard look review, they are acting as the overseer of 
administrative functions that do not, as a constitutional matter, belong to any 
particular branch of the government. 
A. Agency Constitutionalism 
Like presidential administration, judicial administration of due process and 
other constitutional norms influences agency actions and outcomes. As in other 
areas of presidential administration,89 the President controls the form and substance 
of administrative adjudication through appointment, removal, and other forms of 
intra-branch management.90 At times, norms of decisional independence91 render 
the President less influential.92 Nonetheless, administrative law judges have only 
partial decisional independence,93 and recent Supreme Court decisions allowing for 
more political control over administrative adjudicators have begun to deteriorate 
their insulation further.94 Accordingly, trends in administrative adjudication may 
reflect the President’s agenda now more than before.95 
 
89. See supra text accompanying note 36. 
90. Krent, supra note 2, at 1101. 
91. See Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805, 856 
(2015) (suggesting that administrative law judges have significant decisional independence); Ass’n of 
Admin. L. Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984) (“While the position of an ALJ is 
not ‘constitutionally protected,’ in many respects, it is ‘functionally comparable’ to that of a federal 
judge.” (citations omitted)). 
92. “[P]residential direction of administrative adjudication would be seen as an unprecedented 
exertion of power, violating longstanding unwritten traditions, and would for that reason provoke a 
storm of protest. . . . Anticipating the risk of this sort of reaction, Presidents will shy away from testing 
the outer limits of directive authority.” Vermeule, supra note 42, at 1213. “The only mode of 
administrative action from which Clinton shrank was adjudication. At no time in his tenure did he 
attempt publicly to exercise the powers that a department head possesses over an agency’s  
on-the-record determinations.” See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2306. 
93. See Ass’n of Admin. L. Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. at 1140-41 (noting that while “[t]he 
APA contains a number of provisions designed to safeguard the decisional independence of 
[administrative law judges],” and listing these provisions, that “[o]n matters of law and policy, however, 
ALJs are entirely subject to the agency” (citations omitted)); Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A 
Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 62 (1979) (noting that ALJs have less decisional independence than 
Article III judges). 
94. See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 (2018) (holding that administrative law judges 
of the Securities and Exchange Commission are subject to the Appointments Clause); see also Metzger, 
1930s Redux, supra note 60, at 21 (“Whether or not [Lucia] ultimately proves successful in court, the 
mere fact that such a long-established feature of the national administrative state is under question  
is striking.”). 
95. For example, commentators have noticed the prevalence of presidential administration in 
immigration. See, e.g., Bijal Shah, Civil Servant Alarm, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 627, 642–43 (2019) 
[hereinafter Shah, Civil Servant Alarm]  (discussing the furtherance of the Trump administration’s goals 
through policies affecting administrative immigration adjudication); Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke, 
Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent American Experience, 
35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 549, 576-79 (2018) (discussing presidentialism in immigration under the Obama 
and Trump administrations); Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 
48 (2018) (noting the significant political influence on immigration judges ability to, among other things 
“carefully consider and deliberate on cases”); Bijal Shah, The Attorney General’s Disruptive Immigration 
Power, 102 IOWA L. REV. 129, 152-53 (2017) [hereinafter Shah, Attorney General’s Disruptive 
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Courts, too, influence administrative adjudication, and this too, without the 
barrier of agency insulation.96 However, their focus is on the quality of procedure, 
unlike that of presidents, who seek adherence to a substantive agenda. Agencies 
have, in many ways, been “the primary interpreters and implementers of the federal 
Constitution throughout the history of the United States.”97 In response, “over the 
twentieth century . . . courts have cast an increasingly long shadow over the  
administered Constitution.”98 
In particular, the mid-twentieth century was a period of heightened judicial 
interest in ensuring that agencies acted in accordance with procedural and 
constitutional norms. During this apex of constitutional oversight, the Court 
pushed agencies to alter their adjudication processes to better comply with due 
process and a growing equal protection doctrine.99 These cases have been criticized 
as judicial engagement in policymaking, sometimes referred to as  
“judicial activis[m].”100 
Judicial decisions demanding alternate or additional process in administrative 
adjudication have no doubt influenced policymaking outcomes. Nonetheless, this 
Section suggests that the Court has been interested, primarily, in values that are both 
judicial and constitutional,101 as opposed to directing policymaking outcomes. One 
potentially strong exception to this, in which the decider model is arguably 
prevalent, is reflected in cases where judges have issued structural injunctions 
(remedies) against agencies as a result of finding a constitutional violation—for 
instance, of equal protection law.102 In any case, the Court’s interest in overseeing 
administrative constitutionalism has waned since the mid-1900s. 
 
Immigration Power] (considering examples of the political disruption of immigration adjudication from 
the W. Bush and Obama administrations). 
96. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth 
Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 574 (1984) (noting that agency adjudication is beholden to  
Article III courts). 
97. Lee, supra note 86, at 1706. 
98. Id. (“In part, this is because of the well-known expansion of judicial review during  
this period.”). 
99. See infra Section I.A.1. 
100. See Kmiec, supra note 57, at 1447 (noting that the term “judicial activism” originated from 
the perspective of scholars that “are more skeptical of individual judges’ notions of justice”); Edwin 
Meese III, A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from Judicial Law-Making, 40  
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925, 926 (1996) (“[A]n activist federal judiciary is inconsistent with the intent of 
the Constitution and is inherently undemocratic.”); Clint Bolick, The Proper Role of “Judicial Activism,” 
42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 1 (2019) (defining “judicial activism as any instance in which the courts 
strike down a law that violates individual rights or transgresses the constitutional boundaries of the 
other branches of government”). But see id. (“[T]he problem with judicial activism is not that there is 
far too much, but that there has been far too little.”). 
101. The development and application of constitutional due process law falls within the 
judiciary’s mandate more so than any other branch. Indeed, “[t]he President . . . has limited tools for 
applying the Constitution[, which means that] courts can maintain control over legislative and executive 
branch constitutional applications.” Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 
B.U. L. REV. 519, 560–61 (2015). 
102. See infra Section I.A.2. 
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1. Overseeing Administrative Due Process 
Presidential administration may violate due process.103 Judicial administration 
has sought, in contrast, to strengthen this constitutional norm, sometimes to the 
detriment of other administrative values. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme 
Court made efforts to ensure that members of the public whose rights were 
adjudicated by agencies were allotted adequate due process. These cases were 
denounced by critics—including dissenting members of the Court, in some  
cases—as judicial policymaking that overwhelmed the bureaucracy’s own priorities. 
Nonetheless, this Section labels these instances of judicial administration—in which 
courts sought to protect constitutional values or confront constitutional violations, 
however intrusively—as part of the overseer model, because they focus on ensuring 
fairness in adjudicative processes. Note that this argument is distinct from, but 
related to, the more common framing of judicial intervention during this time 
period as responsive, primarily, to judicial and popular distrust of agencies.104 
The era marked by Goldberg v. Kelly105 is viewed by critics as a period in which 
due process jurisprudence began to treat “privileges” as open to enforcement by 
judicial process106 when before, they had not been.107 As a result, this judicial 
engagement was viewed by many as impermissibly legislative and administrative. 
In the well-known Goldberg case, the Court held that the government’s 
termination of public assistance payments without a prior evidentiary hearing 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.108 The Court came 
to this conclusion by framing the government’s main interest as the “uninterrupted” 
provision of welfare,109 and by deprioritizing the government’s desire to “conserve[ ] 
fiscal and administrative resources.”110 By emphasizing a constitutional value over 
the government’s preferred cost-benefit analysis, the Court effectively determined 
 
103. See Shah, Civil Servant Alarm, supra note 95, at 643 (noting the critique that presidential 
directives may “infringe on [agency adjudicators’] core responsibility to issue decisions that are 
unbiased, impartial, expert and well-positioned to withstand judicial review”); Mashaw & Berke, supra 
note 95, at 574, 576 (noting that the President’s “enforcement ramp-up” could infringe on “due process 
or statutory procedural rights”). 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 87-90. 
105. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
106. RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER, JACK M. BEERMANN & JODY FREEMAN, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 584 (7th ed. 2016) (arguing that “the ‘right-privilege’ 
distinction began to erode as courts found creative ways to afford procedural protection to  
untraditional interests”). 
107. Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists: Federal Administration and Administrative Law in 
the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1736 (2007); see also Bills to Provide for the More 
Expeditious Settlement of Disputes with the United States, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on H.R. 4236, 
H.R. 6198, and H.R. 6324 Before Subcomm. No. 4 of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th Cong. 73–74 
(1939) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 4236, H.R. 6198, and H.R. 6324, before Subcommittee No. 4 of 
the House Judiciary Committee] ; see also id. at 83-84 (suggesting a presumption against  
this “assumption”). 
108. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 261. 
109. Id. at 265. 
110. Id. 
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a policy outcome that differed from the agency’s preference.  
Commentators—including the dissent itself—decried the Court’s decision as 
legislative policymaking: 
[W]hen federal judges use this judicial power for legislative purposes, I 
think they wander out of their field of vested powers and transgress into 
the area constitutionally assigned to the Congress and the people. That is 
precisely what I believe the Court is doing in this case. Hence my dissent.111 
In the United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,112 another case from 
that time frame, the Court once more imposed requirements of administrative due 
process that led to changes in the agency’s substantive policy. Here, the Court 
mandated that due process required an administrative policy in which adults, 
claimed as dependents by individuals not eligible for food stamps, might themselves 
qualify for food stamps under the Food Stamp Act.113 In doing so, the Court 
redirected the agency’s initial decision that, as a matter of policy, people supported 
by nonindigent family members should not receive this type of public assistance. 
During this period of judicial activism, the judicial enforcement of due process 
was consistently critiqued as administrative and legislative policymaking. For 
instance, Justice Black’s Goldberg dissent characterizes judicial intervention in due 
process as policymaking precisely because its focus is on what is fair and humane, 
which he implies is a concern best suited for the legislature.114 As in Goldberg, the 
Murry decision deprioritized certain bureaucratic interests to uphold justice-based 
values, which some characterized as policymaking. For instance, Jerry Mashaw 
argues that Murry “illustrates the . . . Court’s failure to recognize that different 
administrative schemes may be based on different models of justice.”115 Instead of 
allowing the agency to follow a feasible model of “bureaucracratic administration,” 
he asserts, the Court in this case dictated it follow a “moral-judgment model of 
justice” that led to a different policymaking outcome.116 This view is reflected in the 
dissent in this case as well, in which four justices “accused the majority of engaging 
in Lochner-esque substantive due process review.”117 Mashaw concludes that “[h]ad 
the Court recognized . . . the appropriateness of the bureaucratic-rationality 
model . . . it could have analyzed the Murry claim in a more sensible fashion.”118 
And yet, the assessment and maintenance of fairness are key to the judicial 
 
111. Id. at 274 (Black, J., dissenting). 
112. 413 U.S. 508, 514 (1973). 
113. Id. at 508. 
114. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. at 276 (Black, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is obvious that today’s 
result does not depend on the language of the Constitution itself or the principles of other decisions, 
but solely on the collective judgment of the majority as to what would be a fair and humane procedure 
in this case.”). 
115. Jerry L. Mashaw, Conflict and Compromise Among Models of Administrative Justice, 1981 
DUKE L.J. 181, 209 (1981). 
116. Id. at 210. 
117. Id. at 209. 
118. Id. at 210. 
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enforcement of due process, and to the extent agencies are tasked with humanely 
and justly enforcing the law,119 it is within the judicial role to ensure they accomplish 
this mission.120 In seeking or purporting to be more efficient, agencies may forgo 
adequate due process. Because of this potential consequence, courts are required to 
maintain oversight of administrative due process. 
Nonetheless, the Court’s approach today is far from the interventionist days 
of Goldberg. On the one hand, the Court is open to limiting agency policies in order 
to protect First Amendment rights, including in a 2019 case condemning the 
prohibition of “immoral” or “scandalous” trademarks121 and in a recent case 
protecting corporate speech,122 among others.123 On the other hand, the current 
standard for due process, as delineated by Mathews v. Eldridge,124 prioritizes the 
government’s interests in efficiency and resource conservation.125 
Despite its willingness to intervene in the past,126 the Court has hesitated more 
recently to curtail executive policymaking power, to the detriment of due process 
and other constitutional values, particularly in the immigration context. In Kerry  
v. Din, the Court refused to limit the State Department’s discretion to deny a visa 
even to the spouse of a U.S. citizen once the agency claimed a potential threat to 
national security, a decision that has implications for both due process and the 
constitutional interest in liberty.127 And in Trump v. Hawaii128 and Trump v. Sierra 
 
119. See McKinley, supra note 87 (arguing that the agencies were created to improve the  
petition process). 
120. See supra text accompanying notes 83-86. 
121. See supra text accompanying note 27 (discussing Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294 (2019)). 
122. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 311 (2010) (holding that under the First 
Amendment, corporate funding of independent political broadcasts in candidate elections cannot  
be limited). 
123. See, e.g., United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001) (holding that mandatory 
advertising assessments imposed on mushroom producers and handlers under the Mushroom 
Promotion, Research, and Consumer Information Act violate the First Amendment); Rubin v. Coors 
Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (holding that a ban on displaying alcohol content on beer labels 
violates the First Amendment); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (holding 
that a ban on editorializing violates the First Amendment). 
124. 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976). 
125. Paradoxically, the Mathews factors both overemphasize efficiency and manage to be 
indeterminate. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the 
Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 457-68 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme 
Court’s Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in 
Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 30 (1976). In addition, some argue that Mathews  
v. Eldridge “disregard[s] ‘process values,’ and focus[es] on ‘subsidiary issues rather than the essence of 
the due process guarantee.’” Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1334 (2012) 
(citing Mashaw, supra, at 48; and then citing Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 
72 CALIF. L. REV. 1044, 1138 (1984)). 
126. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that neither national security 
nor separation-of-powers principles allows the executive branch to violate the Fifth Amendment due 
process of an American citizen by detaining him indefinitely). 
127. Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 91–98 (2015); Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Denial of Visa to 
Husband of U.S. Citizen, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/24/us/
supreme-court-weighs-denial-of-visa-to-husband-of-us-citizen.html [https://perma.cc/9KAN-NVDZ] . 
128. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400–02 (2018). 
First to Printer_Shah.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/23/21  1:55 PM 
2021] JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1143 
Club129—cases concerning the Muslim travel ban and the wall at the southern  
U.S. border, respectively—the Court has likewise been reluctant to constrain the 
President’s plenary power in immigration, choosing instead to bend the norms of 
constitutional law in order to keep from making policy decisions it considers to be 
in the President’s domain.130 
2. Policymaking via Structural Injunction 
Presidents occasionally reorganize agencies when attempting to deal with a 
problem or crisis. Examples include the creation of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, created by President Nixon,131 and the Department of Homeland Security, 
created by the second President Bush.132 Because structuring agencies is a legislative 
power,133 agency reorganization initiated by the President is often reinforced  
by legislation.134 
A court may also “effectuate the reorganization of an ongoing social 
institution” by issuing a “structural injunction.”135 In particular, agency violations 
of constitutional law may lead to forward-looking, court-issued structural 
remedies.136 Unlike presidential reorganizations, however, structural injunctions 
change how agencies operate without legislative approval. In this way, structural 
injunctions are arguably legislative in nature and thus perhaps illustrative of the 
decider model of judicial administration. It bears noting that the focus of the 
structural injunction, however, is on enforcing constitutional values, as opposed to 
dictating the substance of administrative policies.137 
As an initial matter, the judiciary may invalidate administrative policies on a 
case-by-case basis in order to protect liberty and equal protection.138 For example, 
 
129. 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019). 
130. See infra text accompanying notes 511-515. 
131. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 3 C.F.R. 199 (1970), reprinted as amended in 42  
U.S.C. § 4321 note (2006), and in 84 Stat. 2086 (1970) was prepared by President Nixon and approved 
by Congress. 
132. Jonathan Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 513, 525-26 
(2003) (“President Bush proposed and Congress created a department charged with both preventing 
and responding to terrorist attacks.”). 
133. See Shah, supra note 3, at 1963-64 (“Congress designs the structure of every agency and 
administrative subcomponent (although its role in this regard is not exclusive).” (citations omitted)). 
134. See, e.g., supra notes 131–132. 
135. OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7 (1978). 
136. See Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78 IOWA L. REV. 965, 965 (1993) (“[T]he 
structural injunction [is] the formal medium through which the judiciary seeks to reorganize ongoing 
bureaucratic organizations so as to bring them into conformity with the Constitution.”). 
137. See generally Martin H. Redish, Constitutional Remedies as Constitutional Law  
(Nw. Pub. L. Rsch. Paper, Paper No. 20-21, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3669110 
[https://perma.cc/V28D-HX35]  (arguing that, while control of constitutional remedies is generally in 
the hands of the political branches, such remedies should be viewed as an essential element of the 
process of judicial review). 
138. “The Supreme Court has frequently construed statutes strictly in order to limit the arbitrary 
power which would otherwise be vested in administrative officials.” Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE  
L.J. 262, 316 n.271 (1965) (citing Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of 
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in Kent v. Dulles, the Court ruled that while the Passport Office may regulate the 
travel practices of citizens by requiring them to obtain valid passports, it may not 
condition the fulfillment of such requirements with the imposition of rules that 
abridge basic constitutional notions of liberty, assembly, association, and personal 
autonomy.139 Here, the Court created limitations on the agency’s right to restrict 
travel, although it soon backed away from this decision.140 
A few years later, the Court invalidated cost-saving administrative policies in 
order to improve gender equality.141 For instance, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the 
controversy involved a Department of Defense requirement that a servicewoman 
show that her husband is dependent on her for purposes of allowance and benefits, 
even though the wives of male service members were automatically recognized as 
dependents.142 This matter resulted in the Court invalidating the agency’s policy 
because it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.143 Frontiero has 
substantive similarities to other cases that concerned the constitutionality of 
statutes, as opposed to an administrative policy.144 
As in Goldberg,145 the Frontiero decision de-emphasized the government’s 
bureaucratic interests to contend with constitutional concerns. For instance, the 
Court stated that “although efficacious administration of governmental programs 
is not without some importance, ‘the Constitution recognizes higher values than 
speed and efficiency.’”146 It also stated that “‘administrative convenience’ is not a 
shibboleth, the mere recitation of which dictates constitutionality.”147 In Frontiero, 
 
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 984 n.376 (1988) 
(“Courts have often read statutes narrowly ‘as a means of restraining the range of agency choice when 
fundamental individual liberties were at risk.’” (quoting Stewart, supra note 33, 1680–81)). 
139. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (“Since we start with an exercise by an American 
citizen of an activity included in constitutional protection, we will not readily infer that Congress gave 
the Secretary of State unbridled discretion to grant or withhold it.”); Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn 
& Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12 (1982) (noting that, 
in Kent, the agency abridged a constitutional right); see also Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 
(1964) (ruling similarly that the State Department may not violate the Fifth Amendment right to travel 
based on a finding that a passport applicant is a Communist). 
140. See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 7 (1965) (holding that the Passport Act allows the Secretary 
of State to forbid travel to Cuba by imposing general area restrictions on the issuance of passports); 
Aranson et al., supra note 139, at 18 n.79. 
141. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (ruling that the administrators of estates cannot 
be named in a way that discriminates between sexes); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
142. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 678–80. 
143. Id. at 690–91. 
144. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417  
U.S. 628 (1974); see also Serena Mayeri, Marital Supremacy and the Constitution of the Nonmarital Family, 
103 CALIF. L. REV. 1277, 1322–24 (2015) (noting the similarities of Weinberger and Jimenez to Frontiero). 
145. See supra notes 108–110 and accompanying text. 
146. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 690-91 (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)). 
147. Id. (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 653 (Warren, J., dissenting)). According 
to the plurality, “administrative savings does not provide a sufficiently good reason for not treating 
men and women identically.” William R. Engles, The “Substantial Relation” Question in Gender 
Discrimination Cases, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 149, 160 (1985) (emphasis omitted). 
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like in Murry,148 the Court dictated—for a particular controversy—a model of 
administration that complied better with the requirements of the Constitution than 
did the agency’s chosen policy. 
Around the same time, the Court permitted a structural injunction—that is, a 
pronouncement aimed at reducing future constitutional violations by the 
government—to correct racial discrimination perpetuated by an agency. In the early 
1970s, both the Chicago Housing Authority and Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) were found liable for violating the Constitution by selecting 
public housing sites and assigning tenants based on race.149 Initially, the district 
court limited the remedy to within Chicago’s city limits.150 In doing so, the court 
denied the plaintiff’s request for metropolitan area relief that would extend efforts 
to alleviate segregation practices to the suburbs as well.151 
In Hills v. Gautreaux, the question before the Supreme Court was whether a 
court could order a general metropolitan area remedy against HUD in response to 
this particular race-based violation.152 The Supreme Court did not, itself, direct 
HUD to implement a metropolitan area remedy in response to the class action 
decision, but it did find that the lower court had the authority to issue such an 
order.153 The Court characterized this approach as allowing “a federal court to 
formulate a decree that will grant the respondents the constitutional relief to which 
they may be entitled without overstepping the limits of judicial power.”154 This case 
can be contrasted to Milliken v. Bradley, in which the Court determined that a district 
court’s remedy ordering the desegregation of several school districts in Detroit was 
“wholly impermissible.”155 However, in Gautreaux, the Court said a similar remedy 
in Milliken had been impermissible “not because it envisioned relief against a 
wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the violation occurred but because 
it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the operation of local governmental 
entities that were not implicated in any constitutional violation.”156 
On the one hand, structural administrative remedies are generally created by 
agencies themselves.157 The Court itself has noted that it did not wish “to prescribe 
the order which [an agency] should enter,” because “the fashioning of the remedy 
 
148. See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text. 
149. Gautreaux v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 384 F. Supp. 37, 37 (N.D. Ill. 1974). 
150. Id. at 38–39. 
151. Id. 
152. 425 U.S. 284, 286 (1976). 
153. Id. at 306. 
154. Id. at 301. 
155. 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974). 
156. Alexander Polikoff, Gautreaux and Institutional Litigation, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 451, 470 
(1988) (quoting Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 296). 
157. Louis L. Jaffe, The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 HARV. L. REV. 720, 744 
n.69 (1946) (noting the “general doctrine of the administrative power to determine the remedy”); Id. 
(remarking that Judge Learned Hand “believed . . . that the courts are forbidden ‘to disturb the measure 
of relief which [the administrative agencies] think necessary’” (alteration in original)). 
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is a matter entrusted to the [agency], which has wide latitude for judgment.”158 
Justice Scalia argued that “by ‘turning judges into long-term administrators of 
complex social institutions,’ structural reform remedies ‘require judges to play a  
role essentially indistinguishable from the role ordinarily played by  
executive officials.’”159 
Furthermore, “[t]he structural injunction frequently is viewed as an illegitimate 
judicial foray into legislative or executive terrain.”160 As to the former, there has 
developed a literature criticizing structural injunctions on the basis of both 
formalist161 and functionalist162 criteria. Even commentators with an expansive 
conception of the judiciary’s formal power have suggested that courts do not have 
an “unregulable power to issue structural injunctions.”163 
On the other hand, the Court has the authority to foster administrative 
adherence to constitutional values like equal protection. As an initial matter, the 
Court may legitimately empower an agency to enforce a particularized remedy to a 
violation of statutory civil rights law.164 More to the point, the judiciary’s primary 
goal in issuing structural injunctions is to halt unconstitutional administration,165 
 
158. FTC v. A.P.W. Paper Co., 328 U.S. 193, 203-04 (1946). 
159. James D. Ridgway, Equitable Power in the Time of Budget Austerity: The Problem of Judicial 
Remedies for Unconstitutional Delays in Claims Processing by Federal Agencies, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 57, 
110 (2012) (citing Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 555 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
160. Janet Koven Levit, Rewriting Beginnings: The Lessons of Gautreaux, 28 J. MARSHALL  
L. REV. 57, 61 (1994) (discussing Gautreaux); see also Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational 
Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1289 (1983); Donald  
L. Horowitz, The Judiciary: Umpire or Empire?, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 129, 136 (1982) (“In the shaping 
of new rules to govern a variety of institutional settings, courts have been engaged in legislation without 
the benefit of a legislative process.”). 
161. See Nagel, supra note 38, at 663 (characterizing a Supreme Court case, In re Debs, in which 
the federal judiciary issued and enforced a structural injunction, as the Court “assum[ing] for itself the 
authority to share Congress’ plenary power to regulate interstate commerce” (footnote omitted)). “In 
re Debs represents judicial approval of an unusually dangerous combination of functions in the federal 
courts.” Id. at 681 (footnote omitted). 
162. A fair portion of this critique is focused on the inability of judges to manage complex 
institutional reform. See, e.g., E. Garrett West, A Youngstown for the Administrative State, 70  
ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 653 (2018); Robert E. Easton, Note, The Dual Role of the Structural Injunction, 99 
YALE L.J. 1983, 1991 (1990); Robert A. Katzmann, Note, Judicial Intervention and Organization  
Theory: Changing Bureaucratic Behavior and Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 513, 514–16 (1980); see also DONALD 
HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 47–48 (1977). 
163. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 1, at 579 n.142 (“Lessig and Sunstein assert that our 
construction of the Executive Power Clause leads to the conclusion ‘that the judicial branch has a wide 
range of inherent and (legislatively) unregulable judicial authority beyond that enumerated and granted 
by Congress.’ . . . We disagree. Our theory does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that broad and 
unregulable ‘inherent’ judicial powers must exist, such as, for example, an unregulable power to issue 
structural injunctions.”). 
164. See, e.g., W. v. Gibson, 527 U.S. 212, 223 (1999) (holding that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission has authority to award compensatory damages against another agency that 
violated the Civil Rights Act). 
165. See Easton, supra note 162, at 1983 n.1 (“[The structural injunction] usually finds its 
justification in the more open-ended constitutional provisions, such as the equal protection or due 
process clauses.”). 
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not to engage in the substance of future policymaking. Indeed, the structural 
injunction was considered a defensible, if not necessary, remedy for furthering the 
constitutional values inherent in school desegregation.166 Courts can also choose to 
promulgate structural remedies with deference to the other branches167 to reduce 
offense to the separation of powers. Finally, as a practical matter, the structural 
injunction is a remedy of last resort168 and “necessarily require[s] government 
officials to take affirmative steps.”169 Therefore, “they can be extremely difficult to 
implement when those officials are unwilling to cooperate,”170 which may render 
courts overseers, as a matter of fact, rather than deciders. 
B. Augmenting Informal Rulemaking Requirements 
The President influences the regulatory process,171 generally through a 
centralized review process.172 The White House Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB), “which reviews executive agencies’ proposed and final regulations as well 
as their regulatory plans, [allows the President to] exert aggressive . . . control over 
agency rules.”173 A central tension in this context is the need for the President to 
exercise control over her branch while simultaneously allowing agencies to engage 
in rulemaking that reflects legislative intent.174 Accordingly, Harold Bruff advises a 
case-by-case approach to identifying whether presidential involvement in 
rulemaking intrudes on legislative turf.175 
 
166. See Peter M. Shane, School Desegregation Remedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 
U. PA. L. REV. 1041, 1108 (1984). There is a significant body of literature on this topic that is beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
167. See Nagel, supra note 38, at 719-21. 
168. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL 
WRONGS 189 (1983) (arguing that structural injunctions be as unrestrictive as possible); Easton, supra 
note 162, at 1991 (“Varying levels of injunctive relief—including, as a last resort, the structural 
injunction—should be pursued only when less intrusive means fail.”). 
169. Karla Grossenbacher, Note, Implementing Structural Injunctions: Getting a Remedy When 
Local Officials Resist, 80 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2229 (1992). 
170. Id. 
171. “Rulemaking . . . is not immune to outside intervention and instead is open to the influence 
of persons outside the agency . . . including the President.” Bruff, Presidential Power and Rulemaking, 
supra note 1, at 454 (footnote omitted). 
172. “White House review of agency rules is the initial mechanism that Presidents developed to 
exert control over the rulemaking apparatus.” Watts, supra note 5, at 689 (footnote omitted). While 
regulatory oversight has existed since the Carter administration, President Reagan was the first to 
authorize the Office of Management and Budget to oversee agencies’ rulemaking processes. Id. at 
689-91. Indeed, Elena Kagan’s classic example of presidential administration involves President 
Clinton taking the reins from the Food and Drug Administration to initiate a rulemaking on tobacco 
regulation. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2282-83. 
173. Watts, supra note 5, at 685. 
174. “The President needs enough power to execute the laws effectively; yet he must not 
destroy the essential balance of power among the branches of the government.” Bruff, Presidential 
Power and Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 452. 
175. See, e.g., id. at 473–74, 495 (arguing that “[t]he President should have his broadest authority 
over rulemaking in the military and foreign affairs areas. . . . [and that e]mergencies should also justify 
relatively drastic presidential action”). 
First to Printer_Shah.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/23/21  1:55 PM 
1148 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1119 
Courts, too, administer rulemaking. In the mid-twentieth century, courts 
began to force agencies to add procedural mechanisms to rulemaking, such as oral 
argument or an ex parte communication bar, in order to put meat on the bare bones 
of the APA.176 Today, the Court has displayed a willingness to invalidate a regulation 
by deeming the underlying process to be insufficient under the APA177 and thereby 
requiring the agency to promulgate the rule with somewhat more formality. This 
Section considers both the former period of judicial augmentation of the regulatory 
process and the more hands-off—but nonetheless, impactful—judicial 
administration of the notice-and-comment process that occurs today. 
Many formalist critics, including the concurrent Supreme Court in some cases, 
characterized the former practice as both legislative and an intrusion into agency 
policymaking—in other words, as indicative of the decider approach to judicial 
administration—and thus beyond the scope of judicial power. This Section argues, 
however, that these decisions were based in the judicial impulse to ensure fairness 
and public accessibility and are therefore exemplative of the overseer model. Today, 
courts are restrained to a determination of whether agencies have complied with 
minimal rulemaking requirements, as opposed to obliging more. And yet, although 
the current doctrine of judicial administration of rulemaking fits safely into the 
overseer model, it has nonetheless invalidated significant administrative policies. 
“Beginning in the late 1960s . . . judges on the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit—with considerable support from the surrounding 
political and academic communities—decided that the procedures for informal 
rulemaking provided by the APA were inadequate” to stem agency capture.178 
Accordingly, the early 1970s saw a spat of cases requiring added procedures 
designed to improve the quality of rulemaking.179 For instance, in Portland Cement 
Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, decided in 1973, the D.C. Circuit struck down proposed rules 
based on the agency’s failure to disclose the scientific data on which the rules were 
based.180 Moving forward, courts began to expect agencies to “expose[ ] to the view 
of interested parties for their comment” any “scientific material which is believed 
to support the rule,” particularly if a scientific decision is the basis for the proposed 
 
176. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1439 
(2004) (noting that “in the mid-1960s and 1970s, courts reshaped the requirements that an agency had 
to satisfy if it relied on notice-and-comment rulemaking”). 
177. See, e.g., supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. 
178. Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75  
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 857 (2007). 
179. Id. at 857; see also John E. FitzGerald III, Mobil Oil Corp. v. Federal Power Commission 
and the Flexibility of the Administrative Procedure Act, 26 ADMIN. L. REV. 287, 289 (1974) (noting, in 
the mid-1970s, that “[f]lexibility in fitting administrative procedures to particular functions 
[was] . . . crucially important in evaluating the Administrative Procedure Act”). 
180. 486 F.2d 375, 401–02 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see also United States v. N.S. Food  
Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d. Cir. 1977) (making a similar decision as Portland Cement in the 
Second Circuit). 
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rule.181 In addition, the Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC case, decided in 1977, was the 
apex of a judicial requirement prohibiting ex parte communication in informal 
rulemaking.182 Overall, requirements of the time included 
notices of proposed rulemaking that disclose[d] to the public all relevant 
evidence possessed by the agency; the use of oral proceedings, cross-
examination, and discovery when deemed appropriate by the court; 
comprehensive statements of basis and purpose that respond in technical 
detail to all important points raised by outside parties during the 
rulemaking; and prohibitions on ex parte agency contacts with outside 
parties, agency predetermination of important issues, and substantial 
deviations between the proposed and final rules.183 
Some debate the common law implications of this time frame.184 Others have 
discussed whether the judicial augmentation of rulemaking procedures contradicts 
the APA185 and noted its functional implications.186 
Still others contend that courts behaved, in these cases, in a legislative or 
administrative capacity. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself characterized the 
augmentation of administrative procedure as both legislative187 and 
“administrative”188 in the famous Vermont Yankee case189—that is, as engendering 
a decider approach to judicial administration. Put another way, according to 
Vermont Yankee, courts were hiding the exercise of administrative common law 
 
181. N.S. Food Prods., 568 F.2d at 252; see also Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking 
and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 537-39 (2018) (arguing that this practice 
contradicted the text of the APA). 
182. 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829. 
183. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 178, at 857. 
184. See, e.g., John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77  
TEX. L. REV. 113, 181-89 (1998). 
185. See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 181, at 532-44 (arguing, among other things, that requiring 
agencies to show scientific evidence contradicted the text of the APA); Beermann & Lawson, supra 
note 178, at 857 (contending that, at the time, “the lower federal courts essentially rewrote the APA’s 
notice-and-comment rulemaking provisions”). 
186. See, e.g., Kovacs supra note 181, at 544-65. 
187. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 525 (1978); 
see also Beermann & Lawson, supra note 178, at 858; id. at 901 (“Vermont Yankee violations . . . have an 
important feature in common: they all apply a judicial model to what Congress conceived of as a 
legislative process.”). 
188. The Court asserts not only that that “[a]gencies are free to grant additional procedural 
rights in the exercise of their discretion,” and that “administrative agencies ‘should be free to fashion 
their own rules of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge 
their multitudinous duties.’” Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524, 543 (citations omitted); see also Bruff, 
Presidential Power and Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 460 (noting that the Court was concerned that 
“without [the] restriction on the judiciary” articulated by Vermont Yankee, “unwarranted judicial 
intrusion into agency decisionmaking could usurp the political authority of the agencies to set policy”). 
189. The Court also had functional concerns about the practice. Bruff, Presidential Power and 
Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 460 (noting that “the Court worried that enlarged judicial supervision of 
challenged agency actions would unduly restrict all agency choice of rulemaking procedures [and that] 
retroactive judicial imposition of special procedures in some cases could force agencies to act 
defensively by adopting maximum procedures in every case”). 
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behind the veil of judicial statutory interpretation, in particular, of the APA section 
553’s notice-and-comment requirements.190 
Furthermore, Vermont Yankee adopted a formalist view by declaring that it 
exceeds the limits of judicial power to require agencies to implement rulemaking 
procedures beyond those made explicit by Congress or those that agencies have 
decided to implement themselves.191 “The Vermont Yankee decision reasserted a 
conception of the APA as an ordinary statute which does not allow for the exercise 
of such authority.”192 In doing so, the Court declared that courts cannot “impose 
upon the agency its own notion of which procedures are ‘best’ or most likely to 
further some vague, undefined public good.”193 While subsequent decisions have 
suggested that courts may still engage in careful interpretation of the APA,194 at least 
one current Supreme Court Justice advocates for a complete moratorium on  
the practice.195 
Notably, the Supreme Court might not have had such a restrictive approach 
to presidential administration of rulemaking. Bruff argues that “[h]ad the Vermont 
Yankee Court considered presidential review of agency rulemaking . . . it might have 
articulated a relatively broad scope of executive supervision of regulatory 
practices.”196 He suggests, further, that to the extent “Vermont Yankee restricts the 
oversight function of the federal courts on the grounds that they lack the authority 
to affect policy decisions, one of the political branches may appropriately assume 
the initiative, thereby reducing pressure on the courts to step beyond the limits of 
traditional judicial review.”197 
As a general matter, there is merit to the idea that the political branches, 
particularly the legislature, should guide rulemaking. Not only do regulations exist 
to implement legislation with some precision, but rulemaking processes also mimic 
legislative decision-making, which suggests that the legislature should play a pivotal 
 
190. 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
191. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 524 (declaring that APA section 553 “established the maximum 
procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in 
conducting rulemaking procedures. Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the 
exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies 
have not chosen to grant them” (footnote omitted)). The Court asserts, in addition, that “the court 
improperly intruded into the agency’s decisionmaking process” and “‘[n]either the statute nor its 
legislative history contemplates that a court should substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” Id. 
at 525, 555 (citation omitted). 
192. Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 177,  
184 (1983). 
193. Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 549. 
194. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declaring 
that the agency must place, in the rulemaking record, unredacted versions of studies on which it relied). 
195. Id. at 246–47 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Portland Cement doctrine, which 
requires that agencies disclose the studies and data upon which their rules are based particularly when 
the matters are scientific, “cannot be squared with the text of § 553 of the APA,” which suggests that 
it is inconsistent “with the text of the APA [and] Vermont Yankee” (citations omitted)). 
196. Bruff, Presidential Power and Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 460-61. 
197. Id. at 461. 
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role in structuring them. That having been said, Vermont Yankee somewhat obscures 
the constitutional reasoning behind the judicial approach it rebuked. Fairness 
through ample notice, the right to participate in public processes, regulated 
procedure, and procedural transparency are due process values.198 This suggests that 
the augmentation of rulemaking requirements is a valid exercise of the judiciary’s 
responsibility to uphold the Constitution. Even in Vermont Yankee, which 
advocated deeply for administrative autonomy, the Court nonetheless declared that 
“agencies ‘should be free to fashion their own rules of procedure’” only “[a]bsent 
constitutional constraints.”199 
There is evidence that this was the case here. In the D.C. Circuit decision 
overturned by Vermont Yankee, the court notes that the “primary argument 
advanced by the public interest intervenors is that the decision to preclude 
‘discovery or cross-examination’ denied them a meaningful opportunity to 
participate in the proceedings as guaranteed by due process.”200 Therefore, as Cass 
Sunstein has suggested, “the controversial decision of the D.C. Circuit in the 
Vermont Yankee case amounted to an insistence on procedural safeguards” and thus, 
“ought not to be understood as a usurpation of legislative or executive 
prerogatives.”201 Like the discussion on enforcement of due process in 
administration adjudication discussed earlier in this Part, judicial review that bolsters 
due process in rulemaking has some basis in the overseer model of judicial 
administration. Still, as reaffirmed by Perez v. Mortgage Bankers,202 the Court has 
since restrained the judiciary from augmenting rulemaking requirements. 
Nonetheless, the Court has continued to administer rulemaking via review of 
the notice-and-comment processes across administrations. Despite remaining 
squarely in the role of overseer, the Court has invalidated policies that were created 
 
198. See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public Administration: How Chevron 
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 693 (2007) 
(highlighting constitutional values of “public administration [including] . . . fairness to affected interests 
through advance notice [and] broad rights of participation in the rulemaking process”); id. (noting 
additional constitutional constraints associated with the “regularity of process and transparency . . . and 
enforcement and management norms” (footnote omitted)). 
199. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 519, 543 (1978) 
(citations omitted). 
200. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, 547 F.2d 633, 643  
(D.C. Cir. 1976), rev’d sub nom., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519. 
201. Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of the Hard Look: Judicial Activism and Administrative Law, 
7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 52-53 (1984). 
202. See supra text accompanying note 24; Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 95 (2015) 
(rejecting nearly twenty years of D.C. Circuit precedent, encapsulated by Paralyzed Veterans of America, 
to hold that notice and comment is not required when an agency alters an interpretive rule with a new 
interpretive rule); Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997); 
see also Beermann & Lawson, supra note 178, at 860 (arguing that Vt. Yankee can be read, today, to 
“forbid imposition of any administrative procedures not firmly grounded in some source of positive 
statutory, regulatory, or constitutional law”). 
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by agencies at the behest of both Presidents Obama203 and Trump.204 The decisions 
in these cases did not hinge on whether the President’s exercise of power was 
excessive but, rather, on a determination that the policies, while spearheaded by the 
President, lacked the notice-and-comment process required by everyday 
regulation.205 It is remarkable that, despite the very limited role of judicial 
engagement in rulemaking post–Vermont Yankee, the Court has delegitimized 
policies with significant presidential imprimatur by deciding that they violate the 
minimal expectations of the APA. This set of cases exemplifies how interventionist 
the overseer approach to judicial administration can be. 
C. “Hard Look” Review 
Presidents may choose to influence agency expertise206 or to defer to it.207 On 
the one hand, Kagan has argued that when the President has taken an active role in 
administrative decision, courts should reduce their intensity of review under hard 
look doctrine.208 Some scholars suggest that presidential involvement can improve 
agency expertise by making it more accountable to public values209 and that 
insulation more generally interferes with the President’s constitutional authority to 
exert control over his branch.210 On the other hand, presidential influence can 
deteriorate the neutrality of agency expertise,211 for instance, by swaying it toward 
political interests; accordingly, this view suggests that deference to independent 
agency expertise can “ameliorat[e] potential problems with  
presidential administration.”212 
 
203. See supra text accompanying note 21 (discussing the DAPA case, United States v. Texas, 
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)). 
204. See supra text accompanying note 20 (discussing Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139  
S. Ct. 1804 (2019)). 
205. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); Azar 
v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804. 
206. “The Bush administration, for example, demonstrated a behind-the-scenes willingness to 
influence agencies’ scientific findings.” Watts, supra note 5, at 685 (footnote omitted). 
207. Daniel A. Farber, Presidential Administration: Then and Now, 43  
ADMIN. & REGUL. L. NEWS 4, 5 (2017) (pointing out that Kagan noted in her article that President 
Clinton deferred “to agency staff on scientific matters”). 
208. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2372, 2380-83. 
209. See generally Cary Coglianese, Improving Regulatory Analysis at Independent Agencies, 67  
AM. U. L. REV. 733, 746–47 (2018) (arguing for the improvement of executive oversight of independent 
agency policymaking). 
210. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 1, at 599 (arguing that any agency insulation interferes 
with the President’s constitutional power). 
211. See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 599, 612 (2010) (“Independence was traditionally justified, particularly during the New 
Deal era, as promoting expertise.” (footnote omitted)). 
212. Farber, supra note 207, at 5 (“Kagan viewed President Clinton’s deference to agency staff 
on scientific matters as a significant factor in ameliorating potential problems with presidential 
administration.”); see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 55-63 (1993) (arguing for a “depoliticized regulatory process,” that experts should 
play a large role in policymaking and that there are “inherent” benefits to expertise and insulation from 
politics); Bruff, supra note 43, at 489 (suggesting that the President should exercise his appointments 
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Still, others argue a middle ground.213 In this vein, some suggest that presidents 
should be able to foster agency independence if it serves them.214 Others  
contend that while agencies may legitimately be swayed by politics, courts  
should not privilege presidential administration of expertise in  
arbitrary-and-capricious review.215 
Likewise, courts administer expertise—in particular, through the doctrine of 
“hard look.” Hard look review is based in Louis Jaffe’s exhortation that courts take 
on a more significant role in reviewing administrative agency action.216 Soon after 
Vermont Yankee was decided,217 the doctrine of hard look arose. From the 1980s 
until today, courts have engaged in hard look review, by which they interrogate 
agencies’ development and application of expertise. Hard look review “subjects 
agency reasoning processes that underlie significant policy decisions, to a 
heightened form of rationality review”218 under APA section 706(2)(A)’s arbitrary-
and-capricious review, which is otherwise a deferential standard.219 Hard look 
doctrine has evolved the arbitrary-and-capricious standard into a stronger review of 
the agency’s record and may entail judicial involvement in the minutiae of 
administrative policymaking. As Cass Sunstein says, “[t]he judicial role has 
manifested itself most prominently in the development of ‘hard look doctrine.’”220 
State Farm is widely understood as establishing hard look review.221 After 
administrative and legislative proceedings, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
 
power “to select regulatory officers who understand and appreciate the boundary between expertise 
and policy,” allow “experts who are not in political positions to communicate their views on science 
and policy to Congress and the public . . . , [and] limit the number of prompting directives”). 
213. For instance, Cass Sunstein has suggested that “presidential supervision is likely to be an 
important supplement to judicial review, serving some of the functions of the hard look doctrine 
without being subject to its risks.” Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101  
HARV. L. REV. 421, 487 (1987). 
214. See Metzger, supra note 28, at 1928–29 (suggesting that agency independence may in some 
cases even benefit a president’s agenda); Bressman & Thompson, supra note 211, at 631 (suggesting 
that “the President may seek a degree of independence to make credible a commitment to address a 
long-term problem”); cf. Shah, supra note 3, at 2008-13 (arguing that Congress may foster agency 
independence to improve fidelity to legislative directives). 
215. Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law: Power, Rationality, and 
Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1839–42 (2012); Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary 
and Capricious Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 197 (2012). 
216. See generally JAFFE, supra note 28; Daniel B. Rodriguez, Jaffe’s Law: An Essay on the 
Intellectual Underpinnings of Modern Administrative Law Theory, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1159, 1160 
(1997) (characterizing Jaffe as “the intellectual architect of hard look review”). 
217. See supra Section I.A. 
218. Richard W. Murphy, The Limits of Legislative Control over the “Hard-Look,” 56  
ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1126 (2004). 
219. Sunstein, supra note 213, at 463-65, 470–72 (1987) (noting that hard look is a deferential 
standard that considers whether agencies have used illegitimate or irrational factors while developing 
policies); see also cases cited supra note 75 (listing examples of cases in which courts have applied the 
arbitrary and capricious standard in a deferential manner). 
220. Sunstein, supra note 213, at 463. 
221. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983) (“An 
agency’s view of what is in the public interest may change, either with or without a change in 
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Administration (NHTSA) issued Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208 in 1977, which 
mandated the phasing in of passive restraints on vehicles—either automatic seat 
belts or airbags.222 The automobile industry geared up to comply.223 Then, in 1981, 
after President Reagan entered the White House, the new Secretary of NHTSA 
reopened the rulemaking, received written comments, held public hearings, and 
ultimately rescinded the passive restraint requirement.224 
In State Farm, the Court evaluated whether the agency’s rescission of the seat 
belt requirement was based in expertise. The Court declared that its scope of review 
under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard is “narrow and a court is not to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”225 Furthermore, the Court notes that 
field studies regarding auto safety are “precisely the type of issue” that is primarily 
within agency expertise and “upon which a reviewing court must be most hesitant 
to intrude.”226 Nonetheless, the Court picked apart the agency’s decision227 and 
ultimately decided that the agency’s rescission of the rule was arbitrary  
and capricious. 
Hard look review “continues to this day unabated,” which some note with 
criticism.228 For instance, hard look has been criticized from a functionalist 
perspective as a mechanism for the Court to substitute its own, inferior judgment 
for that of the agency.229 Moreover, both formalists and functionalists view hard 
look as allowing the Court to make policy decisions on the agency’s behalf.230 
 
circumstances. But an agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis . . . .” (citation 
omitted)); see also Sunstein, supra note 192, at 210 (“The State Farm decision expressly endorses the 
primary elements, both substantive and procedural, of the hard-look doctrine.”); Peter L. Strauss, 
Considering Political Alternatives to Hard Look Review, 1989 DUKE L.J. 538, 539 (1989) (“[I]n Motor 
Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co . . . the Court 
essentially endorsed ‘hard look’ review.”). 
222. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 34–37. 
223. Id. at 38. 
224. Id. at 39. 
225. Id. at 43. 
226. Id. at 53. 
227. For instance, the Court suggested that even if seatbelts were wanting, NHTSA completely 
failed to consider an alternative of airbags; determined that the agency is too quick to dismiss the 
benefits of detachable seat belts (and therefore, that the agency does not adequately consider consumer 
inertia); and declared that the agency did not articulate a basis for not requiring non-detachable, “spool 
out” seat belts. Id. at 48, 54–55 (“At very least, this alternative way of achieving the objectives of the 
Act should have been addressed and reasons given for its abandonment.”); id. at 52–53 (claiming “there 
is no direct evidence” supporting the agency’s finding that automatic seatbelts will not improve safety); 
id. at 55 (arguing that the emergency release on spooling seat belts seems as successful as those on 
detachable belts); see also Sunstein, supra note 192, at 196–97. 
228. Beermann & Lawson, supra note 178, at 859, 881–82 (noting disapproval from scholars 
such as Paul Verkuil). 
229. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1507 
(1983) (“Courts cannot take a hard look at materials they cannot understand nor be partners to 
technocrats in a realm in which only technocrats speak the language.”). 
230. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 558 
(1985) (using State Farm as an example of when “hard look review [has] permit[ted] a court to substitute 
its judgment for the agency’s on the pretext of determining whether a policy outcome is ‘reasonable.’” 
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Indeed, the formalist view that hard look review allows the judiciary to engage in 
legislative policymaking drives Paul Verkuil’s suggestion that there be a “Vermont 
Yankee II” to curb this doctrine.231 
It is difficult to distinguish between judicial oversight and purposivism in this 
doctrine. Mere supervision of the development of expertise may appear 
indistinguishable from the exercise of policymaking power and may also have a 
significant impact on policy outcomes.232 Furthermore, requiring agencies to bulk 
up rulemaking records to justify decisions based in administrative expertise could, 
in fact, be a reflection of the court’s policymaking interests. In any case, hard look 
doctrine entails judicial involvement in the minutiae of administrative policymaking; 
in this way, it certainly serves administrative policymaking, if not replaces it. 
This Section asserts, however, that hard look doctrine fits into the overseer 
model of judicial administration, at least as a theoretical matter. First, it argues that 
hard look doctrine focuses on calibrating the influence of politics on policymaking, 
as opposed to the substance of policymaking outcomes. Ultimately, by allowing 
courts to monitor the impact of politics on agency decision-making, hard look 
review allows judicial oversight of administrative fidelity to the mandates of 
 
(footnote omitted)); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response 
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525, 549 (1997) (“To advocate hard look review in the context 
of the courts’ prescriptive substantive review function is really to advocate greater discretion on the 
part of judges to substitute their views of appropriate statutory policies and analytical methodologies 
for those of the agency.”). In regards to Massachusetts v. EPA, Ronald Cass suggests that the Court’s 
views on the causes and importance of climate change impacted its decision to require the 
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as pollutants. 
Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 
75, 75 (2007) (“In their eagerness to promote government action to address global warming, the Justices 
stretch, twist, and torture administrative law doctrines to avoid the inconvenient truth that this is not a 
matter on which judges have any real role to play.”); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,  
534–35 (2007) (holding that the agency’s action was arbitrary and capricious because it had offered no 
reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide whether greenhouse gases caused or contributed to climate 
change); id. at 500 (noting the “enormous potential consequences” of the EPA’s actions to stem global 
warming, that a “reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, 
no matter what happens elsewhere,” and that the “Court attaches considerable significance to EPA’s 
espoused belief that global climate change must be addressed”). 
231. Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking: Waiting for Vermont Yankee II, 
55 TUL. L. REV. 418, 418-19, 423-24 (1981); see also Beermann & Lawson, supra note 178, at 859 (noting 
that Verkuil drew on “Vermont Yankee as a broad symbol—a metaphor of sorts—for Supreme Court 
intervention to rein in undue lower-court interference with agency discretion and autonomy”). For a 
discussion of Vermont Yankee, see infra Section I.B. 
232. Sunstein, supra note 213, at 471 (describing hard look as the revitalization of “[a]n 
aggressive judicial role”); Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 2, at 783 (“Without doubt, judicial 
intervention through the ‘hard look’ doctrine made an enormous impact on administrative 
policymaking, an impact depicted in a large contemporary literature on administrative law.”). 
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structural constitutionalism,233 even if it curtails presidential administration as  
a result.234 
Second, this Section contends that hard look doctrine is rooted in the judicial 
supervision of agency expertise, which is distinct from legislative policymaking as a 
matter of custom. This Section makes this claim on the basis of public 
administration scholarship that describes the development of expertise as belonging 
to neither political branch, not even the legislature, and thus is legitimately within 
the domain of the judiciary. As a result, while the development of expertise bears 
on policymaking, the two are distinguishable. In keeping with this idea, hard look 
review does not generally, as an empirical matter, lead to an agency changing its 
policy.235 One reason for this may be that, despite the specter of the court’s 
disapproval, the final decision-making authority rests with the agency.236 
1. Overseeing Political Influence in Expertise 
The Court has long wrestled with whether presidential and political influence 
on agency expertise is justifiable. A key goal furthered by hard look review is 
identification of the appropriate level of agency responsiveness to the President’s 
agenda. In other words, courts have focused, in hard look doctrine, on whether 
policymaking outcomes have been unduly influenced by political interests, as 
opposed to encouraging any particular outcome. In this way, the judiciary has acted 
as overseer, seeking to ensure that there is a balance of political and technocratic 
factors shaping administrative policymaking. 
Despite the outstanding view of State Farm237 as purposivist,238 its most 
substantive contribution was the idea that “agencies should explain their decisions 
 
233. Sunstein, supra note 192, at 198 (arguing that hard look review is “a judicial check,” which 
“ensur[es] that agencies stay within the bounds set by Congress and guard[s] against arbitrariness[, is] 
an important, if imperfect, means of fulfilling some of the purposes underlying the original 
constitutional structure”); Sunstein, supra note 201, at 53 (“[A]ggressive posture of courts reviewing 
administrative action ought not to be understood as a usurpation of legislative or executive prerogatives, 
but as a way for the courts to reclaim some of their prior decision making authority, and at the same 
time to promote, rather than impair, the original purposes of the separation of powers.”). 
234. See Sunstein, supra note 201, at 53 (suggesting further that “the concern about judicial 
usurpation of executive authority, albeit legitimate, is insufficient to justify rejecting the current form 
of hard look”). 
235. William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review 
Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 393, 396 (2000) (“[J]udicial review in the D.C. Circuit under the hard look version of 
the arbitrary and capricious standard generally did not significantly impede agencies in the pursuit of 
their policy goals during the decade under review. In many cases, regulatory programs continued despite 
successful hard look challenges to particular agency rules.”). 
236. For instance, “State Farm . . . require[d] only reconsideration by the agency and d[id] not 
order the passive restraints rule into effect.” Sunstein, supra note 192, at 210-11 (noting that, because 
it may not change outcomes, hard look is “peculiarly vulnerable to the conventional challenge that it 
will serve only to produce needless formality”). 
237. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 57 (1983); 
supra notes 221-227 and accompanying text. 
238. See supra notes 230-231 and accompanying text. 
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in technocratic, statutory, or scientifically driven terms, not political terms.”239 For 
instance, while Ronald Cass suggests that the Court’s views on the causes and 
importance of climate change impacted its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,240 
Harold Bruff argues that the “Court’s unusually aggressive supervision of EPA in 
Massachusetts seems to be due to the majority’s belief that the agency was ignoring 
its own scientific record, which pointed strongly in favor of regulation, in favor of 
presidential policies that did not directly answer the statutory command.”241 
Some approve of the judiciary acting as arbiter of political influence on agency 
policies,242 and others disapprove.243 Of the former, some are concerned that the 
Court has chosen not to apply hard look when the agency has acted in response to 
political pressure.244 These scholars suggest that even policy changes in response to 
political influence should remain beholden to the expectations of hard look 
review.245 Of those who decry hard look limitations on political factors, some argue 
 
239. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 
YALE L.J. 2, 5 (2010) (emphasis omitted); see also Sunstein, supra note 213, at 470-71 (“The disagreement 
[in State Farm] . . . stemmed from contrasting views about the proper role of politics in the regulatory 
process.” (footnote omitted)). 
240. See Cass, supra note 230. 
241. Bruff, supra note 43, at 462–63 (“In essence, the Court was willing to prod the EPA to 
regulate based on its own view of the science of climate change, whatever the President might think. 
The Court never explicitly claimed that it was better suited than the President to make such a judgment, 
but its holding certainly implied such a view.”); see also Kathryn  
A. Watts, From Chevron to Massachusetts: Justice Stevens’s Approach to Securing the Public Interest, 
43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 1061-62 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s purposivism constituted 
adherence to legislative intent). 
242. Shannon Roesler, Agency Reasons at the Intersection of Expertise and Presidential Preferences, 
71 ADMIN. L. REV. 491, 497 (2019) (arguing, contrary to some scholars, that “when an agency is acting 
pursuant to a presidential directive, its decisions require more, not less, scrutiny”); Sunstein, supra note 
192, at 211 (“The technocratic rationality required by State Farm and similar decisions should be 
understood as a device, admittedly highly imperfect, for reducing the risk that agency decisions will 
result from ‘political’ considerations that are sometimes illegitimate and that at any rate ought not to  
be concealed.”). 
243. See Watts, supra note 239, at 2 (arguing that arbitrary and capricious review should privilege 
certain forms of political influence on agency decision-making); cf. Peter L. Strauss, Revisiting Overton 
Park: Political and Judicial Controls over Administrative Actions Affecting the Community, 39 UCLA  
L. REV. 1251, 1324 (1992) (arguing that allowing judges to “interfere with particular outcomes in the 
absence of constitutional or like instructions, simply on the grounds that political processes may have 
been inadequate, is inviting the whirlwind”). 
244. For instance, in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009), vacated, 567 
U.S. 239 (2012), the Court’s view that politics should be allowed to influence agency policies may have 
buoyed its decision to allow the agency to abandon a rule without an explanation for the change. See 
William W. Buzbee, The Tethered President: Consistency and Contingency in Administrative Law, 98  
B.U. L. REV. 1357, 1399 (2018); Short, supra note 215, at 1811; Watts, supra note 239, at 22 (“In 
upholding the FCC’s orders, Justice Scalia’s opinion . . . seems to make it easier for agencies to change 
their policies due to changes in the political landscape.”). 
245. See Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (quoting Motor Vehicle 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983)), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 1134 (2018); see also 
Buzbee, supra note 244, at 1400-01 (detailing how Encino Motorcars reinforced the requirements of 
hard look for policy changes). 
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that presidential influence on agency policies should encourage deference  
to agencies.246 
While acquiescence to the President may be the Court’s general inclination 
today,247 it has placed some limits on administrative capriciousness resulting from 
presidential administration. For instance, in Department of Homeland Security  
v. Regents of the University of California,248 the Court invalidated the 2017 rescission 
of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), accomplished at the urging 
of the Trump administration.249 According to the Court, the agency acted in an 
arbitrary and capricious manner because it took action based on a memorandum250 
that was not adequate to justify its action.251 Although the agency eventually 
supplemented its reasoning, the Court concluded that this supplement was made 
after the action was taken and therefore could not be relied upon to justify the prior 
action.252 As Ben Eidelson notes, the Court’s refusal to accept post hoc 
rationalization is a “turn toward an accountability-forcing brand of arbitrariness 
review”253—and that too, one the Court makes despite the accountability ostensibly 
fostered by the President’s interest in the recission of the DACA program. 
Furthermore, in Department of Commerce v. New York, the Court recently 
engaged in hard look review, initially to determine whether the President’s influence 
on the agency’s decision was permissible.254 However, the Court ultimately upheld 
 
246. Watts, supra note 239, at 2 (arguing that courts should allow agency policies that are 
responsiveness to “public values” espoused by the President to pass arbitrary and capricious review); 
Kagan, supra note 1, at 2380 (arguing for an approach that “relax[es] the rigors of hard look review 
when demonstrable evidence shows that the President has taken an active role in, and by so doing has 
accepted responsibility for, the administrative decision in question”). 
247. See infra notes 508-519 and accompanying text. 
248. 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020). 
249. Adopted by the Department of Homeland Security under President Obama, the DACA 
Memorandum established a process and agency-wide criteria for deferring removal for certain 
noncitizens “who came to the United States as children.” Memorandum from Janet Napolitano, Sec’y 
of Homeland Sec., to David V. Aguilar, Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Alejandro 
Mayorkas, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., and John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs 
Enf’t ( June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-
individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ2V-JSPA] . 
250. Memorandum on Rescission of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. DEP’T 
HOMELAND SEC. (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-
daca [https://perma.cc/9TD7-7M46] . 
251. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. at 1910 (noting that the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security “failed to consider . . . important aspect[s] of the 
problem,” per the requirements of State Farm). 
252. Id. at 1908–09. 
253. Benjamin Eidelson, Reasoned Explanation and Political Accountability in the Roberts Court, 
130 YALE L.J. (forthcoming Spring 2021), https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/beidelson/files/reasoned-
explanation.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7RL-PM6H] . But see Stephen Lee, DACA and the Limits of Good 
Governance, REG. REV. ( July 29, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/07/29/lee-daca-good-
governance/ [https://perma.cc/J5TG-2BXF]  (arguing that the Regents decision is “narrow” and 
“illustrates the limits of the good governance rationale in the context of ongoing struggles . . . to expand 
immigrant rights”). 
254. See supra text accompanying notes 7-12 (discussing Department of Commerce v. New York, 
139 S. Ct. 2551 (2019)). 
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a lower court decision setting aside the Secretary of Commerce’s decision to add a 
citizenship question on the 2020 Census because the Secretary’s expressed 
justification was pretextual255 and thus unavailable for “meaningful judicial 
review.”256 
While much of Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion treated the Commerce 
Secretary’s decision “as a perfectly reasonable and historically grounded policy 
choice,”257 the decision ultimately found that the Secretary “had lied.”258 This meant 
he put forth “‘contrived reasons [that] defeat the purpose’ of courts requiring 
agencies to provide reasoned explanations for their actions.”259 As the Chief Justice 
explained, “[i]f judicial review is to be more than an empty ritual, it must demand 
something better than the explanation offered for the action taken in this case.”260 
Despite this clear reprobation of the agency’s record, the Court did not 
determine that the decision failed arbitrary-and-capricious review,261 although 
Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence that he and three other Justices would have 
held this as well.262 Instead, the Court’s decision in this case was focused, distinctly, 
on the agency’s integrity, which is usually not the explicit concern of the  
arbitrary-and-capricious standard.263 However, as Gillian Metzger argues,  
arbitrary-and-capricious review “serves to identify pretextual decision making” 
—for instance, in the seminal State Farm decision.264 State Farm “did not put its 
holding in terms of pretext.”265 “[I]nstead[, State Farm] conclud[ed] that the agency 
was not acting reasonably to achieve its safety goals. However, an implicit corollary 
of concluding that an agency’s policy undercuts its stated goals is that those goals 
probably weren’t really motivating the agency in the first place.”266 
 
255. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2575 (concluding that “the decision to reinstate 
a citizenship question cannot adequately be explained in terms of DOJ’s request for improved 
citizenship data to better enforce the [Voting Right Act],” and thus that the agency’s explanation “is 
incongruent with what the record reveals about the agency’s priorities and decisionmaking process”). 
256. Id. at 2573. 
257. Metzger, The Roberts Court, supra note 60, at 26. 
258. Id. at 27. 
259. Id. 
260. Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. at 2576. 
261. See id. (remanding the matter to the agency). 
262. Id. at 2584 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“I agree with the Court that the Secretary of Commerce 
provided a pretextual reason for placing a question about citizenship on the short-form census 
questionnaire [but] . . . write separately because I also believe that the Secretary’s decision to add the 
citizenship question was arbitrary and capricious and therefore violated the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).”). 
263. Metzger, The Roberts Court, supra note 60, at 33 (“It’s true that arbitrary and capriciousness 
review does not usually speak in terms of pretext and the Supreme Court had not previously held agency 
action arbitrary and capricious on pretext grounds.” (footnote omitted)). But see id. at n.147 (noting that 
in Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171–76 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), the court 
of appeals applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to uphold “the district court’s determination 
that the justification given for Department of Homeland Security’s [DAPA] program was ‘pretext’”). 
264. Id. at 33. 
265. Id. 
266. Id. 
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Arguably, in both State Farm and Department of Commerce, the Court engaged 
in the overseer model of administration, by seeking to ensure merely that the policy 
was supported by the agency’s purported goals, as opposed to a policy that was 
responsive only to shifting political winds. That having been said, Department of 
Commerce effectively quashed the government’s decision to add a citizenship 
question to the Census, in part because any subsequent justification would be 
equally post hoc.267 Here, we see the potential for the Court to engage significantly 
in administration without making policy itself, in order to arbiter the proper 
influence of politics on agency decision-making. 
2. Supervising the Development of Expertise 
Hard look review is, fundamentally, oversight of the processes of agency 
expertise.268 Despite the consideration of political factors in State Farm, this and 
other cases serve as examples of hard look review emphasizing the importance of 
expertise.269 Many claim that hard look allows courts to substitute their own 
judgment, and impose their own policymaking preferences, on agencies.270 This 
Section argues that expertise-building is distinct from legislative policymaking as a 
matter of custom. More specifically, progressive scholarship from political science 
and public administration suggests that the development, substantiation, and 
application of expertise is not ascribed to either political branch of the government, 
not even the legislature. Certainly, figures like Frank Goodnow and Woodrow 
Wilson acknowledged that agencies settle value questions and engage in political 
issues. But they nonetheless distinguished between the administration of exercise 
and policymaking, despite the endless interaction between the two.271 
The legitimacy of agencies derives, in part, from the extent to which they are 
differentiated from political actors and have developed unique expertise.272 The 
 
267. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text. 
268. “One fundamental doctrine of judicial review, hard look review, both privileges expertise 
and has been found to improve the quality of administrative adjudication, in part because of its emphasis 
on the evaluation of agency process.” Bijal Shah, Interagency Transfers of Adjudication Authority, 34 
YALE J. ON REGUL. 279, 347-48 (2017) (footnotes omitted). 
269. Id. at 347 n.330 (listing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 
U.S. 29 (1983), Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 (1986), and Baltimore Gas  
& Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1983), as examples of hard look 
focused on expertise); see also Sunstein, supra note 213, at 470-71 (“The majority [in State Farm] treated 
the issue [of politics] as if it were simply one of the application of expertise to the problem.”); Sunstein, 
supra note 192, at 196. 
270. See supra notes 229-231 and accompanying text. 
271. “[T]he responsibility of administrative agencies to popular control was a value  
taken-for-granted; the responsiveness of administrators and bureaucrats was not seen as a problem 
because everyone then understood that politics and policy were separate from administration, which 
was concerned exclusively with the execution of assignments handed down from the realm of politics.” 
Wallace S. Sayre, Premises of Public Administration: Past and Emerging, 18 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 102,  
103 (1958). 
272. DANIEL CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, 
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATION IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 14-15 (2001); see 
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“science” of administration (which includes matters of internal agency organization 
and management), substantive scientific knowledge, and technocratic skills are all 
characterized as expertise. Since the New Deal, agencies have been responsible for 
the development and implementation of expertise while administering the law,273 
and they were favored for this purpose over judges as a functional matter.274 That 
having been said, agencies’ responsibility to administer expertise does not stem from 
the legislative delegation of policymaking power. 
In the late 1800s, around the time the first modern agency was created, 
commentators asserted that administration and politics—that is, the workings of 
bureaucracy and of the legislature—are in fact separate and that the former is 
located only in agencies,275 as opposed to Congress. One expectation of the modern 
agency was that it would engage in the work of “administration,” separate from 
what politicians do. In 1887, Woodrow Wilson noted, about the “province of 
administration,” that “[m]ost important to be observed is the truth . . . insisted upon 
by our civil service reformers; namely, that administration lies outside the proper 
 
also DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW: BENCH V. BUREAU IN THE 
UNITED STATES 18 (1983) (characterizing expertise as an “independent” power of agencies for the 
formulation and implementation of public policy). 
273. See James O. Freedman, Expertise and the Administrative Process, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 
364 (1976) (“Those who rationalized the New Deal’s regulatory initiatives regarded expertise and 
specialization as the particular strengths of the administrative process.”). 
274. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 23 (1938) (noting that agencies, 
unlike judges, develop expertise “from that continuity of interest, that ability and desire to devote  
fifty-two weeks a year, year after year, to a particular problem”); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics 
Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (rejecting a challenge to an agency policy in part because it 
concerns “the kind of issue where a month of [agency] experience will be worth a year of [judicial] 
hearings”); Elizabeth Fisher, Pasky Pascual & Wendy Wagner, Rethinking Judicial Review of Expert 
Agencies, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1681, 1682, 1721 (2015) (arguing generalist courts cannot effectively review 
scientific determinations from expert agencies). Critiques that courts lack the expertise to oversee 
agencies date back to before the APA. See, e.g.,  Hearings on H.R. 4236, H.R. 6198, and H.R. 6324, 
before Subcommittee No. 4 of the House Judiciary Committee, supra note 107 (statement of Hon. Harold 
L. Ickes, Sec’y, Department of the Interior) (arguing that courts have less expertise than agencies); A 
Bill to Prescribe Fair Standards of Duty and Procedure of Administrative Officers and Agencies, to Establish 
an Administrative Code, and for Other Purposes; A Bill to Revise the Administrative Procedure of Federal 
Agencies: To Establish the Office of Federal Administrative Procedure: To Provide for Hearing 
Commissioners: To Authorize Declaratory Rulings by Administrative Agencies: And for Other Purposes; 
and A Bill to Provide for the More Economical, Expeditious, and Just Settlement of Dispute with the United 
States, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before a Subcomm. of the  
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong. 173 (1941) (statement of Charles V. McLaughlin, Assistant Sec’y 
of Labor, Department of Labor) (arguing that increased judicial review would allow the judiciary to 
“substitute[e] its own judgment in legislative and executive matters for the qualified opinion of an 
expert body set up by Congress”); Robert M. Cooper, Administrative Justice and the Role of Discretion, 
47 YALE L.J. 577, 581, 596-98 (1938) (arguing that courts, like Congress, do not have the expertise or 
competence to administer the law). 
275. See, e.g., FRANK J. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY IN 
GOVERNMENT 10-11 (1900). See generally Leonard D. White, Public Administration, in RECENT 
SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S RESEARCH COMMITTEE ON 
SOCIAL TRENDS 1391 (1934) (discussing increased centralization, efficiency and expertise in the 
administrative state). Ernst Freund, who favored a “centralized, bureaucratic method of organizing 
administration,” looked to Europe as a model. POSTELL, supra note 29, at 181-82. 
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sphere of politics.”276 Wilson remarked further that “[a]dministrative questions are 
not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should 
not be suffered to manipulate its offices.”277 
At the turn of the twentieth century, scholars “contended that there were ‘two 
distinct functions of government’”278: as Frank Goodnow put it, “[p]olitics[, which] 
‘has to do with policies or expressions of the state will,’ [and] administration[, which] 
‘has to do with the execution of these policies.’”279 Nicholas Henry suggests this 
view was based in the view that “the legislative branch, aided by the interpretive 
abilities of the judicial branch, expressed the will of the state and formed policy, 
while the executive branch administered those policies impartially and 
apolitically.”280 Public administration was associated with unique scientific 
principles that both centered “in the government’s bureaucracy”281 and had no 
particular locus in any constitutional branch, including the political branches.282 For 
today’s purposes, this suggests that an agency’s development of expertise is separate 
from legislative policymaking.283 
Complementarily, scholars also noted a lack of constitutional constraints to 
the development of administrative expertise. Ernst Freund distinguished the work 
of administration from that of the legislature and the judiciary on constitutional 
terms,284 while Wilson claimed that “the field of administration . . . at most points 
 
276. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 210 (1887). 
277. Id. 
278. Nicholas Henry, Paradigms of Public Administration, 35 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 378, 379 (1975). 
279. Id. 
280. Id. (“Separation of powers provided the basis of the distinction . . . .”). 
281. The emphasis of this paradigm was on “locus—where public administration should be.” 
Id. “[I]n the view of Goodnow and his fellow public administrationists, public administration should 
center in the government’s bureaucracy.” Id. 
282. See W. F. WILLOUGHBY, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION (1927); see also 
Foote, supra note 198, at 693 (noting that fundamental precepts of public administration include “the 
use of expertise to run programs; the development of a full administrative record to ensure reasonable 
decision-making; and enforcement and management norms”); Wilson, supra note 276, at 211 (“A great 
deal of administration goes about incognito to most of the world, being confounded now with political 
‘management,’ and again with constitutional principle.”); id. at 212 (noting that statutory law and the 
Constitution, which properly concern themselves with the development of “general law,” are not 
administrative and that only “the detailed execution of such plans is administrative”). 
283. Ross, supra note 101, at 530 (noting, in the twentieth century, “a general belief about the 
separation of the administration of law from politics, reinforced by the image of . . . expert bureaucrats 
controlling agency actions”); id. at 530 n.45 (citing work by Lisa Bressman and Mark Seidenfeld that 
identifies “the early twentieth century dominance of the ‘expertise’ model of administrative law in which 
agencies through their expertise were considered ‘better positioned to produce sound regulation and 
good government than elected officials’”); see also Nicholas Bagley, The Puzzling Presumption of 
Reviewability, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1286 (2014) (“As for history, the sort of judicial review that the 
presumption favors—appellate-style arbitrariness review—was not only unheard of prior to the 
twentieth century, but was commonly thought to be unconstitutional.”).  
284. Freund, supra note 65, at 404 (noting that administrative law “regulates and limits 
governmental action without involving constitutional questions. Its subject matter being the 
administration of public affairs, as distinguished from legislation on the one side and from the 
jurisdiction of the courts on the other, it has been aptly called administrative law”). 
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stands apart even from the debatable ground of constitutional study.”285 Goodnow 
also interrogated the assumption that public administration necessarily had 
“constitutional moorings.”286 Such thinkers have categorized the administration of 
expertise as “extra-constitutional.”287 
As is well known, early in the twentieth century there arose tension between 
the concept of administration as purely focused on science and information gleaned 
through expertise, and its potential to be political; indeed, the APA was passed as a 
symbol of the growing mistrust of administrative power.288 Accordingly, some 
social scientists progressed to the belief that public administration, on second 
thought, cannot be divorced from politics.289 Nonetheless, some of the same group 
of scholars suggested that, as a theoretical matter, agencies still act outside the scope 
of politics, despite their adjacency to the political branches.290 Likewise, government 
agencies themselves argue, perhaps unsurprisingly, against the judicial supervision 
of expert agency tribunals.291 Arguably, the development of agency expertise lies 
outside of the sphere of politics. For this reason, the judiciary may feasibly engage 
with this set of administrative responsibilities, as it has under the doctrine of hard 
look review, without acting as a policymaking decider, from a formal  
separation-of-powers perspective. 
 
285. Wilson, supra note 276, at 209–10. 
286. See Ralph Clark Chandler, Dual Sources of American Administrative Legitimacy, 7 
DIALOGUE 1, 7 (1984). This is not to say that there are no valid constitutional concerns associated with 
agencies’ pursuit of information. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, The Administrative Power of Investigation, 
56 YALE L.J. 1111, 1111 (1947) (arguing that agencies’ investigatory powers may harm “constitutional 
principles concerning privacy, searches and seizures, self-incrimination, and freedom from  
bureaucratic snooping”). 
287. GUSTAVUS A. WEBER, ORGANIZED EFFORTS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF METHODS 
OF ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3-5 (1919) (noting a shift in political science literature, 
toward the recognition of the need for technical, “extra-constitutional agencies” to further the tasks of 
government “efficient[ly] and economical[ly]” (emphasis added)); Wilson, supra note 276, at 211 
(“There is [a] distinction between constitutional and administrative questions . . . .”). 
288. See infra text accompanying notes 364, 366. 
289. See John M. Gaus, Trends in the Theory of Public Administration, 10  
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 161, 168 (1950) (“A theory of public administration means in our time a theory of 
politics also.”); Sayre, supra note 271, at 103 (expressing skepticism of agencies as a result of the 
perceived involvement of administrators in politics); id. at 104 (“Public administration is one of the 
major political processes.”). 
290. See, e.g., Sayre, supra note 271, at 102-03 (arguing that administration is concerned primarily 
with “[o]rganization theory,” that is, challenges associated with “the necessities of hierarchy, the uses 
of staff agencies, a limited span of control, [and the] subdivision of work by such ‘scientific’ principles 
as purpose, process, place, or clientele”); see also Herbert A. Simon, A Comment on “The Science of Public 
Administration,” 7 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 200, 200–01 (1947) (suggesting that public administration 
remained separate from politics and comprised expertise—in particular, two types: a “pure” science of 
administration and the prescriptive decision-making required to issue public policy). 
291. See Hearings on H.R. 4236, H.R. 6198, and H.R. 6324, before Subcommittee No. 4 of the 
House Judiciary Committee, supra note 107, at 107 (statement of Hon. Stephen B. Gibbons, Assistant 
Sec’y, Treasury Department) (noting that in the debates leading to the APA, the Department of War 
argued that “courts are in no position to supervise the exercise of discretionary authority by these 
specialized tribunals except in those cases where there is a clear abuse of power or authority”). 
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Finally, the functional perspective on judicial control of expertise parses the 
matter differently. On the one hand, there are functional reasons to allow agencies 
to maintain primary control over the development and evaluation of information.292 
On the other hand, for those concerned with the technical failings of agencies,293 
there is impetus to give power to courts in this domain.294 A growing functional 
distrust of agencies could be alleviated by a greater emphasis on hard look. More 
intense judicial involvement in the development of agency expertise could push 
agencies to maintain a better quality of expertise despite pressure from the President 
to give short shrift to policies based in independent scientific data. 
For instance, in regard to the Affordable Clean Energy Rule,295 some have 
called the new policy “alarming,”296 and others suggest that it evinces poor or 
obscure scientific reasoning on the part of the Environmental Protection Agency.297 
Accordingly, the Court should scrutinize the agency’s development and application 
of expertise under hard look. Furthermore, to maintain consistency with 
 
292. Emily Hammond Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as 
Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733, 734 (2011) (arguing “that courts ought to be at 
their ‘most deferential’ when reviewing an agency’s scientific determinations,” as “is supported by basic 
notions of institutional competence and . . . a natural judicial tendency to avoid any deep confrontations 
with science” (footnote omitted)); see also supra note 274 and accompanying text. Judicial restraint may 
allow an agency the autonomy to maximize its own, targeted resources and permit a fuller expression 
of the policy, while minimizing the burden on courts, which are tasked with a more generalized 
mandate. Furthermore, it may be misguided to draw on ever-increasing procedure, and in particular 
judicial review, as the basis for administrative legitimacy and accountability. See generally Nicholas 
Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118 MICH. L. REV. 345 (2019). 
293. See, e.g., MARVER H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT 
COMMISSION (1955) (arguing that agencies atrophy and become subject to capture); THEODORE LOWI, 
THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); Mark Green & Ralph Nader, Economic Regulation  
vs. Competition: Uncle Sam the Monopoly Man, 82 YALE L.J. 871, 874–75 (1973) (noting that Congress 
often fails to give agencies enough guidance in the development of expertise). 
294. Indeed, despite Judge Leventhal’s earlier enthusiasm for agency expertise, he eventually 
became convinced that courts should be part of the administrative, record-building process. Compare 
Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Civ. Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 632-33 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (rejecting a challenge 
to an agency policy in part because it concerns “the kind of issue where a month of [agency] experience 
will be worth a year of [judicial] hearings”), with Greater Bos. Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 
851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970). 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20 (discussing Repeal of the Clean Power Plan; 
Emission Guidelines for Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Existing Electric Utility Generating Units; 
Revisions to Emission Guidelines Implementing Regulations, 84 Fed. Reg. 32,520 (July 8, 2019) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
296. Lincoln L. Davies, Tyler Hubbard & Christopher Sanders, Trump, Energy Policy, and Hard 
Look Review 21-2 (Ohio State Pub. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 504, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3454533 [https://perma.cc/MG4S-9ZQK] . 
297. See Jessica Wentz, Four Important Points About EPA’s Affordable Clean Energy Rule, 
COLUM. L. SCH.: CLIMATE L. BLOG ( June 20, 2019), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/
2019/06/20/four-important-points-about-epas-affordable-clean-energy-rule/ [https://perma.cc/MQ 
2G-Q8DN] (suggesting that the “EPA revised its methodology to downplay the public health impacts 
and costs of replacing the CPP with the [Affordable Clean Energy] Rule”); Lisa Friedman, E.P.A. Plans 
to Get Thousands of Pollution Deaths Off the Books by Changing Its Math, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,  
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/20/climate/epa-air-pollution-deaths.html [https:// 
perma.cc/P65Y-H52G] . 
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Massachusetts v. EPA,298 the Court would be advised to push back against the 
agency’s similar reasoning here—that regulatory rescission effected by the 
Affordable Clean Energy Rule is required, because otherwise the agency would 
exceed its jurisdiction under the Clean Air Act.299 
II. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF STATUTORY DIRECTIVES 
The President’s involvement in administrative statutory interpretation is 
controversial.300 This is because the President is rarely delegated direct power to 
implement a statute. Rather, Congress generally allots the authority to implement 
legislation to agencies (or, to be precise, to agency heads). Accordingly, Kevin Stack 
argues that the President should not be allowed to exercise the discretion to 
interpret statutes that has been delegated to an agency, as opposed to the  
President herself.301 
Courts, too, influence the outcomes of policymaking by taking control of 
administrative statutory interpretation. Unlike the President, however, the judiciary 
has a privileged role in administrative statutory interpretation. Furthermore, also 
somewhat unlike the President,302 courts have uncontested power to issue directives 
that legally bind agencies. 
Part I noted that, in the past, the judicial review of agency processes was 
characterized, in effect, as part of the decider model of judicial administration and 
argued that the overseer dimensions of this paradigm have been overlooked. The 
instant Part argues that the opposite is true today in regard to the judicial 
administration of statutes. Just as Chevron303 is a doctrine of judicial restraint, the 
current trend rebuking Chevron reinforces the decider model of judicial 
administration, in which judges “step directly into the shoes” of the agency head304 
and exercise policymaking power delegated to agencies. 
This Part leans into the debate between formalists and functionalists regarding 
Chevron and the extent to which neither considers seriously that there may be limits 
to judicial review. It does not argue that judicial statutory interpretation is 
 
298. See generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding invalid the agency’s 
argument that it was not authorized to regulate carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases as pollutants 
under the Environmental Protection Act). 
299. Wentz, supra note 297 (noting that the “EPA asserts the [Clean Air Act] does not grant 
[authority for the CPP] on the basis of the plain meaning, structure, and legislative history of the [Act],” 
and that “[n]otably, EPA has tried this very move before—and lost before the Supreme Court [i]n 
Massachusetts v. EPA (2007)”). 
300. “American public law has no answer to the question of how a court should evaluate the 
president’s assertion of statutory authority.” Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA  
L. REV. 539, 539 (2005). 
301. See generally id. 
302. See generally Strauss, supra note 34 (discussing and contesting the President’s authority to 
issue binding directives on—that is, to make decisions on behalf of—agencies). 
303. See generally Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
304. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 42, at 1205 (discussing Kagan’s model of presidential 
administration as that of the President “step[ping] directly into the shoes of the relevant official”). 
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illegitimate, especially from a functionalist perspective. However, it does suggest 
that formalists, in particular, cannot argue for judicial primacy in this arena without 
considering the extent to which this approach encourages the judiciary to infringe 
on the authority of the other branches of government per formalists’ own 
conception of the separation of powers. 
Certainly, courts have a mandate to ensure that agencies’ interpretations of 
statutes comply with constitutional expectations and legislative intent. Courts’ 
power to review agency actions arises from the conference of “original jurisdiction 
of all civil actions under the Constitution,”305 and from organic statutes with explicit 
provisions for judicial review, including the APA. 
To the extent agencies “apply the Constitution through statutory 
interpretation,”306 courts have the power to attend to constitutional matters 
implicated by these interpretations.307 Courts are particularly justified in maintaining 
control over administrative statutory interpretation when doing so is necessary to 
manage a constitutional matter, such as preservation of the First Amendment308 or 
application of the Supremacy Clause,309 although constitutional implications may 
obscure the fact that the Supreme Court ultimately engaged in more pedestrian 
statutory interpretation.310 Administrative law is centered as well on judicial 
“interpretations of the statutes establishing the agencies,”311 although the judiciary’s 
role in this regard was not inevitable.312 Shaping administrative policy through the 
 
305. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Administrative statutory interpretation is particularly judicial when it 
involves interpreting a statute in a way that prevents its enforcement by the agency from being 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., FTC v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 307 (1924) (refuting the Federal 
Trade Commission’s interpretation of the Federal Trade Act because the agency interpretation was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment). 
306. Ross, supra note 101, at 561. 
307. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Law, 107 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1674 (2019) (suggesting that 
the canon of constitutional avoidance limits Chevron deference to agencies). 
308. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 
190–91, 195–96 (2012) (creating a more expansive First Amendment prohibition against the application 
of anti-discrimination law to religious employers); NLRB v. Cath. Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 507 
(1979) (eradicating National Labor Board jurisdiction over parochial schools); see also Douglas Laycock, 
Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to 
Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1374 (1981). For more recent examples, see supra  
notes 121-123. 
309. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley Cap. Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 545–52 
(2008) (applying the Supremacy Clause to limit the authority of the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission under the Mobile-Sierra presumption when state law has deregulated its energy markets). 
310. For instance, in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, discussed supra note 308, the “Supreme Court 
affirmed the Seventh Circuit [in this case], but [only] on statutory grounds.” Laycock, supra note 308, at 
1374 (emphasis added); see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Labor Relations Board Regulation of Parochial 
Schools: A Practical Free Exercise Accommodation, 97 YALE L.J. 135, 135 n.2 (1987) (noting a case in 
which the Supreme Court evaded the constitutional questions raised by the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses on which the Court of Appeals based its decision). 
311. Mark Tushnet, Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court’s Accommodation of 
Progressive Legal Theory, 60 DUKE L.J. 1565, 1637 (2011). 
312. Cf. LANDIS, supra note 274 (critiquing the court-centric view of administration and arguing 
that it need not have been this way). For instance, Nicholas Bagley points out that there is a “puzzling 
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interpretation and distillation of legislation is generally accepted as an exercise of 
judicial power that Cynthia Farina refers to as the “independent judgment model” 
of statutory interpretation.313 
However, statutory interpretation is also a tool of administration.314 As a 
matter of positive law, agencies are delegated policymaking authority in order to 
implement legislation.315 As a descriptive matter, Bill Eskridge notes that in cases 
since Chevron, “the primary engine of statutory dynamism is and long has been 
agencies, with courts as second-level interpreters (if that) in most instances.”316 
Accordingly, the “deferential model” of statutory interpretation suggests that 
“principal interpretive responsibility rests with the agency” and that “[t]he court 
must accept any reasonable construction offered by the agency, so long as the 
statutory language or, possibly, the legislative history is not patently inconsistent.”317 
Per this account, “the agency’s function is to give meaning to the statute: the court 
determines only whether the interpretation the agency has chosen is a ‘rational’ 
reading, not whether it is the ‘right’ reading.”318 
 
presumption” in favor of judicial review, even in instances when Congress has expressly legislated 
against it. See generally Bagley, supra note 283. 
313. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative 
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453-54 (1989) (“In [this] model, the interpretive authority rests 
principally with the court. Using traditional techniques of statutory construction, the court exercises its 
own judgment to determine de novo what the statute means.” (footnote omitted)); see also Louis  
L. Jaffe, The Judicial Universe of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 62 HARV. L. REV. 357, 412 (1949); Clyde  
W. Summers, Frankfurter, Labor Law and the Judge’s Function, 67 YALE L.J. 266, 303 (1957). 
314. Frederic P. Lee, Legislative and Interpretive Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1, 24 (1940) (“To 
administer a statutory rule, the administrative officer or agency must first interpret it and determine the 
facts to which it applies. This is especially so where the statutory rule is expressed by Congress in general 
terms as is usual.” ); Wilson, supra note 276, at 212 (“Every particular application of general law is an 
act of administration.”); Foote, supra note 198, at 693 (“[T]he specific procedures that agencies must 
use to formulate substantive rules . . . advance the values of public administration.”) (emphasis  
in original). 
315. Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85  
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1447 (2017) (“Many statutes contain specific statutory delegations of 
authority . . . to accomplish a particular, congressionally identified goal, and resolving such matters 
obviously is not a matter of interpretation but of pure, naked policymaking.” (footnote omitted)); 
Michael Herz, Chevron Is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1883–84 (2015) 
(arguing that agency implementation of statute is not “statutory interpretation,” but  
rather policymaking). 
316. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1196 (2008). 
317. Farina, supra note 313, at 454. 
318. Id. 
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(It is worth noting, briefly, that the deferential model does not hinge on 
whether agencies exercise legislative319 or executive320 power while engaging in 
administrative statutory interpretation. Of course, any comparison of executive and 
legislative power is fraught. Indeed, whether power is exercised in one domain or 
the other may be difficult to parse321 and may even be moot.322) 
In many ways, Chevron strikes a balance between the independent judgment 
and the deferential models of statutory interpretation, in that it limits (albeit 
imperfectly) the judiciary to the role of overseer, by focusing judicial review on the 
reconciliation of agency action with legislative intent, as opposed to on 
policymaking outcomes.323 Indeed, Chevron was once “embraced by the right as an 
effort to cabin the illegitimate exercise of policymaking authority of unelected 
judges . . . and to insist instead on the primacy of officials within the  
Executive Branch.”324 
 
319. While formalists and functionalists on the farthest ends of the spectrum disagree as to 
whether agencies should exercise administrative power, they both take for granted that, for better or for 
worse, agencies do exercise legislative power. On the one hand, some formalists/orginalists are 
dismayed that “in the modern state, and for quite some time, Congress has delegated authority to write 
rules and regulations with the status of laws to administrative agencies situated within the executive 
branch.” Aditya Bamzai, Comment, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the 
Formation and Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 164 (2019) (declaring that 
“Congress is supposed to write laws”). On the other hand, some functionalists concede that 
administrative policymaking power stems from a delegation of legislative power from Congress, but 
they are not concerned about this. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 488-90 
(2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that delegations of legislative power to agencies are acceptable 
as long as the delegation offers an “intelligible principle”). 
320. Some argue that agencies’ policymaking authority is executive in nature—that is, associated 
with their duty to enforce the law. See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013) (“Agencies 
make rules . . . and conduct adjudications . . . and have done so since the beginning of the Republic. 
These activities take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—indeed, under our 
constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the ‘executive Power.’”); see also WILLOUGHBY, supra 
note 30, at 8-9 (noting that primary responsibility for executing the law lies with the President and 
agencies); Lee, supra note 314, at 1 (arguing that the power of administrative agencies to prescribe 
interpretive regulations is inherent to their placement within the executive branch and therefore need 
not be delegated by Congress); Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1557-60 (2015) (reviewing 
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014)) (suggesting this is the most 
agreed-upon theory of the origins of agencies’ policymaking power). 
321. See Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Rules–Interpretative, Legislative, and Retroactive, 
57 YALE L.J. 919, 919–20 (1948) (differentiating between “quasi-legislative” administrative rule-making 
and a seemingly distinct interpretive rule-making, which traditionally falls under the “executive” 
administrative powers, and noting they are difficult to distinguish in practice). 
322. Lee, supra note 314, at 25 (suggesting that the distinction between agency exercise of 
legislative and executive power is academic because “in most of its regulatory Acts Congress includes 
an authorization to ‘make such regulations as are necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act,’ or 
similar language”). 
323. See generally Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical Administrative Law, 133  
HARV. L. REV. 852 (2020). 
324. Sunstein, supra note 307, at 1618; see also Jonathan T. Molot, Ambivalence About Formalism, 
93 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (noting over a decade ago, a trend by which scholars sought to cabin judicial 
statutory interpretation through formalism, even as they embraced judicial discretion in  
constitutional theory). 
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Nonetheless, calls for the demise of Chevron are reaching a fever pitch, and the 
doctrine is weaker than before, due primarily to growing “judicial skepticism of 
administrative government.”325 In particular, the views of Justices Kavanaugh and 
Gorsuch are a rallying cry for those seeking to eliminate judicial deference to agency 
statutory interpretation.326 For instance, Justice Kavanaugh has argued that judges 
“should strive to find the best reading of the statute [and] should not be diverted 
by an arbitrary initial inquiry into whether the statute can be characterized as clear 
or ambiguous.”327 This position is remarkable given Justice Kavanaugh’s 
inconsistent view that the judiciary should abstain from interpreting the APA in the 
wake of Vermont Yankee.328 
Justice Gorsuch, too, “displays a viewpoint that, in historical terms, is relatively 
new at the Supreme Court level: full-scale, heated opposition to the very existence 
of judicial deference.”329 Echoing the Vermont Yankee prohibition on the judicial 
augmentation of the APA,330 Gorsuch has declared that the Auer doctrine (per 
which agencies are entitled to deference for their interpretation of their own 
regulations) constitutes an impermissible interpretation of the APA.331 In contrast 
 
325. Metzger, The Roberts Court, supra note 60, at 3 (suggesting that “the clearest example” of 
this skepticism is the mounting political pressure to eliminate Chevron); see also Cass R. Sunstein, 
Chevron Without Chevron, 2018 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 59 (2018) (noting that Chevron is “under serious 
pressure, fueled by some serious questions about the legitimacy of the regulatory state in general” 
(footnote omitted)). 
326. See Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 60, at 4 (noting, for instance, that “anti-administrative 
views quickly became a centerpiece of Gorsuch’s Senate confirmation hearings—surely never before 
have so many senators spoken at such length about the Chevron doctrine of judicial deference to 
administrative statutory interpretations” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 24 (“So far, only two Justices have 
concluded that Chevron deference to agency statutory interpretations is unconstitutional, though several 
more are willing to limit Chevron’s scope.” (foonotes omitted)); Bednar & Hickman, supra note 315, at 
1451 (noting the recent conversation between now-Justice Kavanaugh and Judge Katzmann 
“reflect[ing] disagreement over Chevron’s approach to statutory ambiguity as well”) (citing Brett  
M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2153-54 (2016) (reviewing 
ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)); and then citing Robert A. Katzmann, Response 
to Judge Kavanaugh’s Review of Judging Statutes, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 388, 398 (2016)); see also 
Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 761 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Chevron deference raises serious 
separation-of-powers questions.”). 
327. Kavanaugh, supra note 326, at 2144; see also Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to 
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (1989) (arguing that textualists like 
him—and presumably, Justice Kavanaugh—are less likely to find statutory ambiguity than those who 
give credence to legislative history while ascertaining a statutory interpretation). 
328. See supra notes 194–195 and accompanying text. 
329. Ronald Levin, Symposium: Auer Deference — Supreme Court Chooses Evolution, Not 
Revolution, SCOTUSBLOG ( June 27, 2019, 11:36 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019 
/06/symposium-auer-deference-supreme-court-chooses-evolution-not-revolution/ [https:// 
perma.cc/72FP-W7XC] . 
330. See supra Section I.B. 
331. “When this Court speaks about the rules governing judicial review of federal agency action, 
we are not (or shouldn’t be) writing on a blank slate or exercising some common-law-making power. 
We are supposed to be applying the Administrative Procedure Act. . . . Yet, remarkably, until today this 
Court has never made any serious effort to square the Auer doctrine with the APA.” Kisor v. Wilkie, 
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2431-33 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (going on to explain how Auer is a 
misconstruction of the APA). 
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to Vermont Yankee, however, Gorsuch argues that it is not the courts, but agencies, 
that are overempowered by this misinterpretation and therefore it is agencies, as 
opposed to courts, that should be constrained.332 
From these Justices’ perspective, eliminating deference to agencies’ statutory 
interpretation would rightfully reestablish power in the judiciary. However, this Part 
argues that a nuanced treatment of this effort to curb administrative power reveals 
that it encourages the courts to engage more directly in policymaking. In other 
words, the call to overturn Chevron is a move toward the decider model of the 
judicial administration of statutory implementation. 
This Part approaches this argument from three angles. First, it argues that 
courts have long deferred to the legislature, and to agencies themselves, the 
policymaking functions of administrative statutory interpretation. In other words, 
claims that eliminating Chevron deference would transfer power from agencies back 
to courts333 are overstated. 
Second, this Part notes that while Chevron concretizes the intuition that judicial 
review of agency statutory interpretation is separate from policymaking, it also 
provides adequate opportunity for courts to disengage from deference in order to 
uphold congressional intent on their own. In other words, Chevron allows courts 
much flexibility to exercise their powers of statutory interpretation, particularly 
while applying the Mead doctrine, otherwise known as Chevron Step Zero. 
Third, this Part illustrates that the decider approach to judicial review of 
statutory interpretation has come to greater fruition under a changing application 
of Chevron. To do so, it offers an example of a model of the decider approach that 
has recently been implemented at Chevron Step One. In these cases, the Supreme 
Court has asserted control over the interpretation of a statute by making 
questionable determinations that statutory language is unambiguous. By claiming 
statutory clarity despite apparent ambiguity, the Court appears to assume the 
policymaking function otherwise entrusted to agencies. This continued approach 
suggests that, whether or not Chevron is overturned, courts may begin to dictate 
administrative policymaking outcomes at a greater pace. 
A. Customary Judicial Reluctance to Make Policy 
Critics of the administrative state argue that there was a golden age in which 
courts had significant discretionary power.334 However, as this Section illustrates, 
they overlook the extent to which the judiciary has customarily been deferential to 
 
332. See id. 
333. “Anti-administrativists” advocate for “a strong turn to the courts to protect individuals 
against administrative excess and restore the original constitutional order.” Metzger, The Roberts Court, 
supra note 60, at 3 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Lee, supra note 86, at 1702-03. “At a 
general level, critics who argue for a return to nineteenth-century administrative law emphasize several 
features said to characterize the period,” including that “courts, not agencies, [were tasked] with 
enforcement of the most coercive policies.” Id. at 1203 (emphasis added). 
334. See Lee, supra note 86; Kisor, 588 U.S. at 2426 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
First to Printer_Shah.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/23/21  1:55 PM 
2021] JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 1171 
agencies on matters of statutory interpretation that bear on policymaking. In this 
way, courts have often retreated from the decider model of the judicial 
administration of statutory interpretation. 
“The legislature [is] the central administrative authority of the state.”335 
Accordingly, many “have long defended judicial power over statutory interpretation 
based on the assumption that judges serve as ‘faithful agents’ for Congress.”336 That 
having been said, administrative agencies owe their existence to Congress and play 
their own role as faithful agents.337 As a result, the judiciary is often deferential to 
agencies’ understanding of the legislation that animates them.338 
Jerry Mashaw notes that the prevalent notion that “administrative officers 
adjudicating cases and making rules appeared only in the late-nineteenth and  
early-twentieth centuries with the creation of so-called ‘independent’ agencies” is, 
in fact, a misrepresentation.339 In contrast, as early as the seventeenth century, 
philosophers warned against the exercise of lawmaking power by the judiciary: 
“There is no liberty,” says Montesquieu, “if the power of judging is not 
separated from the legislative power and from the executive power. If it 
were joined to the legislative power, the power over the life and the liberty 
of citizens would be arbitrary; for the judge would be legislator. If it were 
joined to the executive power, the judge might have the force of an 
oppressor.”340 
Accordingly, by the mid-1700s, there was widespread distrust of judicial 
power,341 including skepticism of the judicial exercise of discretion, which led, in 
part, to the development of stare decisis.342 William Nelson outlines how “judges 
of the eighteenth century . . . inherited a legal system that gave them little  
law-making power.”343 
In “the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries . . . matters of administrative 
structure and technique, and how they were shaped by legislation and administrative 
 
335. Freund, supra note 65, at 413 (making this observation reluctantly). 
336. Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury in the Administrative State: A Structural and 
Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1245 (2002). 
337. Metzger, supra note 28, at 1901; POSTELL, supra note 29, at 73 (noting that even in 
antebellum America, a time of noteworthy judicial power of the administrative state, there arose the 
understanding that “administrators” or “legislators,” and not the judiciary, “should be responsible for 
administrative decisions”). As Ernst Freund noted long ago, in some governmental systems in Europe, 
agencies can exercise power even “independent of statute.” Freund, supra note 65, at 410. 
338. See Foote, supra note 198, at 683 n.36. 
339. JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4 (2012) (“It is but a short step from [this 
misrepresentation] . . . to deep concerns about the legitimacy of the modern administrative state.”). 
340. Pound, supra note 65, at 137; see also Kagan, supra note 1, at 2270 (criticizing the courts for 
“suppress[ing] political control of administration by the legislature”). 
341. See NELSON, supra note 29, at 18 (“Given the vast powers of the courts, it is not surprising 
that men kept close watch over them. Colonials perceived that ‘an impartial administration of justice’ 
was of great ‘moment to the people . . . .’”). 
342. Id. at 18-20. 
343. Id. at 32. 
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action, were necessarily at the heart of the legal enterprise.”344 During that time, 
courts themselves explicitly acknowledged the primacy of the legislature in creating 
the law, and even in determining constitutionality, noting that statutory law has “its 
[own] force.”345 Complementarily, the nineteenth-century attitude toward courts 
was that they should be relatively hands-off agency action too.346 One commentator 
suggests that, since this time, agencies have had a “specification” or “completion” 
power to fill in statutory gaps.347 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the judiciary had the power to issue writs of 
mandamus, including writs to government officials ordering them to properly fulfill 
their official duties or correct an abuse of discretion.348 However, a court would 
compel only what it considered to be a “plain official duty, requiring no exercise of 
discretion,” which rendered the mandamus akin to an injunction enforcing the 
law.349 And in most other circumstances, “there was no judicial review at all, with 
aggrieved claimants relegated either to filing internal complaints with the agency or 
petitioning Congress for relief.”350 
Contemporaneously, “Congress had initiated programs that we would now 
characterize as welfare state activity: veterans’ disability pensions, the establishment 
and operation of seaman’s hospitals, and the provision of relief to persons suffering 
from ‘disasters’ brought about through no fault of their own.”351 Although these 
operations were not large, “each required the development of administrative 
techniques that would generate both a capacity for implementation and sources of 
control and accountability.”352 
Once Congress began to lack the “time, resources, foresight, and flexibility to 
attend to every conceivable detail of regulatory policy,” agencies were created to 
 
344. MASHAW, supra note 339, at 10. 
345. NELSON, supra note 29, at 109 (quoting Adams v. Howe, 14 Mass. (13 Tyng) 340,  
345 (1817)). 
346. MASHAW, supra note 339, at 10; Bagley, supra note 283, at 1286 (“[A]ppellate-style 
arbitrariness review [of agencies] was not only unheard of prior to the twentieth century, but was 
commonly thought to be unconstitutional.”).  
347. Ilan Wurman, The Specification Power, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 689, 709–12 (2020). 
348. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 609–10 (1838) 
(distinguishing between “political duties imposed upon many officers in the executive department” and 
duties that “grow out of and are subject to the control of law”); see also Garfield v. United States ex  
rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 261 (1908) (“It is insisted that mandamus is not the proper remedy in cases 
such as the one now under consideration. But we are of opinion that mandamus may issue if the 
Secretary of the Interior has acted wholly without authority of law.”). 
349. Garfield, 211 U.S. at 261-62 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also 1 RICHARD  
J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3, at 162–63 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that courts 
would grant writs of mandamus only for ministerial, not discretionary, matters). 
350. See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate 
Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 942 (2011). 
351. Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 
1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1338 (2006). 
352. Id. 
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assist in these matters.353 Then, the task of implementing various programs began 
to be delegated to agencies via statute; those responsibilities often involved 
policymaking.354 Some suggest that agencies fulfill only a managerial function as an 
extension of Congress,355 while others argue that officials who oversee 
administration are far from limited.356 
It need not have been this way. Indeed, the legislature might have assigned 
functions in support of itself to courts,357 notwithstanding potential constitutional 
repercussions of this approach.358 This implies that the designation of agencies—as 
opposed to courts—as the conduit for legislative policymaking is purposeful.359 In 
any case, agencies were designated as an extension of the political branches of 
government360 the way an assistant acts as the hands and labor of a visionary. 
 
353. Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency 
Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 364–65 (2010) (noting that “various characteristics 
of agency decisionmaking and institutional structure [made] . . . agencies tolerable (and perhaps even 
superior) substitutes for congressional lawmaking” (footnote omitted)); see also McKinley, supra note 87 
(“Much of what we now call the modern ‘administrative state’ grew out of the petition process in 
Congress.”); Hearings on H.R. 4236, H.R. 6198, and H.R. 6324, before Subcommittee No. 4 of the 
House Judiciary Committee, supra note 107, at 69, 107 (implying that agencies are better suited to 
administer the law than the legislature); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 442 (1998) (“Congress cannot supervise all of the details of 
agency action . . . .”); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century 
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 951 (2000) (noting that “the 
constitutionally created branches needed agents to perform the vast amount of detail work required to 
govern a modern society”). 
354. Mashaw, supra note 351, at 1268 (“Early Congresses delegated broad policymaking powers 
[which] . . . combined policymaking, enforcement, and adjudication in the same administrative hands, 
created administrative bodies outside of executive departments . . . .”). 
355. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to 
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097 (2004) (suggesting that institutional realities render 
agency policymaking limited). 
356. See, e.g., Mashaw, supra note 351, at 1339–41; Sidney A. Shapiro, A Delegation Theory of the 
APA, 10 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 89, 90 (1996) (“Congress delegates development of substantive policies 
to administrative agencies under broad and general guidelines when it is impracticable or impolitic for 
it to make such decisions.”). 
357. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 103 (“As we have seen, many functions can be assigned either to 
an agency or court or both.”); Lemos, supra note 353, at 365 (arguing that “we lack an account of the 
value—if any—of delegations to courts”). 
358. JAFFE, supra note 28, at 103 (noting constitutional concerns when courts engage in 
“functions” which may be “characterize[d] as ‘administrative’ and as such [are] not ‘judicial’”); Margaret 
H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81  
S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 405 (2008) (arguing that courts as well as agencies are constrained by the 
nondelegation doctrine); Freund, supra note 64, at 668 (“The real significance of administrative ruling 
authority then does not lie in any diversion of genuine judicial power, but in relieving the judiciary from 
functions in their nature more or less legislative.”). But see JAFFE, supra note 28, at 274-76 (“The mere 
fact that a question can be made the subject of administrative action does not mean that it is for that 
reason incapable of judicial enforcement, nor does it mean that the legislature intended it to be 
exclusively administrative.”). 
359. “To be sure, the failure of the legislature to grant the power in question [to the judiciary] 
may indicate an intention to withhold it.” See Freund, supra note 65, at 403. 
360. Sayre, supra note 271, at 105. 
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By the twentieth century, “the Supreme Court recognized the limitations of its 
role in reviewing agency exercises of specific authority grants.”361 Accordingly, 
“[c]ourts in the early part of the twentieth century tended to defer to agencies 
implementing and interpreting statutes.”362 Only around the first period of 
administrative growth, just prior to the passage of the APA, did scholars begin 
conceiving of agency power as unconstitutional,363 rather than legitimate 
administrative support for the political branches.364 And yet, worries associated with 
efforts to “judicialize administrative procedure” animated full-throated disapproval 
of the Walter-Logan bill, the precursor to the APA.365 
Eventually, the “view that legal checks, in their traditional form, are an 
indispensable constraint on regulatory administration”366 drove the enactment of 
the APA in 1946, but this perspective remained unpopular at the time.367 
Furthermore, as Cass Sunstein has recently argued, legislative history and other 
considerations suggest that the APA’s judicial-review provisions did not require de 
novo judicial review of agency statutory interpretation.368 A half century later, the 
Chevron opinion concretized the long-standing intuition that de novo review should 
be limited, by distinguishing between judicial statutory interpretation for purposes 
of upholding legislative intent and agency policymaking that furthered the 
 
361. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 315, at 1447–48 (discussing this as evident in a case decided 
in 1936); see also CASS ET AL., supra note 106, at 245 (noting that “[w]hether a . . . court has jurisdiction 
over a petition for judicial review is a distinct question from whether [a] challenged agency action  
is reviewable”). 
362. Ross, supra note 101, at 530-31 (“Courts even deferred to agencies’ interpretations of 
statutes that directly involved the Constitution.”); see also Lee, supra note 86, at 1703-06 (arguing that it 
was in fact “agencies, not the courts, [that] took the lead in interpreting the Constitution” per nineteenth 
century historians’ case studies of administrative constitutionalism). 
363. “The exercise of discretionary authority by administrative agencies has probably been 
subjected to more criticism than any other task of governmental administration . . . . All too frequently 
the exercise of discretion is loosely characterized by reference to some such vague symbolism as 
‘tyranny,’ ‘despotism,’ or ‘bureaucracy.’” Cooper, supra note 274, at 577. 
364. “[A] critical attitude reveals what appears to be a total misconception of the character of 
administrative discretion and the unavoidable necessity for its use in the execution of governmental 
policies.” Id. at 577-78. “This blind hostility and suspicion toward a legitimate administrative function 
is largely the result of a misunderstanding as to the basic problems of government which manifests 
itself in several different ways.” Id. at 577. 
365. Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 
277 (1978). 
366. Sunstein, supra note 76, at 2072; see also LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE ACT, S. DOC. NO. 248, at 3 (1946) (noting in the foreword that the APA “embarks upon 
a new field of legislation of broad application in the ‘administrative’ area of government lying between 
the traditional legislative and fundamental judicial processes on the one hand and authorized executive 
functions on the other”). 
367. Verkuil, supra note 365, at 276-77 (noting that interest in an administrative code like the 
APA was a “minority position” in contrast to many that advocated for administrative autonomy). 
368. See Sunstein, supra note 307, at 1652–57. 
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implementation of statute.369 Arguably, then, popular support for de novo review is 
a relatively new development. 
B. Chevron: An Imperfect Doctrine of Judicial Restraint 
Chevron is simply a doctrine of moderate (at best) judicial restraint.370 The 
decision made explicit the understanding that questions of policy and law are 
distinct and that Congress’s delegation of the former to agencies should be 
guarded.371 In other words, it is a doctrine advising courts to the adhere to an 
overseer model of judicial administration. Note, too, that presidential administration 
may impact judicial deference to agency statutory interpretation. Indeed, scholars 
have disagreed for some time as to whether agencies should merit more or less 
Chevron deference if the interpretation is accountable to the President.372 
Per Chevron, statutory ambiguity is a signal that Congress intended additional 
policymaking by agencies, not courts. As Chevron articulates, “[t]he power of an 
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program 
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap 
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”373 Furthermore, the Court declares, 
“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly 
 
369. William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 
138 (1991) (noting that a “line of precedents culminating with Chevron . . . conceded to agencies the 
power to fills statutory ‘gaps,’ both large and small”). 
370. See Bednar & Hickman, supra note 315, at 1444 (“With all of the debates and complaints 
about Chevron deference, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that Chevron is, primarily, just a standard of 
review rather than a rule of decision.”). 
371. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Chevron and its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency 
Interpretations of Statutory Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 303–04 (1988) (arguing that a “strong 
reading of Chevron” is proper because “agencies are the best equipped institutions to resolve policy 
questions in the statutes that grant the agency its legal power”). 
372. See Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, Administrative Law’s Political 
Dynamics, 71 VAND. L. REV. 1463, 1479-80 (2018) (interpreting Chevron to suggest that it “considered 
political accountability comparatively between the courts and executive agencies,” and not that 
presidential administration merits greater deference). Compare Kagan, supra note 1, at 2376 (“Chevron’s 
primary rationale suggests [an] approach . . . link[ing] deference in some way to presidential 
involvement.”), and Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 875-76 (1997), with Peter M. Shane, Chevron 
Deference, the Rule of Law, and Presidential Influence in the Administrative State, 83 FORDHAM  
L. REV. 679, 680 (2014) (arguing against the view that “presidential involvement in an agency’s decision 
making should intensify its entitlement to Chevron deference”), Stack, supra note 6, at 267 (arguing that 
“the President’s constructions of delegated authority should be eligible for Chevron deference, but only 
when they follow from statutes that expressly grant power to the President”), Lisa Schultz Bressman, 
Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 
463-64, 503-15 (2003) (arguing that political accountability cannot justify Chevron deference if an 
agency’s interpretation is irrational or adopted without the force of law), and Farina, supra note 313, at 
512 (arguing that “presidential control over domestic regulatory policy cannot cure the legitimacy 
problems posed by delegation” of legislative power to agencies under Chevron), and Kenneth W. Starr, 
Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 312 (1986). 
373. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (quoting 
Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
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conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than 
whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge 
must fail.”374 As Justice Scalia declared once Chevron was decided, “Congress now 
knows that the ambiguities it creates . . . will be resolved, within the bounds of 
permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency.”375 In  
this way, “Chevron . . . restrict[s] Article III courts to their appropriate  
institutional roles.”376 
And yet, this Section notes, Chevron also allows courts ample opportunity to 
exercise substantial control over administrative statutory interpretation, including in 
furtherance of policymaking. In other words, even a strict application of Chevron, as 
modified by more recent cases, allows courts to engage in de novo review at will. 
1. Step Zero: A Tool of Judicial Policymaking 
Even under the deferential model of statutory interpretation, courts are 
explicitly empowered to interpret certain ambiguous statutes.377 Principles 
introduced by the Mead case, sometimes referred to as Chevron Step Zero, allow 
courts to rely on signals that suggest Congress did not intend for an agency’s 
interpretation of statute to have authority. Mead declared that Chevron applies only 
if Congress delegated authority to an agency to make rules carrying the “force of 
law,” as shown by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication,  
notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by “some other indication of a comparable 
congressional intent,” and the agency uses this “force of law” authority to render 
the interpretation at issue.378 
Moreover, the FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,379 Massachusetts  
v. EPA,380 and Gonzales v. Oregon381 cases elaborated on Mead to suggest that, under 
certain extraordinary circumstances382 or in regard to “major questions”383 often 
 
374. Id. at 866. 
375. Scalia, supra note 327, at 517. 
376. West, supra note 162, at 629 (arguing that “Chevron [is] an analogue to Youngstown and to 
other doctrines of judicial deference that restrict Article III courts to their appropriate institutional 
roles”); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (noting that “[j]udges . . . are not part of either political branch 
of the Government” and suggesting “[i]n contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated 
policymaking responsibilities” is better situated to make a policy judgment). 
377. See Sunstein, supra note 307, at 1676-78. 
378. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (“We hold that administrative 
implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears that 
Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law . . . .”). 
379. 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
380. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
381. 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
382. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 763-64 
(2007) (noting that in Gonzales v. Oregon, “the Court refused to presume that Congress would have 
implicitly authorized the Attorney General to reach an issue as ‘extraordinary’ as the restriction of 
physician-assisted suicide”). 
383. Cass Sunstein suggests that the “major questions” doctrine is a nondelegation canon that 
should be deployed to limit Chevron deference to agencies. Sunstein, supra note 307, at 1674-78 (arguing 
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concerning matters of national import384 or the determination of agencies’ 
jurisdictions,385 courts can declare that Congress did not intend for agencies to 
interpret a statute, even if the statute is ambiguous. 
The Chevron Step Zero doctrine is far from uncontroversial.386 While some 
(including the Mead majority) argue that Chevron Step Zero allows courts to bring to 
bear a legitimate expression of legislative intent to exclude agencies from 
policymaking, others argue that it allows courts to commandeer policymaking.387 
Notably, Justice Scalia’s dissent in Mead suggests that Chevron Step Zero aggrandizes 
judicial power at the expense of the President.388 In any case, the panoply of cases 
that make up the Chevron doctrine allow the judiciary ample opportunity to take a 
primary role in administrative statutory interpretation. 
In a recent case entitled PDR Network, Justice Breyer remanded a case to the 
court of appeals to make an assessment under Chevron Step Zero. In particular, he 
asked the court below to determine whether an agency’s statutory interpretation was 
“legislative”—in other words, made with the force of law—and therefore an 
interpretation that could merit Chevron deference.389 However, Justice Kavanaugh’s 
concurrence emphasized that in his view the case concerned a major question or 
 
that as a general matter that nondelegation canons should cabin Chevron deference to agencies); see also 
Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency 
Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2019, 2022 (2018) (“[I]n a series of cases in the past three 
decades, the Supreme Court has held that where a statutory ambiguity raises a question of great 
‘economic and political significance,’ it will presume that Congress did not intend the agency to resolve 
the issue.” (citing King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015))). 
384. See Bressman, supra note 382, at 763 (noting that in Brown & Williamson, “[t]he Court 
refused to presume that Congress would have delegated ‘a decision of such economic and  
political significance’”). 
385. Id. at 799-800 (noting that in Brown & Williamson and Gonzales v. Oregon, agencies sought 
to claim jurisdiction, whereas in Massachusetts v. EPA, the agency “declined to assert jurisdiction under 
a statute that arguably encompassed the regulatory subject”). 
386. Cary Coglianese, Chevron’s Interstitial Steps, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1339, 1343 (2017) 
(noting that it is difficult to determine “[t]o what extent has the statute delegated implementing 
authority, including a kind of interpretive authority, to the agency”). 
387. See Emerson, supra note 383, at 2023-24 (arguing that Mead “licenses judicial intervention 
in intensely political disputes”). To this point, the Extraordinary Circumstances and Major Questions 
Doctrines tend to be exercised by the Supreme Court more so than lower courts, suggesting that courts 
are generally loath to undercut agency policymaking, provided it carries the “force of law.” See Michael 
Coenen & Seth Davis, Minor Courts, Major Questions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 777, 799-800 (2017) 
(suggesting that the Major Questions Doctrine should be exclusively applied by the Supreme Court, 
noting that “lower courts lack the institutional features necessary to further the benefits of the [Major 
Questions Doctrine], and any lower court involvement in the exception’s implementation will inflict 
unnecessary costs on litigants, agencies, and the courts themselves”). 
388. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1449 (2005) (noting that Justice Scalia’s dissent in the Mead case and his general 
support for eliminating Mead (and Skidmore, for that matter) would “remove[ ] from judicial control 
and remit[ ] to presidential control [the determination of] authoritative agency interpretations”  
(emphasis added)). 
389. PDR Network, LLC v. Carlton & Harris Chiropractic, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 2051, 2056 (2019). 
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issue of great importance, and that he would not defer to the agency’s interpretation 
even if the policy may be described as legislative.390 
In King v. Burwell, the Court declined outright to defer to an Internal Revenue 
Service regulation extending the tax credits the Affordable Care Act authorized to 
federal exchanges as well as those created by the states.391 In doing so, it cited FDA 
v. Brown & Williamson to suggest that this was an “extraordinary case[]” in which 
Congress did not intend an implicit delegation of policymaking authority to the 
agency.392 Nonetheless, six Justices (in a Court made up of fewer  
anti-administrativists than today) ultimately came to their own independent 
judgment that the relevant section of the statute should be interpreted just as the 
agency had in its regulation.393 PDR Network and Burwell showcase a tension 
between functionalist Justices’ apparent discomfort with engaging in policymaking 
and formalist (as well as functionalist) Justices’ openness to doing so all the same. 
Finally, it bears noting that the Court may engage in statutory interpretation 
by eschewing the entire Chevron framework altogether. For instance, during the 
George W. Bush administration, the Court interpreted the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 in a manner that invalidated a National Labor Relations Board 
policy awarding back pay to undocumented immigrant employees in some 
instances, despite previous judicial interpretation to the contrary.394 In this case, 
“the Court simply resolved the statutory question without relying on any of Mead, 
Chevron or Skidmore, notwithstanding party briefs or concurring or dissenting 
opinions discussing those cases.”395 
And in 2015, the Court determined that the Whistleblower Protection Act bars 
the Transportation Security Administration from taking enforcement action against 
an employee who intentionally discloses sensitive security information.396 This 
decision was based on the Court’s assessment that the phrase “prohibited by law” 
means prohibited by statute only and excludes prohibitions made by regulation.397 
While the agency’s regulation prohibiting the disclosure in question was effectively 
invalidated, the Court did not apply Chevron in order to do so. Instead, the Court 
interpreted a section of the statute that the agency simply failed to consider. 
 
390. Id. at 2062 (declaring that the question of interpretation “raises significant questions under 
the Due Process Clause,” a “serious constitutional issue,” and that Congress could not have intended 
the agency’s interpretation in this case). 
391. 576 U.S. 473 (2015). 
392. Id. at 485. 
393. Id. at 498 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), no less, to hold that 
its reading of the legislation is “fair”). 
394. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
395. See Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 549 (2014). 
See generally Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. 137. 
396. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. MacLean, 574 U.S. 383 (2015). 
397. See generally id. 
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Likewise, in 2020, the Court accepted an administrative interpretation of the 
Affordable Care Act,398 despite the fact that the Third Circuit affirmed a grant of 
preliminary injunction against the agency rule because the court of appeals 
considered the interpretation to be at odds with the statute itself.399 Superficially, 
the Supreme Court simply disagreed with the Third Circuit’s interpretation of 
statute and did not engage in a deference analysis, although the concurrence argued 
that it should have.400 As a result, however, the Court wielded its own power to 
decide the proper interpretation of statute in lieu of the agency. 
2. Step One: A Turn Toward the “Decider” Approach 
Prominent formalist Justice Kavanaugh has argued that it is precisely because 
statutory ambiguity can be found in any statute that judges should be the only 
arbiters of statutory meaning in every instance.401 However, by arguing that courts 
should ignore ambiguity and interpret all statutes as they wish, Kavanaugh is not 
advocating for the reinforcement of judicial power but, rather, for increasing the 
judiciary’s opportunity to make policy decisions in lieu of agencies. 
In addition, “[e]ven when judges employ pure de novo review using traditional 
tools of statutory construction with no layer of deference intruding, they often 
disagree over what statutes mean,”402 which suggests that many interpretations are 
 
398. In this case, the Supreme Court implies that the statute clearly allows for the agency’s new 
policy, issued at President Trump’s direction, allowing employers to opt out of providing no-cost 
contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul 
Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (2020); see also id. at 2397 (Kagan, J., concurring) (arguing that 
both the majority and dissent are incorrect that the statute is clear). 
399. Pennsylvania v. President of the United States, 930 F.3d 543, 575–76 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d 
sub nom., Little Sisters of the Poor, 140 S. Ct. 2367 (affirming the grant of preliminary injunction against 
agency rule allowing, at President Trump’s direction, employers to opt out of providing no-cost 
contraceptive coverage under the Affordable Care Act). “Nowhere in the enabling statute did Congress 
grant the agency the authority to exempt entities from providing insurance coverage for such services 
nor did Congress allow federal agencies to issue regulations concerning this coverage without complying 
with the Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. at 555. 
400. “Try as I might, I do not find . . . clarity in the statute. . . . But Chevron deference was built 
for cases like these. Chevron instructs that a court facing statutory ambiguity should accede to a 
reasonable interpretation by the implementing agency. The court should do so because the agency is 
the more politically accountable actor. And it should do so because the agency’s expertise often enables 
a sounder assessment of which reading best fits the statutory scheme.” Little Sisters of the Poor, 140  
S. Ct. at 2397 (Kagan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
401. See supra text accompanying note 326. 
402. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 315, at 1446-47 (noting further that “even if one pursues 
a robust, de novo–like analysis of statutory text, history, and purpose, some statutory questions simply 
do not have answers that can be derived through traditional common law reasoning”); see also Kristin 
E. Hickman, To Repudiate or Merely Curtail? Justice Gorsuch and Chevron Deference, 70  
ALA. L. REV. 733, 746 (2019) (illustrating that even “traditional tools of statutory interpretation are not 
especially helpful in narrowing statutory meaning to the point of practical application”); Sunstein, supra 
note 325, at 61 (noting that both “textualism and purposivism sometimes fail to give concrete answers 
to difficult statutory questions” under Chevron); Stewart, supra note 33, at 1785 (observing that 
“considerable . . . judicial reconstruction of a statute may be required in order to” assign paramount 
weight to one particular purpose). 
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policy determinations, not a clear expression of legislative intent. And as Merrick 
Garland notes, the risk that a court may “substitute its judgment for the  
agency’s . . . inhere[s] in a court’s determination of which of several statutory 
purposes the legislature considered most important.”403 Therefore, while 
interpreting ambiguous legislation, “the court may be tempted to substitute its own 
hierarchy of values for that of Congress.”404 
This Section argues more narrowly that, if a court makes an erroneous 
determination that a statute is unambiguous, its de novo interpretation of that 
statute may in fact constitute policymaking. This mistaken determination, made at 
Chevron Step One in a handful of cases, offers another opportunity for the decider 
model of judicial administration. The rest of this Part suggests, on the basis of 
examples, that porous determinations of unambiguity at Chevron Step One have 
already moved the judicial administration of statutory implementation toward the 
decider approach. 
Statutory ambiguity signals that Congress has delegated to the agency the 
power to “fill statutory gaps” via policy.405 Therefore, once the court has dispensed 
with Mead,406 its first step under Chevron is to determine whether the statute at issue 
is ambiguous. As Kristin Hickman argues, “Chevron step one, properly understood, 
already strongly resembles de novo review”407—and, in this way, allows a court to 
forgo deference if it determines that Congress did not intend the agency to exercise 
policymaking power. 
When a statute delegates policymaking power to an agency via ambiguity,408 
“the only question of law presented to the courts is whether the agency has acted 
within the scope of its discretion—i.e., whether its resolution of the ambiguity is 
reasonable.”409 Conversely, without ambiguity, an agency official has no discretion; 
in other words, “clear legislative meaning will always make unlawful any agency 
action that conflicts with that meaning.”410 Therefore, if a court’s claim that a statute 
is unambiguous is feeble, the court may, in fact, be engaging in policymaking under 
the guise of declaring the legislature’s clear intent. 
 
403. Garland, supra note 230, at 558. 
404. Id. Accordingly, there is an “overlooked cost of eliminating or narrowing Chevron 
deference: such reform could result in partisanship playing a larger role in judicial review of agency 
statutory interpretations.” Barnett et al., supra note 372, at 1464. 
405. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984); see also 
Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 870-72 (2001); Scalia, 
supra note 327, at 516-17.  
406. See supra text accompanying notes 378-385. 
407. Kristin E. Hickman, SOPRA? So What? Chevron Reform Misses the Target Entirely, 14  
U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 580, 587 (2018). 
408. Whether this refers to ambiguity as a general matter, or ambiguity as to whether Congress 
authorized the agency to make policy under the law, while highly contested by those who read Chevron, 
does not matter much in the doctrine’s practical application; in either case, agencies have some claim 
to policymaking power. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 405, at 833. 
409. Scalia, supra note 327, at 516. 
410. Coglianese, supra note 386, at 1344. 
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It is important to note that this Section assumes that there are tools for 
determining whether statutory ambiguity exists. The determination of ambiguity is 
difficult, to say the least.411 There is a robust literature debating the legitimacy of 
various cannons of statutory interpretation as they relate to the determination of 
ambiguity at Chevron Step One.412 The debate as to whether textualism, purposivism, 
or any other mode of interpretation—including newer modalities of cost-benefit 
analysis413—should be deployed is both highly relevant to the determination of 
statutory ambiguity at Step One and, regrettably, beyond the scope of this Section 
to arbitrate. Rather than engaging in deliberation about how to determine whether 
a statute is ambiguous, this Section assumes that a statute may, theoretically, be 
identified as ambiguous by a court.414 More specifically, this Section relies on the 
views of distinguished commentators—including courts of appeals decisions and 
dissenting Supreme Court Justices—that characterize a court decision as having 
wrongfully deemed a statute unambiguous. 
Sturgeon v. Frost II,415 decided recently, illustrates not only the strong 
inclinations of several Justices who favor de novo review but also a seeming 
indifference in the rest toward the potential for courts to be policymakers as a result. 
In this case, the entire Supreme Court interpreted the statutory language “public 
lands” in the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act to exclude navigable 
waters.416 In doing so, the Court invalidated the National Park Service’s national 
regulations concerning these waters.417 However, the divergent justifications of the 
majority and the concurrence are telling. 
In the majority opinion, Justice Kagan declined to defer to the agency’s 
interpretation of “public land” as inclusive of navigable waters because this language 
unambiguously excludes navigable waters.418 However, the Ninth Circuit, in the 
decision below, relied extensively on precedent interpreting this statute to conclude 
 
411. As Scalia once declared in regard to Step One, “How clear is clear? It is here, if Chevron is 
not abandoned, that the future battles over acceptance of agency interpretations of law will be fought.” 
Scalia, supra note 327, at 520-21. 
412. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 325, at 71 (noting that “it is not easy to identify a canon of 
construction to settle the question how to interpret the word ‘[statutory] source,’” the terminology at 
issue in Chevron); Sunstein, supra note 307 (arguing that textualism is the correct approach to 
determining ambiguity at Chevron Step One); Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of Chevron 
from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725 (2007) (noting that the Supreme Court has moved to 
a textualist approach at Chevron Step One). 
413. See Sunstein, supra note 325, at 73 (discussing this new “canon” of statutory interpretation 
deployed by courts). 
414. If Cass Sunstein may make this assumption, I, too, am so emboldened. See Sunstein, supra 
note 307, at 1613. 
415. 139 S. Ct. 1066 (2019). 
416. Id. at 1085–87. 
417. Id. 
418. “Because we see, for the reasons given below, no ambiguity as to Section 103(c)’s meaning, 
we cannot give deference to the Park Service’s contrary construction.” Sturgeon II, 139 S. Ct. at  
1080 n.3. 
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that the navigable water in question was indeed “public land.”419 The disagreement 
between the Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court as to the meaning of “public land” 
suggests that the term is ambiguous. 
In addition, the concurrence, written by Justice Sotomayor and joined by 
Justice Ginsburg, noted as well that the language is ambiguous.420 Nonetheless, they 
join the majority because its reading of the statutory language is “cogent,” and 
because of “the important regulatory pathways that the Court’s decision leaves open 
for future exploration.”421 That the Court engaged in policymaking does not mean 
that the decision was wrong.422 It means, simply, that since the language at issue was 
ambiguous, the Supreme Court’s interpretation constituted policymaking, rather 
than an expression of evident legislative intent. 
Likewise, in Carcieri v. Salazar, the Court held in 2009 that the Indian 
Reorganization Act of 1934 did not apply to tribes not recognized at the time of the 
statute’s creation, which meant that it invalidated the Department of the Interior’s 
long-standing policy of taking land into trust for Indian tribes recognized after that 
time.423 The matter in dispute concerned the statutory term “now.”424 The statute 
allows the Department of the Interior to take land into trust for “all persons of 
Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now under  
Federal jurisdiction.”425 
“[A] majority of the Court found the meaning of the statute clear.”426 More 
specifically, Justice Thomas drew on a textualist/originalist approach to decide that 
“‘now under Federal jurisdiction’ refers to a tribe that was under federal jurisdiction 
at the time of the statute’s enactment.”427 
However, the “concurrence found the statute ambiguous.”428 Justice Breyer 
noted in concurrence that “now under Federal jurisdiction” could also “refer to the 
time the Secretary of the Interior exercises his authority to take land ‘for 
Indians.’”429 Likewise, those in dissent both agreed with this latter construction and 
also argued that this language is tangential to the crux of the matter.430 
 
419. Sturgeon v. Frost, 872 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. 2017), rev’d, 139 S. Ct. 1066. 
420. See Sturgeon II, 139 S. Ct. at 1087-88 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (drawing on H.L.A. Hart’s 
“vehicles in the park” exercise to suggest that statutory language at issue is ambiguous). 
421. Id. at 1088 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
422. Arguably, the fact that all nine Justices ultimately signed on to the policy outcome (albeit 
for different reasons) suggests the outcome is correct, or at least supported by a number of great legal 
minds. See generally id. 
423. 555 U.S. 379 (2009). 
424. Id. at 388. 
425. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. § 479 (emphasis added). 
426. Hickman, supra note 395, at 542. 
427. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 382; see also id. at 388 (examining the meaning of the term “now” as 
defined by Webster’s New International Dictionary and Black’s Law Dictionary in 1934 and  
1933, respectively). 
428. Hickman, supra note 395, at 542. 
429. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 396 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
430. See id. at 402 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Yet to my mind, whether ‘now’ means 1934 (as the 
Court holds) or the present time (as respondents would have it) sheds no light on the question whether 
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Per the formalism/textualism of Justice Kavanaugh,431 the disagreement 
between the majority and the concurrence as to the meaning of the term “now” 
reveals the ambiguity of this term. Despite this seeming ambiguity, however, the 
majority declined to defer to the agency’s interpretation of the term “now.”432 
Instead, it engaged in an independent interpretation of the language. In other words, 
the Court furthered a new administrative policy that invalidated the Department of 
the Interior’s own policy. The concurrence also refused to defer to the agency by 
arguing, under Mead, that Congress did not give the agency the authority to interpret 
the term “now.”433 This analysis, too, suffers from indeterminacy that offers a 
pathway to judicial policymaking.434 More broadly, both Sturgeon II and Carcieri 
suggest that, as a result of a loosened application of Chevron Step One, the judiciary 
has engaged in policymaking recently, for better or for worse.435 
This route to judicial policymaking is not new. In 1994, in Brown v. Gardner, 
the Court unanimously invalidated a Department of Veterans Affairs regulation 
based on its own statutory interpretation.436 Despite the longevity of the 
regulation437 and legislative silence on whether it comports with a statute passed in 
1934,438 the Court declared that the regulation misread ambiguity into the statute,439 
thus reversing a sixty-year-old policy. Some suggest that the Court did so in order 
 
the Secretary’s actions on behalf of the Narragansett were permitted under the statute.”); id. at 400 
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Nothing in the majority opinion forecloses the 
possibility that the two concepts, recognition and jurisdiction, may be given separate content.”). 
431. See supra text accompanying note 401; Kavanaugh, supra note 326, at 2144 (discussing the 
model of judge as umpire). 
432. Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 396. 
433. Id. at 396-97 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“These circumstances indicate that Congress did not 
intend to delegate interpretive authority to the Department. Consequently, its interpretation is not 
entitled to Chevron deference, despite linguistic ambiguity.” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 
U.S. 218, 227, 229–30 (2001))); see also Hickman, supra note 395, at 542–53 (noting that while Justice 
Breyer conceded the term “now” is ambiguous, he nonetheless declined to defer to the agency  
under Chevron). 
434. See supra text accompanying notes 386-388. 
435. Matthew Sanders, Sizing up Sturgeon v. Frost, A.B.A. (May 10, 2019), https://
www.americanbar.org/groups/environment_energy_resources/publications/trends/2018-2019/may 
-june-2019/sizing-up-sturgeon/ [https://perma.cc/FCS5-4DSD]  (noting that Sturgeon II eliminates 
the National Park Service’s ability to regulate hovercrafts on certain waters); Bethany C. Sullivan  
& Jennifer L. Turner, Enough Is Enough: Ten Years of Carcieri v. Salazar, 40 PUB. LAND  
& RES. L. REV. 37, 37 (2019) (arguing that “Carcieri has been weaponized by states, local governments, 
citizens’ groups, individuals, corporations, and even other tribes, to challenge the exercise of  
tribal sovereignty”). 
436. 513 U.S. 115 (1994). 
437. Id. at 122 (“[W]e dispose of the Government’s argument that the [agency’s] regulatory 
interpretation . . . deserves judicial deference due to its undisturbed endurance for 60 years.”). 
438. Id. at 120-21 (“The Government contends that . . . Congress’s legislative silence as to the 
[agency’s] regulatory practice over the last 60 years serves as an implicit endorsement of its  
fault-based policy.”). 
439. Id. at 117-18 (“Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of statutory 
context, and this context negates a fault reading [that is, the agency’s interpretation of the statute].” 
(citations omitted)); see also Federal Statutes and Regulations, 124 HARV. L. REV. 340, 388 (2010) 
(characterizing the decision in Gardner as “based on a narrow textual reading”). 
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to enshrine a more “veteran-friendly” approach to government policies—in 
particular, one that allows a veteran-friendly interpretation to prevail over the 
agency’s interpretation when a statute is ambiguous.440 
In 1990, in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, the Court denied deference 
to the Office of Management and Budget’s long-standing policy of allowing it to 
review and countermand agency regulations mandating disclosure by regulated 
entities directly to third parties.441 More specifically, the Court decided that that the 
Paperwork Reduction Act is “clear and unambiguous on the question whether it 
applies to agency directives to private parties to collect specified information and 
disseminate or make it available to third parties.”442 In response, the dissent called 
this determination of unambiguity “questionable”;443 argued that the agency’s 
interpretation merits deference;444 and declared further that “[i]f Chevron is to have 
meaning, it must apply when a statute is as ambiguous on the issue at hand as the 
[Paperwork Reduction Act] is on the subject of disclosure requirements.”445 Some 
characterize this case as illustrative of the Court’s reluctance to allow an agency to 
determine the scope of its own jurisdiction.446 Others suggest, however, that the 
Court initiated this policy to curb the Office of Management and Budget,447 a 
powerful White House agency that furthers presidential administration. 
 
440. See James D. Ridgway, Toward a Less Adversarial Relationship Between Chevron and 
Gardner, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 388, 393–94 (2014); Linda D. Jellum, The United States Court of Appeals 
for Veterans Claims: Has It Mastered Chevron’s Step Zero?, 3 VETERANS L. REV. 67, 70 (2011) 
(describing Gardner as a doctrine advising that “interpretive doubt should be resolved in the veteran’s 
favor”); Linda D. Jellum, Heads I Win, Tails You Lose: Reconciling Brown v. Gardner’s Presumption 
that Interpretive Doubt Be Resolved in Veterans’ Favor with Chevron, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 59 (2011) 
(noting that the conflict between Chevron and “Gardner’s Presumption” has led to the quandary of 
“[w]hich interpretation controls when a statute is ambiguous¾the agency’s reasonable interpretation 
or the veteran’s interpretation?”). 
441. 494 U.S. 26 (1990). 
442. Id. at 43–44 (White, J., dissenting). 
443. Id. at 43 (White, J., dissenting) (noting skeptically that the Court required “more than 10 
pages, including a review of numerous statutory provisions and legislative history,” to come to this 
conclusion); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 
1000 n.129 (1992) (noting that in Dole v. United Steelworkers, the Court rejected the “Office of 
Management and Budget’s construction of the Paperwork Reduction Act largely on the basis of 
structural arguments and canons of construction”); Jellum, supra note 412, at 756–57 (characterizing 
the Court’s statutory interpretation as “intentionalist”). “Given his general textualist approach, it is 
indeed odd that Justice Scalia signed onto this opinion, which represented everything about statutory 
interpretation with which he disagreed.” Id. 
444. “Since the statute itself is not clear and unambiguous, the legislative history is muddy at 
best, and [the Office of Management and Budget] has given the statute what I believe is a permissible 
construction, I cannot agree with the outcome the Court reaches.” Dole, 494 U.S. at 53 (White,  
J., dissenting). 
445. Id. 
446. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These 
Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731, 749 n.139 (2014); Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets  
Youngstown: National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1934 (2012). 
447. See, e.g., Pamela M. Foster, A Limit to OMB’s Authority Under the Paperwork Reduction 
Act in Dole v. United Steelworkers of America: A Step in the Right Direction, 6  
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 153 (1992). 
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Also in 1990, in Sullivan v. Zebley,448 the Court required the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to revise and create several regulations in response to the 
Court’s new reading of the relevant statute.449 The Zebley majority accepted the 
lower court’s determination that the statute at issue is unambiguous.450 In response, 
the dissent in this case implored the majority to reconsider its assumption that 
legislative intent is clear in this case.451 In doing so, it argues, as have other 
commentators, that the statute is unambiguous and therefore the agency’s 
reasonable interpretation should stand.452 As a result of “Zebley, the [Social Security 
Administration, which at the time was part of the Department of Health and 
Human Services,] revised the rules used to evaluate childhood disability claims, 
promulgating several new regulations.”453 Here, there is a lack of clarity as to 
whether the Court is rejecting the agency’s interpretation at Chevron Step One or 
Step Two.454 To the extent it is the latter, the Court’s decision is that much more 
surprising, given that courts tend to defer to agencies at Step Two.455 
Again, the analysis in this Section offers no value judgment as to whether the 
Court’s decision was correct. Perhaps the Court stepped in righteously to fill a gap 
in the statute that was unanticipated by the enacting Congress—the coverage of 
disabled children for the relevant social security benefits when only adults were 
considered in the text. Rather, this framing suggests that the Court’s reinterpretation 
of the statute and refutation of the Secretary’s regulations do not reflect clear 
legislative intent, but rather, were acts of policymaking. 
Addled by the Court’s policymaking, agencies have gone to Congress to 
demand a clarification. For instance, in Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the Supreme Court applied an ordinary-meaning analysis to hold that 
the Treasury Amendment to the Commodity Exchange Act exempts off-exchange 
 
448. 493 U.S. 521 (1990). 
449. See generally Amber R. Anderson, Disabled Without Benefits: The Impacts of Recent Social 
Security Reforms on Disabled Children, 41 B.C. L. REV. 125, 130–31 (1999) (discussing the new  
multi-step regulatory process that resulted from the Zebley decision). 
450. See Zebley, 493 U.S. at 527 (“Although the Court of Appeals recognized that the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the statute is entitled to deference, it rejected the regulations as contrary to clear 
congressional intent.”). 
451. Id. at 542 (White, J., dissenting) (“We [must] first ask whether Congress has expressed a 
clear intent on the question at issue here; if so, we should enforce that intent. If not, as I think is the 
case, we should defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is permissible.”). 
452. Id.; see also Merrill, supra note 443, at 991 (citing Zebley to support the argument that the 
Chevron “‘plain meaning’ inquiry has tended in practice to devolve into an inquiry about whether the 
statute as a whole generates a clearly preferred meaning” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)). 
453. Anderson, supra note 449, at 131. 
454. See Russell L. Weaver, Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129, 131–32 (1993) 
(citing Zebley to support the contention that “the Court has been quite willing to reject agency 
interpretations, and the Court is often reluctant to ‘defer’ in the sense of accepting a reasonable agency 
interpretation when it prefers an alternative interpretation” (footnote omitted)). 
455. Shah, supra note 1, at 671 n.140 (“Step Two of the Chevron analysis, at which point the 
court decides whether an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statute is reasonable, tends to be 
permissive; generally, the agency’s interpretation [stands] at that level.” (citations omitted)). 
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trading in foreign currency options from Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
regulation.456 In part because this ruling “served to encourage the continuation of 
widespread fraud in retail [over-the-counter] futures and options on currencies,” 
which cuts against the legislative purpose driving the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, the agency beseeched Congress “to regulate dealers selling retail 
foreign exchange futures or options.”457 Eventually, Congress passed this law.458 
On the one hand, it may have done so because the language of the Treasury 
Amendment indeed lent itself to only the Court’s interpretation proffered in Dunn. 
On the other hand, this chain of events offers the possibility that Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Treasury Amendment was an iteration of legislative 
policymaking that Congress eventually thwarted. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Court can limit agencies’ policymaking 
authority by rebuking their efforts as an infringement on the legislature, while also 
limiting the scope of its own legislative policymaking. For example, in Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. Dimension Financial Corp., the Court rejected 
the agency’s interpretation at Step One of the Chevron inquiry459 by disputing the 
Federal Reserve Board’s interpretation of the term “banks” in legislation designed 
to regulate financial institutions.460 More specifically, the Board stated that “banks” 
includes financial institutions that are “functionally equivalent” to banks, while the 
Court disagreed.461 
The Court went on to declare that “[r]ather than defining ‘bank’ as an 
institution that offers the functional equivalent of banking services, however, 
Congress defined with specificity certain transactions that constitute banking subject 
to regulation”—in other words, that Congress intended to apply the plain meaning 
of banks and not its extension to nonbank institutions.462 “The statute may be 
 
456. 519 U.S. 465, 470–71 (1997); see also Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates  
Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 786 
(1999); Thomas A. Tormey, Note, A Derivatives Dilemma: The Treasury Amendment Controversy and the 
Regulatory Status of Foreign Currency Options, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2320 (1997). 
457. Jerry Markham, Regulating the Moneychangers, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 789, 841 (2016). 
458. Id. (noting that “Congress included such authority in the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act of 2000”). 
459. Merrill, supra note 443, at 1034, 1038 app. (characterizing Dimension Financial  
Corp. explicitly as a Step One inquiry); Jonathon Bloomberg, The Chevron Legacy: Young  
v. Community Nutrition Institute Compounds the Confusion, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 113, 122 n.75 (1987) 
(noting that in Dimension Financial Corp., “the Court overruled agency action as violating clear 
congressional intent in a classic application of the first tier of the review framework” (citations 
omitted)); see also id. (listing Dimension Financial Corp. as evidence that Chevron has taken hold of cases 
on financial regulation). 
460. 474 U.S. 361, 367–68 (1986). 
461. Id. at 362; “The Federal Reserve Board had expanded its regulations to encompass 
institutions which offered bank-like services [by reinterpreting] . . . the definition of ‘bank’ found in 
section 2(c) of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). The Court ruled 
that the statutory definition of ‘bank’ clearly precluded the Board’s action.” Bloomberg, supra note 459, 
at 122 n.75. 
462. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 374 (emphasis added); see also Keith R. Fisher, Federalism 
Contra Federal Reservism: Bank Holding Companies and State Bank Powers, 23 U.S.F. L. REV. 317, 318 
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imperfect,” the Court went on to say, “but the Board has no power to correct flaws 
that it perceives in the statute it is empowered to administer. Its rulemaking power 
is limited to adopting regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as 
expressed in the statute.”463 Furthermore, “[t]he Court [also] found itself 
constrained by the Act’s language, stating, ‘If the Bank Holding Company [Act] falls 
short of providing safeguards desirable or necessary to protect the public interest, 
that is a problem for Congress, and not the Board or the courts, to address.’”464 In 
this case, the Court sought to constrain administrative policymaking power while 
also maintaining its own formal boundaries. The policies in question may have 
suffered, but the Court remained in its role of overseer, as opposed to acting as  
a decider. 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
This Article’s primary contribution thus far has been to provide a 
comprehensive framework of judicial administration. This Part earmarks some of 
the potential ramifications of courts administering the law. Like Kagan herself 
admitted of presidential administration, judicial administration might “push past the 
edges of legality.”465 Critics of administrative agencies must grapple with the 
separation-of-powers implications of an uncritical view of judicial oversight, 
particularly of the decider approach to administrative statutory interpretation. 
And yet, despite the potential constitutional consequences of judicial 
administration, it is uniquely suited to combat the transgressions of presidential 
administration. By maintaining or increasing the judiciary’s power to oversee agency 
adherence to due process and rule-of-law values, courts may better constrain 
concerning exercises of presidential power. 
A. The Constitutionality of Judicial Administration 
As noted in the Introduction, there are fervent arguments among academics 
and in popular discourse surrounding the constitutional legitimacy of the 
administrative state. Formalists, in particular, argue for an increase of judicial power 
over agency action because they believe that agencies exercise unconstitutional 
power.466 More specifically, many decrying agency power today focus on enhancing 
judicial control of administrative statutory interpretation.467 
However, the constitutional legitimacy of judicial administration is debatable, 
too. Indeed, judicial administration has the potential to violate the constitutional 
separation of powers, particularly if one abides by a formalist paradigm. 
 
n.9 (1989) (noting that the Court in this case viewed the agency’s statutory interpretation as “at odds 
with the plain meaning of the statute”). 
463. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 374. 
464. Bloomberg, supra note 459, at 122 n.75 (citations omitted). 
465. Farber, supra note 207, at 4. 
466. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
467. See supra notes 325–332 and accompanying text. 
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By condemning the judicial augmentation of informal rulemaking procedures, 
Vermont Yankee articulated a formalist rebuke of judicial policymaking—that is, of 
the decider model of judicial administration in this context.468 Likewise, the Chevron 
doctrine, which guides the judiciary to defer to policies based in agencies’ 
interpretations of statute, restrains judicial policymaking somewhat.469 And yet, 
many formalists call for the dilution or elimination of Chevron deference, thus 
advocating for the decider model of judicial administration—that is, for a stronger 
norm of judicial policymaking.470 Although Chevron still stands, its dilution by 
Mead471 and at Step One472 has led to an increase in judicial policymaking. If agencies 
indeed exercise constitutional power (be it legislative473 or executive474), then the 
decider model of judicial administration is outside the scope of the judiciary’s formal 
constitutional jurisdiction and an infringement on the legislative475 or executive 
branches,476 including in the context of statutory interpretation/implementation. 
To the extent judicial review of constitutional due process is based in the 
overseer model, as argued earlier,477 it, like the overseer model of presidential 
administration,478 is less objectionable under a formal separation-of-powers 
framework. It is inconsistent, then, that formalists have argued for limits to judicial 
oversight of administrative due process and individual rights in the past,479 but now 
advocate deeply for enhancing courts’ ability to make policy decisions via  
statutory interpretation.480 
Instead of this paradoxical approach to judicial review, formalists might make 
the linchpin of their advocacy the idea that the legislature reclaim certain 
administrative responsibilities.481 But this tack, too, has its problems. As Hickman 
and Bednar suggest, 
 
468. See supra Section I.B. 
469. See supra Section II.B. 
470. See John Yoo & James C. Phillips, With Kavanaugh, the Court Should Tame the 
Administrative State, NAT’L REV. (Oct. 25, 2018, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/
10/supreme-court-brett-kavanaugh-administrative-state/ [https://perma.cc/YC2V-5P89]  (“Our 
constitutional system has the genius of diffusing power among three branches of the national 
government . . . . [F]orsaking the Founders’ limits on government in the name of administrative ease 
would bring far more ruin than failing to attend to the popular policy of the day.”). 
471. See supra Section II.B.1. 
472. See supra Section II.B.2. 
473. See supra note 319 and accompanying text. 
474. See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
475. Lemos, supra note 358, at 408 (noting that “just as agencies exercise a lawmaking function 
when they fill in the gaps left by broad statutory delegations of power, so too do courts”). 
476. Cooper, supra note 274, at 596-98. 
477. See supra Part I. 
478. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. 
479. See generally supra Part I. 
480. See generally supra Part II. 
481. See Bednar & Hickman, supra note 315, at 1461 (“To the extent that courts and 
commentators want to curtail the administrative state, they should focus their efforts on rolling back 
congressional delegations of policymaking discretion to agency officials rather than overturning 
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[U]nless Congress chooses to assume substantially more responsibility for 
making policy choices itself or the courts decide to seriously reinvigorate 
the nondelegation doctrine—neither of which seems remotely likely—at 
least some variant of Chevron deference will be essential to guide and assist 
courts from intruding too deeply into a policy sphere . . . .482 
To formalists’ dismay, courts may continue to “defer” to agencies’ 
interpretations of statute as a functional matter even in the event that Chevron falls, 
in order to limit judicial involvement in legislative policymaking,483 particularly in a 
world where the nondelegation doctrine remains permissive.484 Courts may 
continue to maintain “the line between law and policy in administrative law” and to 
limit their intervention to problems associated with the former, as Jeffrey 
Pojanowski advises they do.485 A more sound approach to curtailing Chevron might 
be to bolster doctrines of judicial oversight that are in tension with it, such as hard 
look review.486 
All of this having been said, judicial administration—even the decider 
model—does not constitute an infringement on the legislature if one takes a more 
functional view of the separation of powers.487 Functionalists do not have cause to 
 
Chevron.”); Aaron L. Nielson, Confessions of an “Anti-Administrativist,” 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 4-5 
(2017) (arguing that some anti-administrativists are already looking to Congress to curb agency power). 
482. Bednar & Hickman, supra note 315, at 1398; see also Metzger, The Roberts Court, supra note 
60 (noting that “bold assertions of administrative authority stem in part from Congress’s inability to 
address pressing problems, with political polarization, intense partisanship, and near parity between the 
main parties often leading to legislative gridlock”). 
483. See Hickman, supra note 407, at 580, 590 (arguing that even if Chevron is overturned, “once 
a statutory question crosses into the policymaking sphere, many if not most judges and justices are 
uncomfortable with making what they recognize as fundamentally policy-based decisions rather than 
traditional interpretive ones. In such cases, their inclination will be to defer to the agency”); Jeffrey  
A. Pojanowski, Without Deference, 81 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2016) (arguing that, even if Chevron did 
not exist, courts would continue to distinguish between legal interpretation and policymaking); Sunstein, 
supra note 325, at 79 (“[A]fter a lengthy and difficult cleanup operation, and after adoption of novel 
formulations, the framework that would ultimately replace Chevron would be likely to operate, in 
practice, a fair bit like that in Chevron itself.”). 
484. See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70  
U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003). 
485. Pojanowski, supra note 323, at 884 (advocating for a theory of law which would “increase[e] 
judicial responsibility on questions of law while decreasing it on matters involving  
policymaking discretion”). 
486. For example, in Encino Motorcars, the Court declined to apply Chevron to a statutory 
interpretation where the agency failed hard look. See supra note 245 and accompanying text; see also 
Richard W. Murphy, Abandon Chevron and Modernize Stare Decisis for the Administrative State, 69 
ALA. L. REV. 1, 31 n.188 (2017). Conversely, Chevron may moderate hard look review. Paul R. Verkuil, 
The Wait Is Over: Chevron as the Stealth Vermont Yankee II, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 921, 929 (2007). 
487. See supra text accompanying notes 62-66. 
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be overly troubled by judicial administration, except to the extent that it creates 
functional problems488 or leads to partisan outcomes.489 
Functionalists might cheer an intensification in either the overseer or decider 
models of judicial administration, depending on their impact on the quality of 
administrative function. For instance, as the next Section suggests, amplifying the 
overseer model could lead to greater fairness in administrative process and more 
expert and uniform policies. Formalists, too, might focus their advocacy for judicial 
power on enhancing the overseer model, to curb the administrative state while 
reducing potential separation-of-powers problems. 
B. Judicial Vis-à-Vis Presidential Administration 
This Article concludes with thoughts on the potential interaction between 
judicial and presidential administration. In some cases, conflicts between judicial 
and administrative policymaking represent a clash of judicial and executive powers. 
Justice Kagan has argued that “courts should attempt, through their articulation of 
administrative law, to recognize and promote” presidential administration.490 For 
instance, she and others suggest courts should accede to the President in the view 
of those that support the political accountability theories of hard look491 or 
Chevron,492 or that advocate more generally for a unitary executive.493 
In addition, presidential administration may shape or constrain judicial 
administration. At its most literal, the executive branch can harness the judiciary. 
For instance, judges themselves might be appointed by the President to directly 
serve in an executive agency;494 unlike members of Congress, there is no clear 
proscription against the appointment of judges into nonjudicial offices (although 
commentators have likewise raised separation-of-powers concerns about the 
practice,495 and the Supreme Court has suggested that judicial participation in 
 
488. See supra note 66 (discussing functionalist concerns with judicial review of agencies such as 
ossification and inferior judicial expertise). More broadly, courts’ own interest in administering the law 
may vary across agencies; indeed, some agencies are known for garnering far less judicial oversight than 
others. John C. Kilwein & Richard A. Brisbin Jr., Supreme Court Review of Federal Administrative 
Agencies, 80 JUDICATURE 130, 132 (1996) (outlining which agencies appear before the court the most 
and their relative success). 
489. See Shah, supra note 1, at 668–69 (offering analysis of decisions written by Justices Gorsuch 
and Kavanaugh that suggest the Supreme Court is susceptible to political capture). 
490. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2363 (arguing that “courts should attempt, through their 
articulation of administrative law, to recognize and promote” presidential administration). 
491. Id. at 2380. 
492. See supra note 372 and accompanying text. 
493. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 2271-72 (articulating ways in which unitary executive theorists 
argue that courts should accord legislative and administrative power to the President). For an oft-cited 
treatise espousing unitary executive theory, see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 1. 
494. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (discussing appointment of judges 
to the U.S. Sentencing Commission). 
495. See, e.g., WILLOUGHBY, supra note 30, at 220-21; Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Morrison  
v. Olson: A Modest Assessment, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 255, 273 (1989) (arguing that the Mistretta decision 
went beyond the permissible role of the judiciary). 
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policymaking is more acceptable if the policy concerns a “uniquely judicial 
subject”).496 These examples involve judges administering the law not as judges but, 
rather, as agency officials bringing to bear their judicial expertise. 
The President might also limit judicial intervention by inoculating agencies 
from judicial review. Increased presidential power over agencies, beginning with the 
conferral of agency-reorganization power on the President497 and including a 
growth in political staff498 and more aggressive presidential leadership,499 has 
rendered administrative agencies more “executive” in nature, for better or for 
worse. This may limit or interfere with the judiciary’s role in guiding agencies’ 
implementation of the law. 
And yet, where presidential administration fails in terms of consistency or 
ethical leadership, or otherwise in the view of those less amenable to a unitary 
executive,500 judicial administration may encourage more equitable administrative 
processes, stable precedent, and adherence to the rule of law in agency decision-
making.501 Increasing judicial oversight could stem the use (or misuse) of process to 
justify and obscure an increase in executive power,502 by holding agencies 
accountable to constitutional norms and the expectations of positive law.503 For 
instance, greater judicial control over the development and application of agency 
processes and expertise could improve the administration of law, particularly  
 
496. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 408. 
497. Herbert Kaufman, Emerging Conflicts in the Doctrines of Public Administration, 50  
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1057, 1066 (1956).  
498. Id.; see Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, Agency Design and Political Control, 126 
YALE L.J. 1002, 1037 (2017) (“There is [empirical] evidence that presidents seek to increase the number 
or proportion of political appointees in agencies that would otherwise be ideologically opposed to 
them.”); White, supra note 275, at 1403. 
499. See Kaufman, supra note 497, at 1070 (“Much of our legislation originates in administrative 
agencies, and most proposed legislation is submitted to such agencies to determine what the President’s 
position on it ought to be.”); PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON ADMIN. MGMT., ADMINISTRATIVE 
MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 29-30, 36 (1937) (discussing 
President Roosevelt’s contention that agencies should be wholly under control of the President); see, 
e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, Cost-Nothing Analysis: Environmental Economics in the Age of Trump, 30  
COLO. NAT. RES. ENERGY & ENV’T L. REV. 287 (2019) (discussing President Trump’s executive order 
on regulatory review and his broad control over certain agencies, namely the Environmental  
Protection Agency). 
500. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the New Presidentialism, 22 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 227, 227-28 (1998) (discussing the dangers of the unitary executive thesis). 
501. See Randy J. Kozel & Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Administrative Change, 59 UCLA L. REV. 112, 
157 (2011). 
502. See supra notes 127–130 and accompanying text. 
503. See, e.g., William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth Amendment, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1849–50 (2016) (discussing how courts hold agencies accountable to the 
Fourth Amendment). 
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if agencies’ rush to further the President’s agenda504 results in sloppy  
administrative action.505 
The promise that judicial administration holds for curbing the excesses of 
presidential administration is, as of yet, unrealized. The Court has, in some cases, 
curtailed executive branch policies, both presidential and administrative, via 
oversight of agency adherence to the requirements of constitutional due process 
and of the APA506—but perhaps most notably only when the breach has  
been egregious.507 
In a number of recent cases, however, the Court has declined to intervene in 
policymaking resulting from presidential administration. For example, although 
President Trump’s immigration ban on the residents of several countries debased 
constitutional principles, the Court subjugated the Establishment Clause to the 
President’s plenary power in immigration law, instead of engaging with the potential 
constitutional violation associated with suspension of the entry of Muslim people 
into the United States.508 Likewise, the Court let stand President Trump’s diversion 
of funds toward the construction of a border wall, in the wake of his declaration of 
a national emergency.509 Instead of contending with the potential statutory and 
constitutional implications of these actions, the Court dismissed the application for 
a stay on the grounds that the plaintiff had no cause of action, thereby effectively 
acquiescing to the President.510 
 
504. Katyal, supra note 69, at 2317 (“[T]he risks of unchecked executive power have grown to 
the point where dispatch has become a worn-out excuse for capricious activity.”). 
505. Buzbee, supra note 244, at 1360 (“Changes [in regulation] cannot be unjustified, purely 
political, or unacknowledged.” (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 1381-1417 (discussing various forms 
of sloppy policymaking happening at the whims of President Trump); Yvette M. Barksdale, The 
Presidency and Administrative Value Selection, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 332–33 (1993) (arguing that 
allowing the President to manage agencies interferes with the administrative value determination);  
cf. Sunstein, supra note 213, at 463-65 (discussing how “the federal courts have also acted as an 
important check on administrative agencies,” primarily through the “hard-look doctrine” (footnote 
omitted)); Farber, supra note 207, at 5–6 (noting that Kagan predicted a growing “disregard for scientific 
expertise” as a result of presidential administration). 
506. In a few recent examples, the Court has invalidated a presidential directive by declaring the 
resulting rule as suffering from an insufficient notice-and-comment process. See supra text 
accompanying notes 20-21, 203-204 (discussing Azar v. Allina Health Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019), 
and the DAPA case, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)). 
507. See, e.g., Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891 (2020); 
Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019) (holding that an agency’s action is 
illegitimate under the APA because it was based on pretext); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510–39 
(2004) (holding that neither national security nor separation-of-powers principles allows the executive 
branch to violate the Fifth Amendment due process of an American citizen by holding detaining him 
indefinitely); see also supra notes 7-14; 248-262 and accompanying text; Sunstein, supra note 213, at 486 
(noting that “judicial control is at best a partial safeguard against administrative malfeasance”). 
508. See generally Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
509. See generally Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019). 
510. See Steve Vladeck, Academic Highlight: The Quiet Doctrinal Shift (Likely) Behind the  
Border-Wall Stay, SCOTUSBLOG ( July 27, 2019, 11:16 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/07/
academic-highlight-the-quiet-doctrinal-shift-likely-behind-the-border-wall-stay/ [https://perma.cc/ 
Z3QA-GMYY]  (“[T]he decision is part of a larger, emerging trend . . . one in which the solicitor 
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Some cases remain open, but it appears unlikely that the Court will interfere 
with agencies’ pursuit of the President’s agenda.511 For instance, fueled by a desire 
to express disapproval of a lower court’s use of a nationwide injunction,512 the Court 
declined recently to stay a controversial Department of Homeland Security 
regulation513 that furthered President Trump’s restrictionist immigration goals.514 
The Court chose to sustain this policy, before a final evaluation of its legitimacy, 
despite the fact that it both dramatically altered the meaning of long-standing 
immigration legislation and, by some accounts, infringes on constitutional norms.515 
This suggests the Court does not take these concerns seriously. 
In addition, it appears unlikely that the Court will delegitimize the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s recent rescission of the Clean Power Plan rules 
issued at the behest of President Trump, despite concerns that it might be arbitrary 
and capricious,516 given that the rule was issued two years after the notice of 
proposed rulemaking without any pushback from the Court in the interim.517 In 
 
general has been unusually aggressive in seeking emergency or extraordinary relief from the justices, 
and the court, or at least a majority thereof, has largely acquiesced.”). 
511. See supra notes 128–129 and accompanying text. 
512. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599 (2020) (referring derogatorily to 
the nationwide injunction against the Department of Homeland Security issued by a district court in 
the Second Circuit). 
513. See generally Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292 (Aug. 14, 2019) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 103, 212, 213, 214, 245, 248). 
514. Michael D. Shear & Emily Baumgaertner, Trump Administration Aims to Sharply Restrict 
New Green Cards for Those on Public Aid, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/09/22/us/politics/immigrants-green-card-public-aid.html [https://perma.cc/BQ5E-L3XR]  
(noting the new rule is the “latest in a series of aggressive crackdowns by President Trump and his  
hard-line aides on legal and illegal immigration”); Ed Kilgore, Trump Moves Ahead with Ban on Public 
Assistance for Legal Immigrants, N.Y.: INTELLIGENCER (Aug. 12, 2019), https://nymag.com 
/intelligencer/2019/08/trump-seeks-ban-on-public-assistance-for-legal-immigrants.html [https:// 
perma.cc/QX86-G3NA]  (noting that the new rule is “central to the administration’s strategy of 
reducing legal as well as illegal immigration”). 
515. See Kilgore, supra note 514 (suggesting that the new rule impacts citizens and has had a 
“chilling effect on participation in non-cash public-assistance programs”); see also Camilo  
Montoya-Galvez, New Trump Administration Rule Cracks Down on Welfare Benefits Use by Legal 
Immigrants, CBS NEWS (Aug. 12, 2019, 9:09 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/what-is-a-public-
charge-new-trump-administration-rule-cracks-down-on-welfare-use-by-legal-immigrants/ [https:// 
perma.cc/Q3YT-5YNK] (noting that of the over 26,000 comments submitted within a 60-day public 
comment window, “nearly all [were] critical of” the regulation). 
516. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. 
517. The rule was finalized in 2019, supra note 15, while the notice was issued in 2017. Approval 
and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; Virginia; Amendment to Ambient Air Quality 
Standard for Ozone, 82 Fed. Reg. 48,035 (proposed Oct. 16, 2017) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52). 
First to Printer_Shah.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/23/21  1:55 PM 
1194 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1119 
both of these cases, the administrative policies encouraged by the President remain 
in place,518 and in the case of the travel ban, have become more severe.519 
The submissiveness of the Court in these cases suggests that those who view 
judicial intervention as an antidote to unabashed growth in agency or presidential 
power should focus on bolstering the judicial administration of agency processes.520 
Those concerned with growing executive power might promote a more vigorous 
fulfillment of the judiciary’s role in ensuring constitutional due process.521 The 
Court appears willing to consider concerns about the notice-and-comment 
process;522 advocates might pursue such claims with more vigor. More drastically, 
reversing or pulling back on Vermont Yankee could allow the judiciary to require 
more robust rulemaking processes that better constrain the whims of presidential 
administration. For instance, the HBO case,523 if expanded properly, could improve 
public awareness of “ex parte communications from the White House during the 
rulemaking period.”524 Reinvigoration of hard look doctrine525 could encourage 
agencies to conform policies, such as the regulation of safety and greenhouse gases, 
to good science, instead of presidential interests. In addition, as is illustrated by the 
Census case,526 judicial oversight may begin to serve the important function of 
ensuring that agencies behave ethically, regardless of whether they are influenced by 
the President’s agenda.527 
 
518. See RICHARD IRWIN, NAT’L IMMIGR. L. CTR., ONE YEAR AFTER THE SCOTUS  
RULING: UNDERSTANDING THE MUSLIM BAN AND HOW WE’LL KEEP FIGHTING IT (2019) 
(“Unfortunately, the Supreme Court turned a blind eye to the Trump administration’s blatant bigotry 
when it allowed Muslim Ban 3.0 to go into full effect on June 26, 2018.”); Liptak, supra note 127 
(discussing Kerry v. Din); Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, On the Border Wall, the Supreme Court Caves to 
Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/01/opinion/trump-
supreme-court-border-wall.html [https://perma.cc/SS2T-PR5A]  (noting that Trump compared the 
ruling to the Muslim ban cases, saying that in regards to the former, just as in the latter, the Court is 
likely to acquiesce to his policy); Dana Nuccitelli, The Trump EPA Strategy to Undo Clean Power Plan, 
YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS ( June 21, 2019), https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/ 
06/the-trump-epa-strategy-to-undo-the-clean-power-plan/ [https://perma.cc/T55X-SUH8]  (noting 
also that the new regulation will fail to reduce carbon emissions). 
519. See Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Trump Administration Adds Six Countries to Travel Ban,  
N.Y. TIMES ( Oct. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/31/us/politics/trump-travel-
ban.html [https://perma.cc/RTN9-W82B]. 
520. See Molot, supra note 336, at 1246 (arguing that “as the lone constitutional actor with no 
formal role in legislation or law execution the judiciary is the only entity available to place needed limits 
on government administration”). 
521. See supra Section I.A. 
522. See supra text accompanying notes 20-21; 203-204 (discussing Azar v. Allina Health  
Servs., 139 S. Ct. 1804 (2019), and the DAPA case, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)). 
523. Home Box Off., Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also text accompanying 
supra note 182. 
524. Bruff, Presidential Power and Rulemaking, supra note 1, at 503-04. 
525. See supra Section II.B; supra notes 235–236 (noting that hard look does not tend to change 
policy outcomes). 
526. See supra text accompanying notes 254–262 (discussing the Court’s focus on the agency’s 
lack of integrity in Department of Commerce v. New York). 
527. See supra Section II.B.1. 
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CONCLUSION 
Scholars, as led by now-Justice Kagan, have written about presidential 
administration in depth. The instant Article argues that the judiciary, too, 
administers the law. More specifically, it brings to the fore a comprehensive 
framework of “judicial administration.” In doing so, it sheds light on how courts 
sometimes administer in the role of custodian, or overseer, of agency compliance 
with law, while at other times, they assume administrative policymaking authority as 
deciders. Neither approach is inherent to any particular doctrine nor better than its 
complement—at least, from a functionalist perspective. Rather, both may be 
present in any administrative law context, and this Article’s foremost contribution 
is highlighting a long-standing tension between the two. 
In addition, this Article contributes some thoughts on if and when judicial 
administration constitutes overreach. Anti-administrativists should be leery of the 
judiciary’s potential imposition on the other constitutional branches. Despite some 
formalists’ energetic interest in increasing judicial control over the administrative 
state, formal separation-of-powers principles caution against the exuberant transfer 
of policymaking power from agencies to courts. 
To avoid a violation of a formal model of the separation of powers, even anti-
administrativist Justices should calibrate judicial review of statutory interpretation 
to ensure that the judiciary requires agencies to follow Congress’s broad directions 
without implementing a new order in which courts make policy decisions primarily 
on their own. That having been said, reaffirmation of judicial oversight could help 
curtail the most pressing problems caused by and facing the executive branch, 
without offending a formal vision of the constitutional separation of powers. This 
approach might include enhancing the judicial role in ensuring executive compliance 
with constitutional norms, ethical agency conduct, and policymaking based in 
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